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Abstract 
This thesis examines the efforts of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and 
the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to promote regional integration between 1980 
and 2015 in the areas of trade and security. The conceptual framework provides a focused review of 
general and specific literature on two key concepts of regional integration: divergence, and convergence. 
Throughout the thesis, the core focus is on the divergence and convergence of COMESA and SADC.  
The thesis articulates two analytical frameworks: the neoclassical economics approach, and the 
neoclassical realist approach. A historical account focuses on the history of the Preferential Trade 
Agreement (PTA) of 1981 that evolved into COMESA by 1993. A history of Southern Africa’s Frontline 
States (FLS), which evolved into the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) 
in 1980, and later into SADC in 1992, is then provided. The thesis discusses apartheid South Africa’s 
involvement in the 
 
Eastern and Southern African regions. The thesis provides a discussion on the debate on the rationalisation 
processes of these two organisations: COMESA and SADC, between 1991 and 1997.  The thesis next 
expands on the regionalisation processes of COMESA and SADC between 2008 and 2015. The main 
actors and factors assessed involve South Africa’s market-led regional approach, its regional 
developmental role and its economic impact on both regions since it joined SADC in 1994. The thesis 
expands on the two main regional integration approaches adopted by the COMESA–EAC (East African 
Community)–SADC Tripartite bloc (created in 2008) of variable geometry and trade liberalisation, as it 
moved towards its Tripartite Free Trade Area that was signed in June 2015. 
 
The thesis also provides definitions and assumptions of two new theories deployed to strengthen 
the research: i) neoclassical economic regional integration, and ii) neorealist security 
convergence, which are applied in the thesis. The thesis thus expands on how COMESA and SADC 
(as both institution and member states) manage multiple memberships. A central argument of the thesis is 
that multiple memberships have become a stumbling block for convergence. In furtherance of this 
argument, the thesis explains the benefits of regional integration schemes. Therefore assessed, is how 
developing countries are likely to be better served by “North–South” than by “South–South” free trade 
agreements. The analysis is expanded by a discussion of economic convergence in the neoclassical 
economic approach of open trade in regional trade agreements within the Southern African Customs 
Union (SACU) – whose five members all belong to SADC - with the presence of a regional hegemonic 
state: South Africa. To further expand the concept of regionalism to encompass security cooperation, the 
thesis finally assesses COMESA and SADC’s  managing of regional security since the 2008 Tripartite 
Agreement, by employing the concept of regional security complexes.  
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction  
 
1. Purpose and Objectives of the Thesis 
 
The purpose of the thesis is to reach a better understanding of Africa’s efforts at promoting 
regionalisation and its relevance to the continent and for its regions. The thesis therefore attempts 
to provide an overall understanding of integration processes to assess the effectiveness of such 
attempts at regional economic and security integration. Moreover, the thesis draws on the debate 
of divergence and convergence, which can help us better understand and contribute to a more 
effective analysis of the regional transformation discourse and processes in eastern and Southern 
African states over the years. The primary focus of the thesis is on two regional economic 
communities (RECs): the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC), and assesses their attempts at promoting 
regional economic and security integration. The thesis examines their transformation processes 
and their formation through the lenses of regional integration, divergence and convergence. First, 
this chapter explains the rationale for and relevance of the thesis; states the thesis objectives; 
provides the research questions which guide the thesis, outline the research methodology 
deployed in the study, and frames the outline of the thesis. 
 
This thesis makes two main arguments focused on divergence and convergence of regional 
economic integration and, on divergence and convergence of regional security. The first main 
argument of the thesis is premised on the relationship between divergence and convergence of 
regional economic integration policies of COMESA and SADC. The thesis underscores that 
owing to COMESA and SADC’s regional integration policies (of both institutions and member 
states) of free trade agreements, which is largely premised on neoclassical economics linked to 
open markets and free trade, and due to the unequal nature of intra-regional trade, regional trade 
policies will diverge. The thesis therefore posits that because open markets and trade are largely 
premised on neoclassical economics, as also outlined by the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) (now called the WTO) principles, open markets cannot be simply wished away 
since it is part of the real world.  
18 
 
Moreover, the thesis argues that due to the distorting nature of trade that is premised on the 
neoclassical economics approach, economies of  COMESA and SADC member states will also 
diverge and hence under-development and poverty will be experienced and not economic growth. 
The thesis posits that the implementation of effective regional policies of COMESA and SADC 
as regional blocs have the potential to converge regional trade policies, and increase regional 
trade and grow the economies of its member states; granted that such policies take into account 
endogenous factors of growth, such as technology, research, and inputs of smaller industries into 
the outputs of production of regional trade that links clear agreed to rules of origin (ROOs) in 
order to spur real economic growth; and incentivising poorer economies of its member states. The 
argument further stipulates that while a strong economic partner with smaller economies in a 
regional bloc can grow the economies of the smaller economies over a long-run convergence 
period like South Africa attached to SACU; the flipside of the long-run convergence theory is 
that due to the liberal tariffs incorporated by the COMESA-EAC-SADC 2008 Tripartite 
Agreement, smaller economies within this regional grouping that are attached to the SACU bloc 
have diverged the regional integration policies of the COMESA-EAC-SADC 2008 Tripartite 
Agreement. This main argument is adequately supported in discussions provided in the thesis of 
Walter Mattli,
1
 as well as Anthony Venables,
2
 and those of Steve Dowrick and Duc-Tho 
Nguyen,
3
 among other important scholars explained in Chapter (2) under the neoclassical 
economics divergence and convergence debate and applied in Chapter (5) of the thesis. The 
overall findings of this main argument are further assessed in discussions outlined and 
demonstrated in Chapter (5) of the thesis. The second main argument of the thesis underscores 
that the regional security frameworks of COMESA and SADC and also that of the East African 
Community (EAC) can converge regional security mechanisms of its member states, considering 
that there is a regional hegemonic power 
__
 a state with a strong economic and military power that 
has geopolitical interests in pursuit of national interests 
__
 such a regional hegemon has the ability 
to converge regional security of member states within such a regional grouping. This second 
main argument is further assessed in chapter (6) of the thesis. 
 
                                                 
1
 Walter Mattli, The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999). 
2
 Anthony J. Venables, “Regional Integration Agreements: A Force for Convergence or Divergence?” Policy 
Research Working Paper, no. 2260, World Bank (December 1999). 
3
 Steve Dowrick and Duc-Tho Nguyen, “OECD Comparative Economic Growth 1950-85: Catch-Up and 
Convergence”, The American Economic Review, vol. 79, no. 5 (December 1989), pp. 1010-1030. See also, Dan Ben-
David, “Trade and Convergence Among Countries”, Journal of International Economics, vol. 40 (May 1996), pp. 
279-298. 
19 
 
Second, the thesis provides an understanding of the overall regional integration literature and the 
divergence and convergence literature linked to neoclassical economic growth in trade 
liberalisation and is assessed within regional trade agreements in chapter (2). This literature 
allows the researcher to be better equipped to analyse the divergence and convergence debate as 
the main threads and arguments in defining regional economic and security integration. The 
thesis also under this chapter provides definitions and assumptions of two new theories: i) 
neoclassical economic regional integration, and ii) neorealist security convergence, which are 
discussed in chapter (2) to allow further support of the overall literature reviewed in chapter (2).     
 
Third, the thesis provides an assessment of the historical period of the Preferential Trade Area 
(PTA) for eastern and Southern Africa and its formation, which subsequently evolved into 
COMESA. Also provided is a commentary on the historical period and an assessment of the 
Front Line States (FLS) that evolved into the security Organ of SADC. In order to facilitate 
understanding and gauge the extent to which their existence filtered into the new COMESA and 
SADC, the discussion expands on how these institutions evolved during their rationalisation 
process which is also further discussed in chapter (3). The thesis therefore focuses on regional 
and sub-regional cooperation in industrial policy and programming of the PTA that became the 
cornerstone for rapid industrial development in Africa. It was seen as an important mechanism to 
address issues of colonialism and racial discrimination in Rhodesia and confront the apartheid 
regime in South Africa.
4
 The thesis assesses the impact that non-trade barriers had on the 
potential of trade creation for PTA member states. The Southern African Development 
Coordination Conference (SADCC) has conducted trade since 1980, without a trade protocol or 
treaty, and the PTA was formed in 1981 and its Treaty was signed in June 1982. In assessing the 
period between 1980 and 1992, it is thus critical to examine how PTA member states have 
benefited from their treaty. The challenges that both the PTA and SADCC member states faced, 
and in becoming economically and regionally stable will be assessed in chapter (3). The 
establishment of SADC in 1992 and COMESA in 1993 was momentous, owing to the 
destabilisation practices of apartheid South Africa.  
                                                 
4
 Douglas G. Anglin, “Economic Liberation and Regional Cooperation in Southern Africa: SADCC and PTA”, 
International Organization, vol. 37, no. 4 (Autumn 1983), pp. 681-711. See also, Samuel K.B. Asante, “The Years 
of Preparation: Adedeji and the ECA”, in, Asante, African Development: Adebayo Adedeji’s Alternative Strategies 
(Lagos: Spectrum, 1991), p. 21. 
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The PTA’s initial ten states – Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, 
Rwanda, Somalia, Tanzania, and Zambia (in the 1990s Comoros, Djibouti, Lesotho, 
Mozambique, Swaziland, and Uganda joined, followed by Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe), 
and SADCC’s nine states – Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, 
Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe (and later Namibia, which joined SADCC in 1990), were 
forced to consider a difficult decision during the 1990s: whether to incorporate a post-apartheid 
South Africa into COMESA or SADC, or whether to merge into one institution. These processes 
are discussed during the period of rationalisation. Also considered and taken into account are the 
Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and the Common Monetary Area, which were 
established to create a customs union and monetary area for SACU.  
 
Fourth, the thesis discusses COMESA and SADC’s period after the rationalisation process 
(1991–1997) and focuses on the period between 1998 and 2008, and considers what factors led to 
the Tripartite 2008 agreement. It uses the literature on regional integration and convergence to 
help illuminate this period and outlined and discussed in chapter (4). The thesis explains how 
Africa’s regionalisation attempts have further evolved with the adoption of an action plan by the 
African Union (AU) in 2012 for boosting intra-African trade and the creation of a Continental 
Free Trade Area (CFTA), have been accelerated through regional initiatives. Such initiatives 
include the COMESA–EAC–SADC 2008 Tripartite Free Trade Area (FTA). This thesis therefore 
assesses and discusses these issues in depth to provide an understanding of the three RECs: 
COMESA, EAC, and SADC that joined forces on 22 October 2008 to create a Tripartite alliance 
towards Africa’s regional integration efforts, by integrating trade and economic development 
towards a CFTA with an indicative date of 2017, a Continental Customs Union by 2019, an 
African Common Market by 2023, and a Continental Economic and Monetary Union and Pan-
African Parliament by 2028.
5
 Key to their agenda is the implementation and acceleration of trade 
liberalisation; regional infrastructure development programmes in transport, information 
communications technology, energy and water; civil aviation and expansion of trade to alleviate 
poverty and improve the quality of life of their citizens and Africa at large; as well as security.
6
  
 
                                                 
5
 United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), “Assessing Regional Integration in Africa V”, 2012, 
pp. 13-16. 
6
 Danso Kwaku, “The African Economic Community: problems and prospects: the Politics of Economic Integration 
in Africa”, Africa Today (Fall, 1995).   
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Member countries are now faced with various challenges in COMESA and SADC blocs to 
commit to an FTA. Similarly, effective regional economic integration does not only comprise 
intra-regional trade, but numerous other factors, inter alia, transaction costs; infrastructure 
systems such as transport, information and communications; commitment at national government 
level to regional policy and hence to implementation of agreed tariffs; trade creating and trade 
diverting effects; multiple regional arrangements by states; and regional security mechanisms. 
The lack of a workable infrastructure has thus placed a damper on regional integration. Member 
states have indicated that it may be more economically viable to do business with Europe, for 
example, rather than conducting trade inter-regionally or intra-continentally, owing to the poor 
African infrastructure. COMESA, EAC, and SADC comprise 10 landlocked states: Botswana, 
Burundi, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Malawi, Rwanda, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Only 
30 percent of the roads on the entire continent are paved. Mechanisms such as infrastructure (rail, 
roads, ports, air, water and electricity) are important in assessing Africa’s integration attempts.  
 
The thesis thus discusses these challenges and the main actors and factors in their various forms 
within the convergence (coming together and joining forces) of COMESA and SADC during the 
Tripartite 2008 agreement leading to the free trade area in June 2015 discussed in chapter (4) of 
the thesis. The analysis includes the regional policies based on the Tripartite 2008 memorandum 
of understanding (MOU): i. trade protocols and legal instruments; ii. regional free trade areas 
relating to intra- and inter-regional trade policies and total trade; obstacles to trade (trade barriers 
and non-trade barriers [NTBs] such as border posts, industrialisation, value-added chains, and 
rules of origin [ROOs]); iii. customs unions; iv. legal binding commitments according to the 
Tripartite MOU of 2008; v) macro-economic frameworks towards establishing a monetary union; 
vi. progress in infrastructure development such as transport corridors (rail, road, air, and ports), 
regional electricity generation (trade, demand and supply), and information and technology; and, 
vii. socio-political issues touching on education and migration policies.  
 
Fifth, the thesis assesses multiple memberships of the COMESA and SADC blocs. As a result of 
trade liberalisation and tariff adjustments, conditions concerning economic pressures leave 
member states either joining other regional groupings, or remaining in the bloc but not adhering 
to the RECs policies, or else delaying trade agreements by not signing agreements that could 
facilitate trade because they are unable to do so largely owing to the fragility of their markets.  
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A larger market is able to create a larger space for competitive pricing of goods within an 
economic grouping; this further creates a larger geographical scale and more purchasing power, 
thus creating economies of scale. Each REC also has its own trade processes of liberalisation 
according to its protocols; hence reforms toward a single Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA) are 
stalled and the regional integration process is concomitantly delayed. The thesis therefore further 
addresses how COMESA and SADC are dealing with their approach, which allows states to enter 
agreements and liberalise trade at their own pace – the variable geometry approach that both 
COMESA and SADC have embraced. But the variable geometry approach becomes unwieldy 
when the slower members sign on as members in either blocs or other adjacent regional 
groupings.
7
 The thesis provides therefore a further understanding of how COMESA and SADC 
manage relations of its member states with external trade partners like the African Growth 
Opportunities Act (AGOA) with the United States (US) and the Economic Partnership 
Agreements (EPAs) with the European Union (EU), which the Tripartite 2008 Agreement is 
promoting. These approaches then incorporate new dynamics to the dimension of trade and 
ROOs. The various evolving bilateral and multilateral agreements of COMESA and SADC 
member states similarly require an in-depth analysis to ascertain their relevance in the regional 
integration process of COMESA and SADC; how COMESA and SADC deal with these 
phenomena are further lines of enquiry and discussed in chapter (5) of the thesis.  
 
Moreover, regional integration efforts within these groupings have been challenged by historical 
internal and external actors and factors that have filtered into existing regional practices. Such 
challenges constitute uneven economic growth of the member states at national, regional and 
continental levels. Stronger economies like those of South Africa attached to SACU and SADC, 
and Angola in SADC, and Egypt and Kenya in COMESA, which are linked to regional trade 
arrangements, dominate the trade markets, leaving very little room for the smaller economies to 
manoeuvre. These stronger economies have bilateral international trade agreements that have 
impacted on the smaller economies, with infant industries either destroyed or becoming 
insolvent. Therefore the concepts of “divergence” and “convergence” raised in the literature 
review in chapter (2) are important analytical lenses for understanding and explaining the issues 
raised and discussed in assessing multiple memberships in chapter (5) of the thesis.  
                                                 
7
 See also, Southern African Development Coordination Conference/Southern African Development Community 
(SADCC)/(SADC) Summit Communiques, 
<http://www.sadc.int/files/3913/5292/8384/SADC_SUMMIT_COMMUNIQUES_1980-2006.pdf>. 
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These two concepts are inter-connected and states may have incentives to join and form a region 
to attract direct foreign investment in favour of their own markets and could divert it from other 
members. Therefore the thesis takes into account the pernicious effects that the direction of trade 
can have on infant economies that are associated with liberal tariff adjustments, such as 
commodity prices and price volatility, which play a major contributing role in diversion. 
Similarly, the discussion also takes into account recessions and economic downturns, when 
markets could swing either way, from low to massive surpluses, with prices falling either way.
8
 
The thesis considers these issues in the convergence debate in chapter (5). The thesis further 
expands on how COMESA and SADC are dealing with the issue of multiple memberships by 
providing an analytical discussion. Further expanded in the thesis and assessed is South Africa’s 
relations in SACU. The thesis thus provides an explanation of South Africa’s approach in 
managing SACU member states and what this means for regional integration and convergence for 
the region.   
 
Sixth, the thesis further expands on the interplay between economic and security links and the 
importance of regional stability. The security apparatus of COMESA and SADC towards region 
building, as well as their abilities and attempts in achieving peace and security, are therefore 
assessed. An expansion of the security dynamics of COMESA, EAC, and SADC member states 
are provided which underscores that a powerful state like South Africa with a robust military 
component, while serving its own parochial interests can converge regional security of 
COMESA, EAC and SADC member states. These issues are adequately discussed in chapter (6). 
The thesis thus poses the following five main research questions to guide the study.  
 
1.1 Research questions  
 
Five key research questions are addressed in the thesis: 
1) How did COMESA and SADC evolve from their predecessor institutions, the PTA and   
SADCC respectively, and who were the actors that informed their relationship?  
 
2) What explains the new convergence of these two regional communities, COMESA  
and SADC, in signing a 2008 Tripartite agreement (which includes the EAC)?  
 
                                                 
8
 José Antonio Ocampo and Joseph E. Stiglitz (eds.), Capital Market Liberalization and Development (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 125-126.   
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3) How much trade have these two regional institutions (COMESA and SADC) promoted? 
What do the literature and theories on divergence and convergence tell us about their trade 
liberalisation processes? 
 
4) How are these two regional institutions (as both institutions and member states) managing 
multiple memberships? 
 
5) How are these two regional institutions (COMESA and SADC) managing the issue of 
regional security?  
 
As outlined above, these five core questions will help the thesis to interrogate regional economic 
communities of COMESA and SADC, with member states that are straddling national positions 
and regional obligations. The relationship is a divided one, with values such as power and wealth 
filtering into the regional economic fraternity.
9
 Because the concepts of states, markets, and 
power cut across and form the core building blocks of several theoretical strands, the thesis 
utilises two mutually supporting approaches to link these concepts to guide the study: the 
neoclassical economics approach and the neorealist approach which will serve as principal 
indicators for conceptualising the literature review and interpreting the research findings as well 
as the conclusions presented in the thesis. Also considered is the security of the region and its 
fragile regional security mechanisms as well as the requisite literature for understanding security 
convergence and cooperation.  
 
1.2 Thesis Methodology 
 
The thesis does not take the approach of econometric cross-country growth indicators to measure 
results. Instead, the primary focus is to understand trade liberalisation theory analysed in trade 
regional groups of COMESA and SADC, during the rationalisation process (1991–1997) and is 
discussed in chapter (3). Trade figures are accessed from the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Africa and from the World Bank’s reliable statistical database, which furnishes 
relevant and reliable information. An analysis is provided in support of the findings.  
                                                 
9
 See also, David Balaam and Michael Veseth, Introduction to Political Economy (Upper Saddle River: Pearson 
Prentice Hall, 2001), pp. 110-127. 
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The East African Community is not core to the thesis, and neither is SACU. However, the 
literature review in this chapter and elsewhere in the thesis where relevant also discusses the 
EAC, since COMESA and SADC have signed a Tripartite agreement
10
 that also involves the 
EAC, and some of the EAC and SACU member states are also members of COMESA and 
SADC. The thesis employs both quantitative and qualitative research methodologies. 
Quantitative research is based on observations that are converted into discrete units that can be 
compared to other units by using statistical analysis. Emphasis is being placed on the statistical 
part of the research examination as the most essential part of quantitative research. Quantitative 
research is thus based on a positivist position. In 1830 Auguste Comte first coined the word 
positivism, which for him was synonymous with science or with positive or observable facts, 
based on measurable variables and provable propositions. Positivism is thus based on 
explanation, prediction and proof. In, “Science, Faith and Society”, Polanyi, purports that “in 
research, personal judgments, intuitiveness and sensitivity plays a vital role in the world of the 
scientist itself.”11 Hence, personal judgements, intuitiveness and sensitivity is a critical aspect in 
the world of the scientist. Qualitative research examines people’s words and actions in narrative 
or descriptive ways more closely representing the situation that is being researched as 
experienced by participants. Qualitative research is based on a phenomenological position. 
Phenomenology is the philosophical study of the structures of experience and consciousness from 
a first-person point of view, and attempts to understand the meaning events have for individuals, 
where the person is viewed as having no existence apart from the world, and similarly, the world 
has no existence apart from the person.
12
 In summary, the debate about research should not be 
based on the correctness of qualitative versus quantitative theories, but should rather be all-
encompassing. Questions that need to be addressed in research should be those of ontology, 
epistemology, logic, and teleology. Ontological assumptions concern the nature of reality.  
                                                 
10
 COMESA-EAC-SADC 2008 Tripartite partnership agreement, < http://www.comesa-eac-sadc-
Tripartite.org/sites/default/files/documents/Tripartite-Triparrtite%20MoU%20Signed%20Version.pdf>. 
11
 Michal Polanyi, Science, Faith, and Society: A Searching Examination of the Meaning and Nature of Scientific 
Inquiry (US: University of Chicago Press, 1964), pp. 21-42. See also, Kuhn Thomas S, The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1970); Kant. I, “Empirical and a Priori Knowledge”, in, 
Madden Edward H, The structure of Scientific Thought (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Riverside Press, 1960); and 
Berlin Isaiah,  Auguste Comte Memorial Lectures 1953-1962 (UK: Athlone Press, 1964). 
12
 See, Johann Mouton, Basic Concepts in the Methodology of the Social Sciences (Human Sciences Research 
Council [HSRC]: Pretoria, 1988). See also, Dawn Nagar (Alley), “Research Methodology”, in, “An Examination of 
the South African Correctional Services’ Policy with respect to Children Living with their Mothers in Prison”, 
M.Phil. Thesis, University of Port Elizabeth (UPE), 2003. 
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Epistemological assumptions concern the origins of knowledge that concerns the nature of 
reality. Relationships between the “knower” and the “unknown” and the role of value and 
judgements contribute to the overall principles of logic and an attempt to demonstrate and verify 
assumptions of knowledge. The researcher has to address pertinent questions. For example, in the 
logic of enquiry, are causal linkages between bits of information possible? What is the possibility 
of generalisation occurring? Teleological questions ask what research contributes to knowledge 
and what is the purpose of research? The answers to these questions comprise the postulates of 
the research paradigm. By paradigm, the thesis refers to a set of overarching and interconnected 
assumptions about the nature of reality. Assumptions cannot be proved; they are stipulated, and 
these stipulations are called postulates, which form a paradigm. Hence, this thesis is guided by 
the interpretation of both documentary evidence (primary sources) and interviews (secondary 
sources). The desktop analysis with regard to the politics, economics and security of COMESA 
and SADC’s integrating policies will draw on the primary and secondary data outlined in the 
literature review and conceptual framework in chapter (2). The thesis study similarly draw on 
statistical data and provide a thorough assessment and an analysis by using graphs and tables 
including the use of total gross domestic product (GDP) percentages, per capita GDP ratings, 
foreign direct investment (FDI) and trade data. Core to the research methodology is the 
deployment of interviews that were conducted in the region which the thesis draws and rely 
heavily on in its findings and overall discussion and analysis.  
 
The thesis provides an overall display of the trustworthiness and research rigour of the research 
methodology deployed as reliable. The thesis thus builds strongly on reliable data and sources as 
defined by academic scholars such as Monique Hennink, Inge Hutter, and Ajay Bailey and others 
such as Punch, Turner and Shipman.
13
 Hence, the researcher is confident that in the event that 
this same study and investigation is undertaken by a different researcher/s 
__
 while deploying the 
same research methodology 
__
 that the exact same results would be achieved. The thesis has thus 
provided explanatory discussion and research findings while a number of methods were used to 
gather qualitative material. These also included participation in meetings and seminars on 
Africa’s regional integration and security frameworks and processes, meetings with South 
African ambassadors, empirical observation of political events, and in-depth interviews.    
                                                 
13
 Monique Hennink, Inge Hutter and Ajay Bailey, Qualitative Research Methods (London: Sage, 2011); see also, 
M.D. Shipman, “The Limitations of Social Research” (New York: Routledge, fourth edition, 2014); see also, Keith 
F. Punch, Introduction to Social Research: Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches (London: Sage, 2005).  
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1.2.1 Structured interviews and analysis 
 
Interviews form a critical part of this thesis.
14
 To strengthen the thesis, open-ended questions 
carefully designed pertaining to the participatory and experiential approach of the participants’ 
experience in the field of study of COMESA and SADC. Their viewpoints provided in-depth 
knowledge pertaining to the study. My role as researcher was to accumulate the data in an 
unbiased fashion and utilise all the information provided during the interviews and adherence to 
forms and data collection analysis were used. The overall preparation for the research entailed 
structured interviews conducted in 2011 with a previous SADC executive secretary in 2011 in 
Kariba Lake, Zambia and also in 2015; and in 2009, 2010, and 2011 with the former head of the 
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) in Cape Town, in Ijebu Ode (Ogun 
State, Nigeria), and in Stellenbosch (Western Cape) respectively.  
 
In 2009 and in 2013, the research was further supported by interviews conducted at the 
Secretariat of SADC in Botswana, and in 2014 research interviews were conducted at the 
Secretariats of COMESA in Lusaka, Zambia and at the Secretariat of SACU in Windhoek, 
Namibia. The conversations and discussions with staff from the three Secretariats (COMESA, 
SADC, and SACU) were highly effective, and their commitment to the COMESA–EAC–SADC 
Tripartite in spearheading regional integration was shown in their willingness to give up several 
hours of their time (frequently after working hours) to inform this research. Confidentiality was 
also important for staff and conversations were underpinned by work ethics and assurances of 
confidentiality during the interview process. Discussions were structured in boardroom 
engagement at all three Secretariats. Information gathered from the research has been sensitively 
reported so that confidential information is not divulged, nor Secretariat staff or government 
officials implicated. Interviews were conducted with three high-level government officials in 
South Africa in 2012, and 2013 and one of these meetings also took place in 2010 in Lagos, 
Nigeria. A further interview was conducted with a South African Ambassador for the AU/African 
Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Office in Brussels, Belgium.  
                                                 
14
 Daniel Turner, “Qualitative Interview design: a practical guide for novice investigators” the Qualitative Report, 
15, 3 (May 2010). 
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There were also numerous discussions with both the South African Department of Trade and 
Industry (DTI) and the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) in 2013 
and 2014, and with senior government officials at ambassadorial level who have worked for over 
30 years at the United Nations. There were further interviews with a senior parliamentarian and 
South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) veteran at the Namibian Parliament in 
Windhoek in 2014. Also interviewed, was another senior official head of Southern Africa from 
UNECA in 2014 in Tshwane (Pretoria). Meetings and conversations were also held with 
professors from the Universities of the Western Cape, Johannesburg, the Witswatersrand, North-
West, and Cape Town, and more importantly, with senior government officials serving in the 
ministries of South Africa and Swaziland in 2011, and in 2012. Interviews and discussions were 
conducted with former as well as current secretaries-general and executive secretaries of 
COMESA and SADC Secretariats respectively, while policy research staff and trade officials 
strengthened both economic and security integration, facilitating the researcher’s grasp of the 
problems. Mindful of the various sensitivities arising from summit meetings, information was 
shared with circumspection; however the discussions did not hamper the research for this thesis 
project and these interviews were extremely meaningful in gauging accuracy in the analysis and 
assessment of the Tripartite agreement in terms of its convergence and the overall analysis 
provided within the thesis. My personal participation and involvement in observation and 
participatory forums on regional integration made possible through the work of the Centre for 
Conflict Resolution (CCR) further strengthened my understanding to undertake the research. 
 
1.3 Outline of the thesis 
 
The thesis comprises seven chapters.  
 
Chapter 1 (which is this chapter, Introduction) introduces the purpose of the research, its aims 
and objectives, the research questions, and the methodology selected. It provides a roadmap of 
the thesis as it unfolds in subsequent chapters. 
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Chapter 2 provides the underpinning of the research by establishing a theoretical and conceptual 
framework for studying regional integration in COMESA and SADC. As Joseph Nye contends, 
“scholars studying integration in Africa must remember the primacy of politics and [should] not 
be misled by assumptions natural to ‘developed’ societies. It is important to pay attention to 
social, historical, and economic factors”.15 
 
Chapter 3 first gives a historical account and focuses on the 1970s–1990s and discusses Africa’s 
main regional economic communities, born out of a pan-African vision and ideology for 
achieving political solidarity and economic independence. Further spearheaded by UNECA, the 
PTA of 1981 evolved into COMESA in 1993. A history of the FLS, which evolved into SADCC 
in 1980 and later SADC in 1992, is also provided. Also discussed is apartheid South Africa’s 
involvement in the eastern and Southern African regions, which leads to a debate on the 
rationalisation period between 1991 and 1997. Engagement with the literature on divergence and 
convergence provides a theoretical underpinning to the rationalisation process.   
 
Chapter 4 covers the regionalisation processes of COMESA and SADC for the period 
1998
__
2008 and leading up to the TFTA in June 2015. Within the parameters of COMESA and 
SADC’s 2008 Tripartite Agreement, I provide an in-depth study of the significance of this 
partnership for Africa’s integration agenda. I therefore assess the roadmap of the 2008 Tripartite 
Agreement, and give an assessment of its trajectory to further understand how the partnership has 
evolved. The main actors and factors are discussed and assessed like South Africa’s regional 
developmental role as the strongest economy in the COMESA and SADC blocs. Also assessed 
are the failures and achievements of the 2008 Tripartite Agreement, which was aimed at 
developing a full free trade area and a customs union. Therefore, trade liberalisation policies, 
trade barriers and non-trade barriers, infrastructure development, as well as macroeconomic 
convergence frameworks, are assessed. The chapter also provides an understanding of the 
processes of regional integration geared towards economic growth, and poverty alleviation and 
reduction, by incorporating the main theories of convergence on trade liberalisation within the 
neoclassical economics approach.  
 
                                                 
15
 Joseph Nye, Pan-Africanism and East African Integration (Princeton: Harvard University Press, 1965), cited in, 
James T. Gathii, “Neo-Liberal Turn in Regional Trade Agreements”, Albany Law School Legal Studies, Research 
Paper Series, no. 40 (2010–2011). 
30 
 
Chapter 5 provides an in-depth assessment of the management of multiple memberships by 
COMESA and SADC member states (as both institution and member states) in Africa. This 
chapter applies the new theory of neoclassical economic regional integration (defined further 
above) which allows the thesis’ explaining of the two regional integration approaches adopted by 
the COMESA–EAC–SADC Tripartite bloc and discusses the variable geometry and trade 
liberalisation approaches of open markets in moving towards a Tripartite Free Trade Area.  Also 
touched on is the EAC, since the EAC member states are also member states of COMESA and 
some are part of SADC. The chapter assesses the links of multiple memberships and international 
trade agreements such as AGOA with the United States, and EPAs with the EU. This discussion 
also provides an understanding of the impact of these external trade relations on the Tripartite 
relationship, since the Tripartite 2008 Agreement allows member states to form international 
trade partnerships, and also allows for a variable geometry approach. Furthermore, discussed is 
the impact of rules of origin on trade within the Tripartite bloc. This chapter will also provide an 
understanding of South Africa’s (as hegemonic state) approach in managing SACU member 
states, by furnishing an explanation for South Africa’s maintaining a relationship with SACU, 
while all these member states are also part of COMESA bloc. In furtherance of this debate, the 
discussion is centred on the neoclassical economic convergence approach and considers the view 
of Venables’16 theory to understand how South Africa’s role as a SACU member, and as a 
dominant economy in the COMESA and SADC bloc, is managing its SACU partners and how 
this relates to divergence and convergence.  
 
Chapter 6 of the thesis discusses a regional security complex framework theory, which provides 
assistance in understanding security complexities. In support of the overall literature review 
under security, this chapter applies the new theory: neorealist security convergence (defined 
under new concepts and definitions in chapter [2]) to illuminate the discussion of realism and 
security and its role in convergence of regional security practices and the geopolitical interests of 
a hegemonic state converging regional security within a regional grouping. This will strengthen 
the overall thesis analysis.  
                                                 
16
 Venables, “Regional Integration Agreements: A Force for Convergence or Divergence?”, 1999. 
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The chapter expands on Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver’s17 observations that a starting point for 
such an analysis should be based on a clear definition of a regional security system. Chapter 6 is 
also guided by Amitav Acharya’s observations on regional security within regionalism that sees 
security complexes as a national threat and discusses determinants of security interdependence.
18
 
The chapter expands on the main conflict areas and states in the eastern and Southern African 
regions and discusses the convergence of COMESA and SADC in managing these conflicts as 
well as the member states of the EAC.  
 
Chapter 7 Provides a substantial conclusion based on the research and the main premise of the 
research. Also highlighted is the importance of the research for the field of international relations. 
Gaps are identified and explanations provided. Also highlighted within the concluding chapter 
(7) are possible policy recommendations to be considered, for trade, governance and security 
officials and policymakers within the COMESA, EAC, SADC and SACU Secretariats and their 
governments. It is envisaged that the South African government, Africa’s continental bodies (e.g. 
the AU), other important African bodies (such as the New Economic Partnership for Africa’s 
Development [NEPAD]), the African Development Bank (AfDB), the Development Bank of 
Southern Africa (DBSA), UNECA, the EU, the US, and donor community and civil society 
actors will find the thesis recommendations provided useful to their work. In an attempt to build 
the knowledge production in Africa, based on the findings of the thesis, it will also consider two 
new regional integration theories related to the Tripartite bloc’s convergence efforts in economic 
integration (as will be discussed in chapter 5), and in security (as will be discussed in chapter 6) 
respectively, for the academic community to be potential beneficiaries of. The thesis findings will 
therefore be relevant to Africa’s think tanks and policy institutes, and for universities and 
libraries in Africa where emerging academics and students could assess, address and expand on 
gaps in this research study. These could possibly further strengthen future studies in this area and 
on topics pertinent to Africa’s development for sustained and solid economic growth. The thesis 
will contribute to the divergence and convergence debate in chapter (2) (literature review: 
theoretical and conceptual framework) and will be utilised to determine the degree of divergence 
and convergence of COMESA and SADC in the expanded thesis and to which we now turn. 
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 Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, Regions and Powers, The Structure of International Security (London: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003). 
18
 Amitav Acharya, “Regional Security Complexes in the Third World: Stability and Collaboration”, National 
University of Singapore: Department of Political Science (unpublished essay) (1992), <www.amitavacharya.com> 
(Written permission by email granted by Author to the Researcher to use article, accessed 20 March 2015). 
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Chapter 2 
 
Literature Review: Theoretical and Conceptual Framework 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The theoretical and conceptual framework outlined in this chapter, provides a platform and base 
for discussing the primary pillars of this thesis on divergence and convergence of Africa’s main 
regional economic communities, COMESA and SADC. In analysing the regional transformation 
processes of eastern and Southern Africa, the theoretical and conceptual framework provides a 
focused review of general and specific literature on the concepts of regional integration, 
divergence, and convergence. In this context, the chapter begins by locating regional integration 
within the larger divergence and convergence debate. The discussion provides an understanding 
of the politics and economics surrounding the two concepts. This lays the foundation for the 
examination of the different meanings, goals and specific approaches employed in regional 
integration in contemporary divergence and convergence discourse. The literature review on 
regional integration also provides a broad scope within which multiple memberships and regional 
security are discussed. Informed by the rich theoretical and conceptual debates and issues 
established in regional integration and divergence and convergence literature, the chapter 
articulates two analytical frameworks, the neoclassical economics approach and the neoclassical 
realist approach which will serve as principal indicators for conceptualising the theory and 
literature review and interpreting the research findings as well as the conclusions presented in the 
thesis. 
 
2.2 Situating regional integration within the divergence and convergence debate 
 
Regional integration processes in Africa and elsewhere have been considerable, with most 
regions confronting the same needs, forces, obstacles and constraints in various forms.
19
 Regional 
economic integration has been viewed by many states as a mechanism for sovereign states to 
come together and to conduct economic integration in trade and is able to link government’s 
national policies to a supranational entity.
20
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Regional economic integration that is linked to market factors and open trade can dictate the 
outcome of regional integration schemes that are linked to regional institutions.
21
  
 
2.2.1 International relations and regional integration theory: divergence and convergence 
 
A debate important and relevant to the thesis is the understanding of the historical dimensions of 
regional integration in Africa, which also briefly centres the discussion on Europe’s success at 
economic integration of incremental lobbying, as well as getting the buy-in of its member states 
at each stage of the process.
22
 For Africa, Pan-Africanism defined political integration as the 
foundation for economic integration in Africa. This idea stemmed from political leaders such as 
Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah, Mali’s Modibo Kéïta, Senegal’s Cheikh Anta Diop, and Guinea’s 
Sékou Touré, who promoted the formation of a single African government aligned with common 
institutions.
23
 The period 1935 to 1957
24
 marked the colonial phase of a much earlier attempt of 
regional integration for Africa. In 1945, the Fifth Pan-African Congress, held in Manchester, 
England, called for concrete recommendations towards combating the exploitation of Africa’s 
resources. Further calls were made at the 1955 Bandung Afro-Asian Conference and subsequent 
Declaration, which also attempted to address the political and economic liberation of both Africa 
and Asia. These earlier ideas stemmed from a deep political and cultural notion of a unified 
Africa, and African unity – meaning a complete political union of Africa.25 Between 1957 and 
1960, 19 African states achieved independence
26
 from colonial rule, with Ghana signalling the 
first integration efforts after having attained independence in 1957 under the leadership of 
Kwame Nkrumah.  
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Africa’s anti-colonial struggles received the backing of fellow veterans from the 1955 Bandung 
Conference, as well as from an earlier conference staged in Brussels in 1927. The League Against 
Imperialism and Colonialism included Asian and African leaders such as Senegal’s Lamine 
Senghor, India’s Jawaharlal Nehru and Vietnam’s Ho Chi Minh.27 Five Pan-African Congresses 
took place between 1919 and 1945.
28
 Hence, theories of regional economic integration that 
largely were based on Europe’s arrangements in integrating markets and institutions that started 
in the 1950s, also spilled over into other integration models.
29
 Europe’s views thus informed 
Africa’s early attempts at pan-Africanism in the creation of a political union. Africa was enthused 
by Europe’s rapid economic growth. Arguments were also put forward for the possibilities of 
regionalism among least developed countries (LDCs) by other integration economists like Raúl 
Prebisch while he was head of the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), which 
became the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) during the 
1960s. Prebisch reinforced pan-African views among Africa’s governments.30  
 
The practical successes of Europe therefore dominated theories of integration, and also 
influenced region builders’ thinking in other Third World continents like Africa, to attempt 
economic integration, and to apply it in their own regions.
31
 Africa believed that it could adopt a 
similar regional integration model and cure the ills of post-colonialism plaguing its weak 
economies. In Africa, regional integration meant strengthening the fragile economies of newly 
independent states; for Europe, regional integration meant avoiding war, since its integration 
processes started after the Second World War
32
 and was a difficult period for Europe that wanted 
to avoid war at all costs. Africa’s regional integrationists appeared to have had no urgency, and 
took on a gradualist approach adopted through sub-regional organisations, but socio-economic 
conditions and a paucity of technology and minimal industrialisation militated against the desired 
functional spillover and linkages originally envisaged as outlined by Robert Henderson, Richard 
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Gibb, and Samuel K.B. Asante.
33
 For Africa, the traditional intellectual debates of integration 
schemes have been influenced by experiences of integration by Western countries.
34
 This 
discussion further outlines the regional economic integration theories starting from the 1950s. 
These views were expressed in various approaches and schools of thought: federalism, 
functionalism, and neofunctionalism. Regional economic integration is also different to pure 
economics, since it can dictate the outcomes of integration linked to open trade.  
 
Initially, between the 1950s and 1960s, regional integration processes were particularly 
concerned with how supranationalism could modify state behaviour in community building, 
while viewing sovereignty as an important component in the promotion of economies of scale. 
Karl Deutsch stressed this importance, by noting that Europe had to consider and focus on the 
real reasons for joining a supranational organisation and forego sovereignty.
35
 Deutsch also 
described supranationalism as a vehicle whereby the behaviour of the state could be modified 
through building a community of values and attitudes that could promote cooperation.
36
 
Supranationalism therefore implied that an international institution was able to exercise authority 
over its members (states), which involved elements of authoritative power in the political and 
legal areas, and which limited the autonomy of sovereign states. The EU is an example of a 
supranational entity which serves as the primary decision-making organ through the Council of 
the European Union. 
   
Region builders of the federalist school (1950s) viewed politics and state governments as the 
cornerstones of regional integration processes. The federalists held the view that politics trumped 
economics, and integration had to be pursued through the creation of a centralised, supranational 
entity. For the federalists, maintaining a national identity and promoting economic growth could 
best be achieved by creating a central government, joint institutions, and a common constitution. 
Ernest Haas was the first proponent to write on the logic of integration, and his efforts pioneered 
analysis on the European Community as a supranational entity that led to the development of the 
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framework for his theory of “neo-functionalism”.37 Leon Lindberg shared similar frameworks to 
those of Haas.
38
 Spillover from institutions was seen to further the neo-functional discourse, 
which entailed that through enhanced increased trans-border exchanges, and cooperation in 
technical areas (as was the case of the Economic Coal and Steel Community [ECSC]), that 
integration processes could lead to an increased transnational interdependence, which in turn 
would create functional spillover into other areas, and ultimately, the integration process could 
become more sustainable.
39
  
 
But federalist thinkers in Europe were challenged in the 1960s by functionalism and neo-
functionalism approaches. David Mitrany, who was also known as the father of functionalism, in 
his concept articulated as, “peace by pieces”, argued that a functional alternative to international 
integration was essential. For Mitrany, international cooperation had to be premised on the view 
that non-political issues of the state, such as “socio-economic, technical, and issues of a 
humanitarian nature, could be separated” and dealt with independently.40 A functional approach 
was therefore seen by Mitrany as a pragmatic one, which instead of placing emphasis on the 
state, should be created, and constitute units of sectoral activities in the economic fields, for 
market regulation, communications, and management of natural resources. Furthermore, sectoral 
units had to be given a sense of autonomy and power for such units to solve the problems of the 
state. These efficiencies would spill over into the political fields, and in so doing ultimately avoid 
war and violent conflicts.
41
  
 
As noted above, Africa’s regional blocs have largely been created from a difficult past. The 
European Union that emerged from the Second World War provides a pertinent analogy. In the 
case of Africa, its regional integration processes have faced underdevelopment and poor 
integration processes that either failed, or have been ineffective. The majority of African 
economies and states are peripheral economies with five large core economies: Nigeria, Kenya, 
Egypt, Angola, and South Africa. Africa’s regions still lack regional integration policies viable 
for economic growth, such as government support for businesses of small, micro, and medium 
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enterprises (SMMEs) that can grow industrialisation alongside value-added production through 
intra-regional trade and manufacturing. Such factors are important in fostering endogenous 
growth through the transference of technology and skills to boost development, research, and 
education supported by strong government policies. Such factors should therefore be considered 
and engender support through state-led policies that are implemented at both national and 
regional levels. External bilateral and multilateral relations have, however, flourished more 
amidst regional trade agreements on the African continent. There is very little traded on the 
continent, with only 12 percent of intra-regional trade in 2014. African countries still face similar 
issues as those prevalent at independence, with largely mono-crop economies that spend a large 
part of their resources on the production of export commodities. For instance, the 1980s was 
viewed as “Africa’s Lost Decade”, since economic integration was ineffective, because there was 
debt build up and no economic growth. Region builders in Africa further evolved from the AU’s 
predecessor’s plan, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) that defined regional integration as 
a vehicle for states to build regional institutions and to advance economic growth, as defined in 
its Charter.
42
 Further spearheading Africa’s regional integration cause, UNECA was seen as the 
master builder of Africa’s integration, and assisted in the creation of the EAC established in 
1967, and involving Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania.
43
 The grandiose integration plans pursued 
regionalism solutions – a paper plan and concept that collapsed within the reality of Africa’s own 
political economy of strong sovereign states holding onto power.
44
  
 
But what place for regional integration in Africa, already enhanced during the early 1900s? 
Pascal Lamy notes that regional integration is not a new process and that the African continent 
had seen the creation of the first of such processes of integration in 1910, with the creation of 
SACU, while 1919 saw the birth of the EAC.
45
 Regional integration processes only really took 
root in the rest of the world about 40 to 50 years later.  Such integration processes, for example in 
Europe, formed the ECSC, created in 1951. Other regional mechanisms were also formed such as 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) created in 1967; and in South America, the 
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Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR) created in 1991. In retrospect, although Africa was the 
first integrator and builder of regional economic communities, it is currently lagging behind in 
intra- and inter-regional trade and still facing major infrastructure impediments. In Europe, for 
example, the levels of inter-regional trade were 60 percent, while ASEAN’s inter-regional trade 
levels were between 30 and 40 percent. MERCOSUR is a further example, with an inter-regional 
trade level of 40 percent in 2014.  
 
On the other hand, the developmentalist approach of UNECA stressed the need to develop 
cooperation integration that centred on well-strategised projects, and that could promote 
integrated markets and co-investments. Through the efforts of UNECA’s commitment, regional 
economic cooperation and integration evolved and initially only the Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS) and the PTA for eastern and Southern Africa were established 
with the East African Community already being in existence.
46
 The EAC was Africa’s most 
successful regional cooperation and sophisticated regional grouping until it failed.
47
 Kenya had a 
strongly developed industrial base and was seen as the major beneficiary of the community’s 
economic development, but the economic and political ideologies of Idi Amin, the former 
Ugandan president, contributed greatly to the demise of the community in 1977.
48
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In furthering the regional integration cause in Africa, the key goals of the PTA were advanced by 
UNECA to promote trade liberalisation and state cooperation in specialised development 
industries such as production of food crops and livestock, development of science and 
technology, exploitation and utilisation of natural resources, human resources development, and 
creation of transport and telecommunications networks.
49
  
 
But it was also a difficult period for eastern and Southern African states that faced regional wars 
targeting economic integration and destroying their infrastructure – valuable to the growth of the 
economy. But while South Africa had an influence on SADCC’s non-growth on the one hand (by 
destroying its infrastructure), on the other hand the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 
created through British imperialist objectives and interests, was a step ahead of the rest of the 
SADCC states. Those countries linked to the Federation – Northern Rhodesia (Zambia), 
Nyasaland (Malawi), and Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) had access to railways. Through the 
railway system, these three countries had access to South Africa through Bechuanaland 
(Botswana), and further access to the ports of Beira and Lourenco Marques (Maputo) in 
Portuguese East Africa (Mozambique).  
 
Aside from rail access, the countries linked to the Federation had telecommunications as well as 
electricity generated from the Zambezi River and accessed through Northern Rhodesia, 
Nyasaland, and Southern Rhodesia; this energy was generated from the Kariba power station. 
Throughout South Africa’s apartheid years, the South African government had developed most of 
its neighbours’ economies in some way or another, other than those of Angola and Tanzania.50 
Africa’s slow economic growth among the regional communities has largely been attributed to 
the inappropriate integration models used as well as to major global events.  
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Lynn Mytelka,
51
 Ibrahim Gambari,
52
 Gerald Meier,
53
 and Lamy
54
 all argued that global events 
that compounded the regional integration cause for Africa were largely due to the 1973 oil crisis, 
which triggered a three-fold increase in the price of oil demanded by the Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).
55
 The soaring oil price of 400 percent in 1980 led to an 
increase in production and transport costs overall and placed a further burden on Africa’s 
economies.
56
 External involvement also had implications for autonomous development and 
against regional political and economic cooperation agendas.  
 
While restructuring institutions, the region’s concern was focused on whether SADCC would 
have attained a level of economic development and integration that could withstand a powerful 
economy like that of South Africa. The major factor was the historical legacy of apartheid South 
Africa in terms of its aggressive military role in the region. SADCC member states viewed their 
organisation as a political institution designed to reduce dependence on the economy of South 
Africa in terms of trade, transport, communications, and infrastructure, either individually or 
jointly as a regional bloc. It is necessary to understand these debates in the theory and literature 
review, in order to have salient discussions in the thesis on how COMESA and SADC intend 
addressing the issue of regionalisation and convergence of their own protocols and treaties to 
remedy the economic growth for their member states.  
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As noted by Gambari, it was not possible for Third World countries to separate economics from 
politics, nor would the spill over of economic to political cooperation be a natural process.
57
 
Many African countries, having gained independence in the late 1950s and early 1960s, became 
protective of their independent states after the end of the colonial period. African states were 
therefore guarding their sovereignty. According to Gambari, the least developed countries in 
Africa viewed the role of the sovereign state as paramount in attempting integration, since these 
states were more intent on pursuing wealth and enhancing economic growth, and less concerned 
with the issue of avoidance of war and conflict that concerned the functionalist scholars like 
Mitrany.
58
 Regional integration in the 1970s expanded more on economic cooperation, 
intergovernmentalism, developmental regionalism, political cooperation, economic cooperation, 
old and new regionalism, and regionalisation, and other integration processes that evolved across 
the world. Scholars of regional integration like Joseph Nye,
59
  Robert Keohane,
60
 and Andrew 
Moravcsik
61
 all viewed successful integration as inter-dependent. Their view was that for 
integration to materialise, member states in a regional group should have the ability to adapt and 
respond to cooperative agreements through negotiation between governments, which in their 
view was a viable strategy which could lead to successful outcomes of integration. These scholars 
further noted that such negotiation processes should consider two important variables: 
“bargaining” and, “negotiating” among powerful members within the group. Also, through such a 
move, Europe’s economic policy converged. The literature provides various views on 
regionalism. These views articulated regionalism seen as processes that have evolved from being 
state led, to constituting important dimensions of global restructuring processes. Similar concepts 
are expanded on by scholars such as Margaret Lee who writes on regionalism. She indicates that 
regionalism is “the adoption of a regional project by a formal regional economic organisation 
designed to enhance the political, economic, social, cultural, and security integration and/or 
cooperation of member states”.62  
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Asante’s discussion on Africa’s regional integration within economic integration views 
integration as: “A process where two or more countries in a particular area voluntarily join 
together to pursue common policies and objectives in matters of general economic development 
or in a particular economic field of common interest to the mutual advantage of all the 
participating states.”63  
 
Old and new regionalism concepts were succinctly argued by Alex Warleigh-Lack as overly 
exaggerated political and economic projects. Warleigh-Lack explained this was not sufficient, by 
drawing on Haas’s neo-functionalist theory in describing regional integration projects as being 
dependent on certain factors for success, such as increasing transaction levels between states that 
could benefit all member states, with wealthier participating states providing side-payments when 
necessary. Warleigh-Lack drew on a range of regional integration debates, including the 
constructivist approaches of Björn Hettne and rationalist perspectives of James Mittleman. 
Warleigh-Lack identified the importance of four independent variables in exploring regionalism 
within the political economy framework and these he defined as the rationale or genesis, 
functionality, socialisation, and the impact of the regionalisation process. Warleigh-Lack 
therefore noted that a successful regional project should concentrate on homogeneity of wealth 
and size of the participating members within a regional grouping, and focus should be on 
institution building when creating a common market.
64
 For example, SADCC, and the PTA, were 
very closely linked regions, owing to both their geography and colonial heritage. During the 
1980s, however, when the PTA and SADCC were formed, they had different regional 
perspectives to contend with. While SADCC was saddled with apartheid regional practices, the 
PTA was faced with complying with the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA). The true realities of 
struggling economies set in as the apartheid government in South Africa began its wars against 
the liberation movements in Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Namibia, and within South 
Africa. A further issue was the SACU agreement that generated trade revenue for the weak 
economies of Lesotho, Swaziland and Botswana and that was linked to a monetary area.  
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John Akokpari defines regional cooperation as cooperation between states, which translate to 
regional integration and which is also a starting point for regional integration to advance. 
Regionalism in his view is a broadened concept that is beyond economic and market integration. 
Regionalisation, on the other hand, is seen as a broader process to include elements of both 
regionalism and interactions of formal and informal structures in a region. Later these processes 
could result in regionalisation.
65
 According to Marianne Marchand, Morten Bøås, and Timothy 
Shaw, they similarly describe region-ness, or regionality, as the various dimensions and 
exchanges of cultural affinities, political regimes, economic policies, and security 
arrangements.
66
 Tanzania for example, was instrumental in assisting with the liberation 
movements of Southern Africa. Tanzania, Angola and Mozambique became active participatory 
states in the involvement of the FLS and their liberation movements and struggle against white 
superiority and racism. Angola joined the Alliance members of Southern African states after 
independence in 1975. During the 1960s, Mozambique found a safe haven in Dar es Salaam for 
its Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO). The historical dimension of EAC also stems from 
the 1969 Lusaka Manifesto and Tanzania was a key player in forming the FLS.   
  
Akokpari provides a more definitive analysis of theories on regional integration in defining 
“regional integration” and “regional cooperation”, as well as “regionalism” and “regionalisation”, 
and his view is that theories have become conflated because these terms involve policies and 
harmonisation of such policies among states, as well as activities aimed at “accelerating regional 
development”.67 He also describes regional integration as a process that “... takes various forms 
including market integration (common markets) and development integration”.68 During the 
1980s, Zimbabwe had the second largest economy in Southern Africa after South Africa.  
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The link between the BLNS countries and their attachment to South Africa was SACU 
established in 1910, which remained a significant economic link during the 1980s and beyond. 
South Africa’s attachment to Zambia for example, was linked to the mining industry.69 Zambia 
received most of its mining equipment from South Africa and was also equipped by the South 
African government with mining skills and technology. South Africa has built up extensive 
investments in neighbouring countries that were aligned with the Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia 
and Swaziland (BLNS) states. But, in considering Warleigh-Lack’s views, an assessment of the 
historical legacy should thus be undertaken in relation to the economic, social, political and 
infrastructural development of the region. These socio-economic and political factors as well as 
security issues cannot be ignored, and define the pace and intentions of regional integration. Such 
factors include skills and education; labour migration; infrastructure such as transport and 
communications; trade and finance; and other critical components important for achieving 
regional development.  
 
South Africa as a hegemonic power has been a prominent player in regional integration efforts. 
Post 1994, South Africa assumed a market-driven developmental regional integration approach 
and a micro-regional approach. However, many states in the region accused South Africa’s 
multinational corporations (MNCs) of regional investments that benefited South Africa more.
70
 
South Africa’s regional strategy involved using Spatial Development Initiatives (SDIs) as a 
springboard to assist South Africa’s neighbours, while also attempting to improve South Africa’s 
own socio-economic and poverty stricken society with its huge skills shortages and poor 
education, poverty, and lack of the most basic of services such as running potable water, housing 
and sanitation. For example, the Maputo Development Corridor (MDC) that evolved from 
SADC’s SDIs was developed by South Africa with billions of dollars provided by the South 
African government.
71
 These issues are critical in order to grasp why Africa is struggling to grow 
its economies as Gregg Mills posits in his account of the reasons for Africa’s poverty and why 
the continent has lagged behind amidst an abundance of natural resources.
72
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But according to Ian Taylor, new regionalism is seen as having three different levels – macro, sub 
and micro – within regional projects that interact with and react to other elements of the global 
economy. These three levels Taylor also viewed as important in understanding how macro-
regions generate tensions and contradictions, for example within the SDIs of SADC that are 
linked to private partnerships and MNCs. These debates also evolved from the growing climate 
of globalisation in defining a new regional strategy for groupings like SADC and that focused on 
“developmental integration”.73 Taylor, Hettne, András Inotai, Osvaldo Sunkel, and Mittleman all 
expanded on “New Regionalism Approach/Theory (NRA/T)” that includes regionalism, 
regionalisation and transnational cross-border flows, which are seen as interdependencies within 
a global perspective and at multiple levels.
74
 John Ravenhill is also of the view that if political 
cooperation is effectively facilitated and institutionalised, African agency would be enhanced, 
could serve as a collective voice, and become meaningful at international forums (such as the 
WTO, or Group of 20 [G-20] summits).  
 
Therefore, one of the main reasons for creating RECs in Africa was to promote sustainable 
regional economic policies to address the imbalance of weaker economies against stronger ones 
within regional economic clusters. Africa’s states were clustered into regional groupings based 
merely on geographical proximity. As noted earlier, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland 
was established in August 1953,
75
 and alliances such as these had to spearhead infrastructure; 
however the region’s infrastructure, depleted by apartheid South Africa in its wars against 
regional states, did not bode well for socio-economic development. Neither did the migration 
movements from neighbouring states to South Africa advance regional integration during the 
1970s and 1980s, with labour continuously ebbing from the Southern African states. This left 
neighbouring countries in a great predicament in their attempts to rectify the damage and contend 
with a deteriorating infrastructure. It was therefore imperative for the OAU to consider the 
production of economic growth for Africa’s development.  
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The three RECs comprising eastern and Southern Africa were identified as pillars for Africa’s 
integration. These three RECs constitute 26 of Africa’s 55 countries, and have a combined 
population of 530 million people and a total GDP of $1.3 trillion, with a total GDP per capita 
averaging $1.180. Furthermore, they encompass over half of the AU’s membership and more 
than half of the African continent’s one billion people. They are COMESA, the EAC, and SADC. 
The AU’s Constitutive Act of 2000 and the Abuja Treaty of 1991 both viewed all three as the 
building blocks for achieving an African Economic Community (AEC).  
 
Furthermore, the regional economic communities also manage regional security mechanisms 
which place a further strain on these communities. Hence, for African agency to benefit the 
African continent, Ravenhill suggests that political cooperation should be encouraged instead of 
imposed by the African Union. Regional institutions should therefore serve as vehicles that 
strengthen the state; simultaneously sovereign capacity should be considered that could enhance 
regional cooperation and promote greater economic cooperation and, ultimately, regionalism.
76
  
 
In addition to the “New Regionalism Approach/Theory”77 of Fredrik Söderbaum and Björn 
Hettne, other forms of integration emerged in Africa, such as micro- and macro-regionalism. 
Micro-regions had seemingly become the backbone in public–private partnerships, and were 
more trans-border in nature, existing at both national and local levels and unlike macro-regions 
(world regions), as noted by Söderbaum and Taylor.
78
 Macro-regions are defined as:  “larger 
territorial units or sub-systems between the national and the global levels”.79 Söderbaum and 
Taylor draw this analysis from Mozambique and South Africa’s development corridor, where 
macro-regions are defined as larger territories or sub-systems between national and global 
levels.
80
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Similarly, Nikki Slocum-Bradley discusses similar regional schemes such as the Zambia–
Malawi–Mozambique Growth Triangle (ZMM-GT) (which covers the Zambezi Valley in 
Mozambique and certain micro-regions of Malawi and Zambia that border Mozambique) and 
defines them “as subjective phenomena that are continuously re-created through discourses by 
various actors and for various purposes […] the existence of regions is preceded by the existence 
of region-builders”.81   
 
However, an opposing view is provided by Olubanke King-Akerele and Kojo Asiedu of micro-
regions to that of Söderbaum and Taylor, and Slocum-Bradley that is also based on the ZMM-
GT. King-Akerele and Asiedu observed that micro-regions could be an innovative step to grow 
economies and a mechanism to withstand global competition, which the thesis will apply in 
chapter (4) of the thesis to ascertain how COMESA and SADC might grow their economies and 
mitigating the pernicious effects of open markets and whether it has the potential of convergence 
for the COMESA and SADC blocs.
82
 Further afield, ASEAN, for example, experienced the 
emergence of such sub-regional growth, comprising three-tier growth triangles. ASEAN’s growth 
triangles were believed to have contributed to economic growth because of the success of 
ASEAN’s economic growth trajectory. Ravenhill also provides a specific example and defined: 
“the Johor–Singapore–Riau Growth Triangle within ASEAN, which took advantage of 
Singapore’s skilled labour and developed infrastructure, Johor’s land and semiskilled labour, and 
Riau’s land and low-cost labour”.83 Quebec’s large industrialised region is another example of an 
economy’s forming successful micro-regions which were both independent and technologically 
advanced. Therefore, new regionalism can be defined as a process that develops in a multipolar 
context where the drivers do not have to be superpowers but can be more spontaneous; it includes 
states of semi-core and peripheral economies.
84
  
                                                 
81
 Nikki Slocum-Bradley, “The Zambia-Malawi-Mozambique Growth Triangle (ZMM-GT): Discursive Region-
building in Africa and Consequences for Development”, in, Söderbaum, and Taylor (eds.), Afro-Regions, 2008, p. 
90.   
82
 Olubanke King-Akerele and Kojo Boafo Asiedu, Accelerating Africa’s Integration Through Micro-Regionalism: 
The case of Zambia-Malawi-Mozambique Growth Triangle and Its Impact (Tema: Digibooks, 2013). 
83
 John Ravenhill, “The ‘new East Asian Regionalism’: A Political Domino Effect”, Review of International Political 
Economy, vol. 17, no. 2 (2010), pp. 173-177. 
84
 Ravenhill, “The ‘new East Asian Regionalism’: A Political Domino Effect”, 2010. 
48 
 
The African Union’s agenda on regional integration is also aimed at creating more efficient ways 
of building regional communities – hence the prominence afforded to fast-tracking regional 
integration through growth triangles with greater focus placed on the private sector. This is 
central in growth mechanisms that also include public–private sector partnerships as important 
strategies to achieve economic growth and that can contribute towards regional integration. The 
thesis will expand on how sub-regional economic zones have benefited member states within 
COMESA and SADC, such as South Africa and Mozambique’s relations with the MDC and 
discussed in chapter (4) of the thesis. Also assessed is South Africa’s micro-regional 
developmental integration approach in building infrastructure, such as the MDC and the energy 
grid – the Southern African Power Pool (SAPP) established in 1995 are assessed within the 
parameters of economic integration and convergence and how the South African government’s 
domestic condition affected its regional response which is discussed in chapter (4) of the thesis.  
 
2.2.2 Dependency theories 
 
Africa’s regional integration attempts cannot be discussed without assessing open markets of 
open trade and liberal agreements to assess economic growth. In taking these views into account, 
Bela Balassa posits that, “economic cooperation among member states to include actions aimed 
at lessening discrimination such as concluding international agreements on trade policies; and, 
economic integration and comprises measures and actions taken that suggests suppressing some 
forms of discrimination through removal of trade barriers.”85  
 
Currently it appears that Africa’s efforts of liberalising its markets, and, “lessening discrimination 
such as concluding international agreements on trade policies” by finalising trade policies and 
deals with the international community, such as the Economic Partnership Agreements
86
 with the 
European Union and other agreements such as the Europe-South Africa Trade Development and 
Cooperation agreement (EU-SA TDCA) of 1999, have impacted negatively on the region and 
may have further negative impact on COMESA and SADC’s diverging trade integration schemes 
and discussed in chapter (4) of the thesis.  
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John Friedmann explains the unequal nature of growth in world systems theory, and contends 
that wealth from the “core” or “semi-core” will not automatically filter down to peripheral 
economies. The periphery is always dependent on the core for its market, technology, and 
production (spillover). World systems theory posits that as the market economy of the core 
grows, it continually expands, ultimately creating a larger periphery (or a semi-periphery), which 
gradually transforms, taking on similar attributes to the core, which may include advanced levels 
of technology, production, and an efficient market. However, the core can also be seen to be 
dependent on the periphery through market exploitation, creating a periphery of the periphery 
(with poor, vulnerable and resource-depleted economies).
87
 The reality is that the region builders 
(government leaders) have not sufficiently merged policies of trade and policies of migration 
(labour).  
 
Owing to the Tripartite bloc’s (COMESA–EAC–SADC) infancy stages of development and trade 
since 2008, endowment factors that concern input and output have not been overly advantageous 
for regional integration. Knowledge spillover has been lagging as well. This, the thesis views as 
important and will expand on in addressing these conflicting views. As Justin Malewezi suggests, 
technological advancement and knowledge spillover are important to any region-building efforts; 
this the thesis will consider in discussing the regional economic integration processes of 
COMESA and SADC’s Tripartite agreement and their efforts to converge policy, 
implementation, and practice discussed in chapter (4) of the study.
88
  
 
Instead, Africa’s regional integration processes have adopted a market-led strategy of free trade – 
a neoclassical economic approach of open markets that works against the principles of variable 
geometry, which the COMESA–EAC–SADC have adopted as a mechanism and framework 
designed to protect smaller economies and infant industries. These policies are also still being 
negotiated. Several smaller economies have therefore become dependent on other forms and 
ways of economic growth to protect their infant industries. Such mechanisms entail signing 
external trade agreements. The thesis discusses these multiple memberships and bilateral 
international trade agreements in greater detail in Chapter (5.)  
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While market integration and regional trade are important factors to consider in COMESA and 
SADC’s regional integration attempts, state capital of hegemonic states has become increasingly 
important in influencing the pace of economic and regional growth and setting the pace for 
integration efforts. Robert Putnam’s “two-level game” model, adequately explains “how the 
relationship between diplomacy and domestic politics can be integrated”, and “domestic politics 
and international relations [are seen as interlinked and entangled]”.89 Stephan et.al, clearly 
defines Africa’s regional integration condition as being “constrained by globalisation, with 
realities of inadequate investment flows, adverse trading regimes, and the legacy of 
colonialism”.90  According to Putnam’s two-level game theory: 
 
“Each national political leader appears at both game boards. Across the international table sit his 
foreign counterparts, and at his elbows sit diplomats and other international advisors. Around the 
domestic table behind him sit party and parliamentary figures, spokespersons for domestic 
agencies, representatives of key interest groups, and the leader’s own political advisors. The 
unusual complexity of this two-level game is that moves that are rational for a player at one board 
(such as raising energy prices, conceding territory, or limiting auto imports) may be impolitic for 
the same player at the other board. Nevertheless, there are powerful incentives for consistency 
between the two games.”91     
 
In expanding on Putnam’s two-level game theory in chapter (5) of the thesis, South Africa’s 
investment through its market-driven approach, which recognises the importance of increasing 
intra-regional trade while balancing external trade within the SACU bloc, is expanded. Ian 
Bremmer further explains that the role of the hegemonic state in an integration process can either 
slow down economic growth by over regulating markets, or use the market as a means to bolster 
self-fulfilled trade for a state’s own gains and for domestic and political positions.92 Moreover, 
regional integration has been affected by state capitalism, which has become prominent in state 
inter-relations, and has placed a damper on regions by stifling trade liberalisation and distorting 
markets.  
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According to Bremmer: “government sectors that own the world’s largest oil companies, and 
those controlling three-quarters of the world’s energy reserves, have huge influence on the 
direction of trade and have further influenced the pace of regional integration”.93 Various other 
processes have also hampered regional integration efforts in Africa. Globally, regional integration 
had been overshadowed by competing rounds of over 200 bilateral agreements, a mechanism to 
circumvent the Uruguay Rounds of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (now 
called the WTO) to raise tariffs. Bremmer also suggests that: “protectionism begets 
protectionism, and subsidies beget subsidies”.94 From the neoclassical realist perspective, the 
literature on regional integration identifies that ‘tit-for-tat’ tactics and various power games 
exercised by states can erode cooperation and disadvantage peripheral economies; this creates 
regional economic divergence instead of convergence. For example, the Doha Round of 
international trade talks that failed in 2008, was effected by the US and the EU’s agricultural 
tariffs, leaving China and India dissatisfied with the Doha Round process and wanting to protect 
both their farmers and infant industries.
95
  
 
In considering Africa’s economic integration processes, Hazelwood,96 purports that Africa’s 
markets are  largely driven through free trade that entails reductions in tariffs between states and 
other methods of lowering transaction costs between them, such as common currencies and 
lowered restrictions on labour and capital mobility within a region. Therefore, such strategies 
require effective policy mechanisms for economies to progress. Gambari underscores that 
conventional integration theories tended to focus largely on economic prerequisites such as gains 
in trade as discussed by Jacob Viner,
97
 and were largely a means to gain from exchanges in trade 
and led to either trade creation or trade diversion. Gambari indicates that economic factors, 
including the free movement of goods and elements of production, as well as the elimination of 
discrimination and discriminatory policies among member states, have not been conducive to 
Africa’s economies and do not benefit LDCs.98      
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Gains and benefits in a regional scheme are important considerations for states, depending on 
what the gains and benefits are. Andre Gunder Frank,
99
 provides a different view from what 
Friedmann suggested (as noted above) in World Systems Theory. Frank identifies the “core” as 
feeding off the periphery, which distorts trade, but regional trade agreements are believed to help 
address such conflicting objectives of distorted trade through policy formulation and 
implementation as Hazelwood and Gambari posit. Further discussion on trade distortion and 
unequal benefits, and how these unequal gains and benefits are derived are expanded on by Jens 
Haarløv.
100
 In related but different contexts in the literature review, James Gathii’s101 focus on 
bilateral trade groupings is further explored in Chapter 5 of the thesis.  
 
Regional integration discussed above highlighted the attempts made by Africa to join forces and 
integrate the region through regional economic communities through promoting open markets 
and free trade areas but as discussed above divergence and convergence of regional integration 
attempts in Africa can occur. Because economic growth linked to open markets and free trade 
(pursued by COMESA and SADC) is largely based on neoclassical economics, the thesis now 
turns to understanding this debate and the literature review is thus premised on the divergence 
and convergence literature of neoclassical economics and to which we now turn.  
 
2.3 Neoclassical economics: divergence and convergence 
 
Like the concept of regional integration, divergence and convergence is a multi-dimensional 
concept to analyse and to assess through a single prism, which is economic growth policy. The 
literature will now outline economic growth models that demonstrate how divergence and/or 
convergence in regional groups and countries can be achieved that favour free trade through 
eliminating discriminatory policies as well as fostering industrialisation, technology and 
knowledge-driven production factors in endogenous growth models.  
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The literature will also highlight how convergence can be achieved by poorer countries’ 
becoming on par in their per capita income with that of rich countries over a long-term period (6, 
10, and 18 years) (in the example of South Africa in SACU); in time such countries could benefit 
from technology knowledge spillover. The literature on divergence and convergence will also 
explain how the growth experienced within a rich state can benefit smaller economies within a 
regional bloc, and how such benefits can advantage and disadvantage regional integration 
processes.  
 
While the body of literature on regional integration, divergence and convergence is intertwined in 
the observations on regions and to fully comprehend the neoclassical economics approach, the 
literature review will first discuss the genesis of the approach and then move the discussion to 
contemporary theories of neoclassical economics of divergence and convergence and how these 
theories and discussions could relate to COMESA and SADC’s promoting of convergence 
through regional integration. The literature review will also broadly explain, overlapping 
memberships and security integration and their relevance to the literature review and the overall 
thesis, which is further outlined below. Early studies (during the 1960s) on divergence and 
convergence focused primarily on the United States, as well as states and groups in Europe. 
Traditional industries in these countries were strongly driven by rules of competition combined 
with intensified levels of knowledge production in technology and research design.
102
  
 
The prediction of the theory is that “poorer economies will show faster growth than richer 
economies, which will therefore converge over time towards common levels of per capita 
income.”103  
As suggested by Meier: 
“According to the second generation of development economists, correct policies were to move 
from inward-looking strategies toward liberalization of foreign trade regime and export 
promotion; to submit to stabilization programmes; to privatize state-owned enterprises; and to 
follow the dictates of the market price system. Through its guidance toward the correct policies, 
neo-classical economics were believed to be the safeguard against policy-induced distortions and 
nonmarket failures.”104  
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classical economic growth model indicates: “that a reduction of barriers to trade associated with 
economic integration will lead to increased growth for poor countries”,105 and will show faster 
growth for poor versus rich countries, with economies converging “over time towards a common 
level of per capita income associated with strong, absolute, and unconditional convergence”.106 
But there was also a divergence in this understanding of economic growth, with Western and 
Eastern economic performances showing different development outputs. Within the classical 
economic approach there was poor economic performance in the West, but growth in Eastern 
economies was observed in technology and space shuttle (Sputnik) launches, as well as rapidly 
growing economies in the Soviet Union.
107
 
 
The concepts of divergence and convergence have been evolving since the work of Robert Solow 
in 1956, and have as their origins classical economics linked to economic growth theory.
108
 These 
two concepts stem from the 1929 Great Depression, and the 1940s and 1950s aftermath of under-
development after the Second World War. Samuelson’s (1949) writing on classical economics 
was conducted through abstract modelling and began setting a new path and a different model for 
classical economists.
109
 However, theories also differed among economists. The Solow theory 
predicted that economic integration would lead to an increase in efficiency, and hence an increase 
in income per capita with growth accelerating to a new equilibrium. But it does not provide 
explanations for how technology spillover could affect economic growth. At that time, Solow’s 
model was seen as an idealised case, not sufficiently taking into account the real world. This 
reality portrayed various frictions and deviations from the ideal conditions caused by 
monopolistic and oligopolistic imperfections of the market, external economies, price and wage 
rigidities, and lack of information and technological advances.
110
  
 
The huge under-development of least developed countries was an added factor to the debate of 
classical economics. The classical economic model was attempting to find ways and means to 
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address the LDCs’ under-development and poor conditions. For example, Schultz, in 1964, noted 
that the LDCs were poor economic performers, largely owing to government failures. Therefore, 
fixing markets through government intervention would not rectify the economies of the poor 
states.
111
 Governments of LDCs were to conform to principles of market openness, fiscal 
discipline, and non-interventionism in order to gain from economic development, and hence 
growth rates and national wealth of LDCs would over time equal those of developed countries. 
Theories varied and scholars differed in their understanding of and solutions to why some states 
remained impoverished, and tried to deploy strategies that would assist least developed countries 
to grow their economies, and similarly grow out of poverty. Solutions were also sought by 
classical economists in trying to understand the protracted decline of the US production 
industries and failing world markets. In Gilpin’s view, the controversy that ensued was between 
the development economists and development theorists. For the development school, LDCs were 
different from the industrialised group, functioned in a different economic setting, and were 
victims of “late-late” development.112  
 
Development theorists also believed that the strategy for development should be trade 
protectionism and import substitution, as well as building industrial structures behind high tariff 
walls. These ideas were proposed by leading economists, like Raúl Prebisch, who was heading 
ECLA and UNCTAD. Prebisch’s ideas also became central to the import-substitution strategies 
of Latin America.
113
 For the classical economic historians, productivity and related variables 
were inconclusive; they operated in silos without linkages afforded to long-run economic growth, 
which omitted historiography from the debate. These ideas found expression in the views of 
Alexander Gerschenkron,
114
 arguing against the neoclassical economists’ view that US 
productivity growth rates had been low relative to those of Germany, Japan, and many other 
countries. Other spurts of integration with Solow’s economic growth model contributed to the 
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public finance work undertaken by David Cass, which addressed his question of determining 
factors on optimal savings.
115
 
 
While the Keynesian model contributed to the neoclassical economic approach, various global 
events equally shaped the thinkers.
116
 Such events were the 1973 OPEC oil-producing countries 
that saw huge financial surpluses later recycled as international bank loans to LDCs, which 
resulted in a wave of global financial shocks and debt crises.
117
 The neoclassical economic model 
evolved largely from the success of East Asia in 1997, which ushered in variables of endogenised 
growth theory and accumulation of factors. This success was attributed to rapid accumulation of 
capital and labour, and the basic factors of production in supporting the neoclassical growth 
model.
118
 Attempts made to understand how economic growth could be accurately measured in 
the divergence and convergence fraternity of debates, with claims that labour productivity and 
per capita income levels in the industrialised market economies that have tended to converge 
since the second World War (1945–1980s), with convergence implying a tendency for the poorer 
countries in the group to grow more rapidly than the richer ones – also led to doubts in terms of 
the empirical evidence.  
 
It was not clear to all scholars whether the Solow model suggests that when broadening the 
analysis of endogenous growth theory to a wider spectrum within a regional grouping, 
convergence necessarily leads to growth, as it was assumed that it is due to absence of income 
convergence among countries. Robert Lucas,
119
 and Paul Romer
120
 suggested that convergence 
would only occur in an endogenous technological change model that considers “an equilibrium 
model of endogenous technological change in which long-run growth is driven primarily by the 
accumulation of knowledge by forward-looking, profit maximizing agents”.121  
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The divergence and convergence theories further expanded into the business, labour, finance, and 
history economic paradigms. Edward Prescott used the Solow technology parameter to develop 
the neoclassical stochastic growth model in their study. The study assessed business cycle 
fluctuations to estimate aggregate consequences of public finance and terms of trade shocks. 
Expanding on the Solow model predictions, “the neoclassical stochastic growth model unravels 
the argument that: “Once the model has a multistage production process, the neoclassical growth 
theory predicts the high volatility of inventory investment and also the fact that inventory stocks 
lag the business cycle.”122 Similarly, business economist, Gary Hansen, expanded his model 
based on the Solow model and “introduced non-convexities into the mapping between hours 
allocated to market activities and units of labor service produced, a feature of the economy well 
documented by micro observations”.123 The neoclassical economic growth model expanded into 
the financial markets and added to the Stanford Grossman and Robert Shiller study of stock 
market volatility.
124
 
 
2.3.1 Market-driven trade liberalisation and economic growth  
 
Building on the theories and empirical evidence of endogenous growth factors that lead to 
convergence, Lucas also argued that the endogenous growth model lacked the variables of 
diversity across countries, labour mobility, and the enormous pressures for immigration seen in 
the real world.
125
 As suggested by Lucas, such variables were necessary to consider, based on the 
fluidity of movement of people in the world. The analysis observed that the endogenous growth 
model was missing key variables such as human capital and government policies, and the 
incorporation of these variables would provide a different result.  
 
The divergence and convergence literature was also focused on conventional integration theories 
which tend to concentrate on economic factors and promote more efficient use of resources, 
eliminating discriminatory practices such as import substitution, and free movement of goods and 
services in a customs union. These older debates are discussed by Gambari, Mytelka, and also by 
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Walter Ochoro.
126
 As Gambari posits, not all these processes have been conducive to Africa’s 
integration attempts. They constitute regional integration driven by developed countries, causing 
divergence in trade that has not been profitable for trade creation. Particularly in the areas of 
eliminating import substitution, Africa’s governments have neglected to implement such policies, 
which are relevant for supporting LDCs in markets of free trade. The researcher finds these views 
relevant to the study and they are expanded on in the thesis. Such views outline that regional 
economic integration is a concept that involves state actors coming together in their economic 
activities to trade, and, in the case of COMESA and SADC, to create free trade. African 
governments have been attempting to address the obstacles of regional integration. These 
obstacles include barriers to trade: “a) to reduce supply-side constraints, improve competitiveness 
and promote industrialisation and diversification; b) to take practical steps to reduce trade barriers 
and facilitate trade; and, c) to deepen regional integration.”127  Neoclassical economics is based 
on conventional neoclassical growth theory, as it is assumed that economic integration will occur 
when there is a reduction of barriers to trade and will lead to increased efficiency and income per 
capita convergence.  
  
In measuring economic growth in trade liberalisation, Robert Barro and Xavier Sala-i-Martin 
provide an understanding of economic growth convergence by outlining two levels of 
convergence models as a basis for their theory. These are defined as beta-convergence (β) or, 
absolute convergence (also defined as the catch-up process), and sigma-convergence (ơ) (when 
the dispersion among a group of countries tends to decrease over time).
128
 Barro and Sala-i-
Martin assessed the European economic and monetary policies measured against the removal of 
trade barriers, harmonisation of regulations, and liberalisation of capital and labour movements. 
The main empirical study was applied to patterns of convergence across 73 regions of Western 
Europe, as well as growth across the United States. The findings suggests that countries such as 
the US as well as European markets experienced club convergence in increased economic 
integration processes of trade liberalisation when factors of mobility were considered, and this 
led to opportunities for economies of scale and specialisation. Barro and Sala-i-Martin also 
observed that reducing transport and transaction costs could lead to greater “spatial 
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agglomeration” as well as specialisation. These findings also suggest that easing and reducing 
costs of settling payments with a single currency led to convergence of factor prices across the 
US and European markets, but in addition also led to convergence in economic structures as well 
as per capita incomes.
129
 But as Rob Davies has indicated, in Africa, which is lagging behind in 
economic growth and is saddled with many weak economies, benefits of functional spillover 
have not been as significant as in the instances of the EU and the US, given the infrastructure 
incapacities that Africa has yet to deal with.
130
   
      
In shaping growth model studies, research measuring growth performance in trade liberalisation 
by Dowrick and Duc-Tho Nguyen,
131
 focused on comparative economic growth performances of 
the Organisation for Economic Development (OECD) countries using trade liberalisation as a 
criterion. Their results indicated that labour productivity as a convergence variable was 
inadequate to measure economic performance. The model proposed total factor productivity 
(TFP) as the ‘catch-up’ and as a variable: “TFP catch-up implies a tendency for income levels to 
converge, but such a tendency may be masked or exaggerated if factor intensity growth varies 
systematically with income growth.”132 Furthermore, Dowrick and Nguyen observed that if 
poorer countries were to invest substantially more in employment and output than richer 
countries did, the convergence in labour productivity would be more rapid than in total factor 
productivity, since faster capital accumulation assisted the least developing countries’ catch-up 
with the industrialised countries in their model testing. In expanding on endogenous growth 
factors in industrialisation and value addition of inter-regional trade, the thesis will employ 
Dowrick and Duc-Tho Nguyen’s TFP as a catch up variable for downstream industries and is 
discussed in chapter (5).      
 
Various approaches conducted in divergence and convergence growth economic models have 
provided different results. For instance, Oded Galor’s theory on divergence and convergence was 
a response to the controversy in the debates of the neoclassical economic growth theory models 
in frameworks by Paul Romer; Barro and Sala-i-Martin; and Gregory Mankiw, David Romer, 
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and David Weil. Galor’s findings indicated that the absolute convergence hypothesis that 
suggests: 
“… per capita incomes of countries converge to one another in the long run independently of 
initial conditions as inconclusive; since an economy’s long-run equilibrium depends on its 
structural characteristics (e.g. technologies, preferences, population growth, government policy, 
factor market structure, etc.) Absolute convergence [therefore] requires convergence in structural 
characteristics across countries.”133  
 
Galor’s work on divergence and convergence further argued that the “traditional neoclassical 
growth paradigm in club convergence hypothesis as well as in the conditional convergence 
hypothesis is empirically linked and therefore should include key variables such as human 
capital, income distribution, and fertility in conventional growth modelling, along with capital 
market imperfections, externalities, and non-convexities”. Galor also posits: “i) The absolute 
convergence hypothesis – per capita incomes of countries converge to one another in the long-run 
independently of their initial conditions (Paul Romer; Robert Lucas; and Barro). ii) The 
conditional convergence hypothesis – per capita incomes of countries that are identical in their 
structural characteristics (e.g. preferences, technologies, rates of population growth, government 
policies, etc.) converge to one another in the long-run independently of their initial conditions 
(Barro; Gregory Mankiw, David Romer and David Weil; and Barro and Sala-i-Martin). iii) The 
club convergence hypothesis (Steven Durlauf and Paul Johnson; and Danny Quah) (polarisation, 
persistent poverty, and clustering) – per capita incomes of countries that are identical in their 
structural characteristics converge to one another in the long-run provided that their initial 
conditions are similar as well.
134
  
 
As Ron Martin points out, within trade liberalisation, club convergence can be hampered “if 
economies in a region differ in their basic growth parameters (such as saving ratios, technological 
innovativeness, human capital development, etc), or spill-over of knowledge between economies 
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is weak, and therefore they may not converge to a common per capita income but instead to 
different economy-specific equilibrium levels of relative per capita income (so-called 
‘conditional’ or ‘weak’ convergence)”.135  
 
Divergence among groups was also discussed by Matthew Slaughter, who provided an expanded 
understanding of the difference-in-differences methodology (comparative methodology 
approach) to assess income dispersion, and which compares convergence patterns among 
countries before and after liberalisation of open trade in those countries, as well as with the 
convergence pattern among a control (selected group) group of countries before and after trade 
liberalisation. Slaughter’s methodology tested trade liberalisation effects on income convergence 
over four liberalisation groups: the European Economic Commission (EEC); the European Free 
Trade Association (EFTA); trade liberalisation between the EEC and EFTA; and the Kennedy 
Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. The main empirical result was that trade 
liberalisation did not foster significant convergence among liberalisers in any of the four 
controlled groups.
136
   
 
The divergence and convergence literature outlined various historical models and studies and 
provided empirical evidence that largely centred on the neoclassical growth model, which 
focused on growth paths. However, a more holistic approach is required to assess convergence of 
free trade agreements and intra-regional trade, which we now discuss. 
 
2.3.2 Free trade agreements and Intra-regional trade: divergence and convergence  
 
The 1973 oil crisis and subsequent global events precipitated other equations and findings to the 
neoclassical economics debate. These events were mainly centred on the success achieved by 
Asian countries between the periods 1997–1998, which was after the collapse of major markets in 
1973 with OPEC’s increase of oil prices. During the same period, Europe’s economic growth was 
not as successful in managing the financial global crisis as it was for Asian countries, as Richard 
Griffith
137
 contends. Asian countries’ growth levels were due to their dynamic economic 
performance and achievements, largely drawn from specialisation and market competitiveness, 
                                                 
135
 Ron Martin, “EMU Versus the Regions?, 2000. 
136
 Matthew J. Slaughter, “Trade Liberalization and per Capita Income Convergence: A Difference-In-Differences 
Analysis”, Journal of International Economics, vol. 55 (2001), pp. 203-228. 
137
 Richard Griffith, “The Dynamics and States of European Construction, 1945-1995, SADC-EU”, Seminar on the 
Regional Integration Process (1995), p. 78.  
62 
 
whereas European businesses needed to improve their international competitiveness. Japan, for 
example, was undercutting Europe’s products in consumer heavy-duty products, and also in car 
manufacturing. In addition to the economic crisis, Europe was also faced with the Bretton Woods 
system that collapsed in 1973, leaving the European Economic Commission unable to support its 
member states.
138
 Further studies conducted in Europe during the 1990s by Dan Ben-David were 
based on the trade arrangement of EU member states. These deliberated how to improve their 
economies and whether there had been any success achieved in economic and social conditions in 
free trade areas among the member states of the group. The findings noted that convergence led 
to growth for poorer economies and highlighted that trade agreements in free trade areas and 
customs unions could have a significant effect on growth in this region. Therefore the hypothesis 
supported the finding that trade liberalisation in a group of states could lead to economic growth 
in income per capita convergence.
139
  
 
Since the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade processes of 1990, literature on exports and 
growth started rapidly evolving in the convergence debates. Francisco Rodriquez and Dani 
Rodrik made this clear distinction on the evolving nature of the trade growth divergence and 
convergence debate that was centred on openness and growth. Rodriquez and Rodrik noted that: 
“between 1980 and 1991, studies were conducted that were more concentrated on per capita 
income growth modelling in openness and growth, which focused on exports and growth in trade. 
However, since the GATT negotiation processes, studies conducted from mid-1991onwards 
focused more on trade policy and economic growth.”140  
 
One of the leading economists, Paul Krugman
141
 further advanced research on divergence and 
convergence in free trade agreements. He provided an expanded view of Asia’s economic 
performance, termed the ‘Asian Miracle’, and the ability of Asian economies to weather the 
economic crisis of 1997/1998. In studying Asia’s growth patterns, Krugman indicated that 
extrapolating growth favours a progressive policy and not a laissez-faire approach, where states 
leave it all up to the markets. But instead, to experience economic growth in trade liberalisation, 
states needed to implement economic policy that incorporated sophisticated industrial policies 
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and selective protectionism. He further contended: “On one side are increases in ‘inputs’: growth 
in employment, in the education level of workers, and in the stock of physical capital (machines, 
buildings, roads, and so on). On the other side are increases in the output per unit of input; such 
increases may result from better management or better economic policy, but in the long run are 
primarily due to increases in knowledge”.142 Krugman’s growth accounting tautology also 
outlined that a developed index is important to combine all measurable inputs that are able to 
measure the rate of growth of national income relative to that index. Krugman’s hypothesis, 
defined in endogenous growth, which assumes that convergence in economic integration can 
contribute to and yield higher growth rates, and allow states to converge regional economic 
systems relatively easily, is in contrast to Gambari’s view.  
 
Gambari and Mytelka observed that for the economies of LDCs, larger markets might not be able 
to enhance greater flows of foreign capital and endogenous factors of spillover in skilled labour, 
and suggested that there should be processes in place to support import substitution, with trade in 
Africa being conducted in foreign currency, leading to trade diversion. The literature of Krugman 
on regional convergence
143
 is of particular relevance to the thesis. As Martin also suggested that, 
“the dependence of regional economies on export clusters held together by local Marshallian144 
type external economies, reaps benefits from specialised labour of technological spillover, and 
leads to increasing economic returns that can benefit the regional states, by placing them at a 
competitive advantage.”145 Krugman purports, growth accounting needs to calculate explicit 
measures of both “increases in the output per unit of input”. Increases in knowledge can be 
positive for growth convergence. However, growth measurements must be considered in the 
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process of economic growth. The view is that “per capita income can only occur if there is a rise 
in output per unit of input”.146 Krugman does not take into consideration the aspects of rules of 
origin that concern inputs of production in his accounting index. The literature review identified 
this as a gap in his research; therefore the thesis will expand on this in respect of COMESA and 
SADC’s rules of origin policy and the effects thereof in the multilateral trade agreements of 
AGOA, and EPAs. This discussion is attempted in Chapter 5 and the views of Frank Flatters
147
 
are also taken into account, which underscore that rules of origin could lead to divergence of 
trade policies in regional schemes, should policies not conform or be streamlined and addressed 
at both national and regional levels. Of equal relevance is endogenous growth factors in support 
of industrialisation and value addition in inter-regional trade and meaningful for the Tripartite 
bloc’s convergence. The chapter therefore employ Dowrick and Duc-Tho Nguyen’s TFP as a 
catch up variable for downstream industries and is discussed in chapter (5).      
 
A more expanded view of regional convergence theory is provided by Ochoro
148
. He holds the 
view that: “convergence is more likely to occur when technology and production are adequately 
incorporated into a regional grouping and where governments play more of a central role. 
Policies should therefore reflect such strategies that develop appropriate technologies, promote 
research and development, address essential tax credits, develop new ways for infrastructure, and 
formulate strategic trade policies.”149 Moreover, when all these factors are considered, infant 
industries could then be protected and have the tenacity to foster further innovation across a range 
of other related industries, which could also converge regional integration policies.
150
 Besides 
considering technology, and research and development to spearhead production and economic 
growth convergence, various other factors are also at play. For example, technical barriers to 
trade (TBTs) are viewed as the yardstick for the harmonisation of technical regulations and 
standards of conformity, as well as assessment of products traded in goods and services. Hence, 
such frameworks as outlined by Ochoro should consider TBTs in convergence of economic 
growth. Similarly, Carolyn Jenkins and Lynne Thomas highlighted that governments should 
coordinate effective policies that can mitigate the effects of labour within national economies: to 
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gain from remittances and income flows is an important mechanism in converging economic 
growth. Therefore, governments should also ensure that opportunities for labour are concentrated 
in industries that could mitigate the effects of trade diversion and allow for growth.
151
  
 
Phillip O Nying’uro holds the view that the capitalist global order has been more diverging than 
converging.
152
 These theories are further elaborated in Chapter 3 of the thesis in assessing the 
rationalisation processes of the PTA and SADCC institutions. The theories on divergence and 
convergence are also relevant to the thesis in understanding South Africa’s role (prior to its first 
democratic elections in 1994) in the rationalisation process within these two RECs, and are 
therefore expanded in Chapter 3.         
 
The theory and literature review outlines a mixed bag of evidence in the studies on divergence 
and convergence in trade liberalisation which was mainly centred on by Western scholars on the 
United States and Europe. Furthermore, these studies mainly focused on measuring “factor 
outputs against intermediate inputs” and on economic divergent or convergent economic growth 
and per capita income convergence. The literature review also discussed trade liberalisation and 
open market performance by measuring population, as well as income per capita and endogenous 
growth factors such as technology, skills, and production spill-over that could lead to growth.  
 
A recent report of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD),
153
 
outlined several studies on various continents, including Africa. The report highlighted that 
globalisation and technological change can affect income distribution. The report’s findings also 
revealed that since policies influence the nature and speed of economic integration, they will also 
influence and affect the process of structural change and the related creation of employment and 
wage opportunities in high-productivity activities.
154
 Therefore UNCTAD highlighted that 
economic structures should not be implemented in silos and should neither be independent of 
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trade and financial integration, nor its management and implementation, but should be seen as a 
joint process.  
 
The G-20 Summit that met in Brisbane on 15 November 2014 highlighted in their meeting that 
Africa’s economies were over-reliant on natural resources; Africa’s services sector was similarly 
weak. Africa’s policymakers should therefore consider enhancing the productive manufacturing 
sectors, which are believed to be the key to Africa’s convergence. The missing piece in trade 
convergence and sluggish growth were noted to be due to the slow pace of industrialisation, and 
it was unlikely that Africa could replicate the convergence dynamics evident in Europe and 
Asia.
155
 Similar views were expressed by William Baumol in respect of how to increase 
convergence through productivity levels.
156
 Such an approach needed to take into account the 
macroeconomic principles that are able to support the concepts to which endogenous growth 
theorists like Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman allude.
157
  
 
Concepts that pertain to knowledge spillover and specialisation in Robert Baldwin’s discussion 
on openness and growth, highlight that endogenous factors that lead to increasing returns do not 
adequately inform how trade policy can affect growth rates.
158
 In expanding the literature on 
endogenous factors leading to growth, Baldwin discussed policy and implementation levels and 
suggested that policies affecting the “openness” of trade and investment or its “inward 
orientation” or “outward orientation” should incorporate components of “outward-looking 
development policies that take into account endogenous growth factors as well as addressing 
government’s inward-looking and outward-looking policies, which involve more than just trade 
and trade policies.”159 Baldwin further noted that: “consideration of such factors would then lead 
to growth convergence for poorer economies. Policies should therefore also include the 
willingness of governments to accept foreign direct investment (FDI) so that market-oriented 
exchange rates are maintained; budget deficits and corruption are tightly monitored; and 
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monopolistic behaviour by firms and industries is controlled so that trade and growth are not 
restricted to individual states within a group”.160 This discussion is relevant to the thesis in 
discussing the formation of SADCC to SADC and is particularly pertinent to chapter (3) of the 
thesis.    
 
2.3.3 Macroeconomic policies – divergence and convergence 
 
The literature review further explores the divergence and convergence debate of macroeconomic 
policies within regions. A study conducted by UNECA, which tests macroeconomic policies 
using econometric testing of income per capita, GDP, and economic fiscal growth factors within 
regional economic groups, noted that: “African governments should consider harmonising and 
coordinating macroeconomic policies at national levels as a first step first in considering a 
monetary union.”161 Similarly, David Dollar, notes that “within a macroeconomic regional 
framework, weak trade policy must be addressed and prioritised early on in an integration 
process. This will help in financial integration at the regional level and facilitate the 
institutionalisation and implementation process thereof, which constitutes more than just focusing 
on trade liberalisation.”162 Ogochukwu Nzewi stressed that: “weak national economies are also 
characterised by poor organisational learning, lack of resources (human, technical, and financial) 
and weak, politically marginalised secretariats”,163 and such factors should be equally taken into 
account when considering regional monetary schemes.
164
 According to UNECA, the extent to 
which national macroeconomic policies reflect government’s monetary, fiscal, trade and 
exchange policies, often discriminates against regional trade and is seen as the main impediment 
to viable integration.
165
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More progressive regional blocs such as Europe, Bernard Fingleton, Harry Garretsen and Martin 
contended that the European Monetary Union (EMU) was not able to support EMU member 
states’ economies during the 2008 and 2009 global economic crisis and caused divergence among 
members.
166
 They also observed that during the first major economic shock in 2008, the EMU’s 
meltdown raised several questions of whether monetary integration for regions, which had a 
shared institutional monetary policy, would lead to divergence or convergence in conditions of 
economic crisis. Europe is still trying various mechanisms to address its falling economy in the 
eurozone. While geography played a major role in the economic and monetary integration plans 
for Europe, peripheral eurozone members were also tied to a monetary policy and to the 
European Central Bank (ECB) that was largely dominated by the large economies of Germany, 
France, and Italy (eurozone member states). Hence, Fingleton, Garretsen and Martin argued that 
the peripheral eurozone members lacked the adjustment mechanisms needed to avoid a severe 
negative economic shock in the 2008 and 2009 economic crises and were worse off than those 
states of non-eurozone members.
167
  
 
The European Commission has ever since the economic crises battled to keep some of its 
economies afloat. In January 2015, the ECB launched a government bond-buying programme of 
one trillion euros, known as the quantitative easing programme, as a rescue plan to revive the 
economic growth and to ward off deflation for Europe.
168
 According to an article by Reuters, this 
meant that the ECB would purchase bonds to deal with sovereign debt from March 2015 to the 
end of September 2016, and release into the EU market bonds to the value of 60 billion euros 
($68 billion) a month in the form of cheap loans to banks.
169
 Fingleton, Garretsen and Martin 
observed that a monetary union could lead to regional divergence and greater disparity, and make 
regions more vulnerable. Optimum currency areas (OCAs), Fingleton, Garretsen and Martin also 
observed, were not part of the initial planners and were not incorporated into the EMU’s 
framework when it was created. “The OCA theory highlights that symmetry, flexibility, and 
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integration are key variables to consider when forming a monetary union.”170 Fingleton, 
Garretsen and Martin also noted that “within the eurozone, core states that were closely 
connected to economic powerhouses like Germany, suffered less in terms of employment loss, 
which was in contrast to those states of the peripheral regions (Ireland, Spain, the Baltic states, 
and Greece)”. “These peripheral states had also fared worse during the financial recessions of 
2008 and 2009 and experienced greater divergence”.171  
 
Various scholars suggest that African economies like SADC member states are not ready for 
macroeconomic convergence.
172
 This is mainly due to the caveat that states regional blocs must 
have sound financial policies that are resilient and able to support the bloc during global financial 
crises, and also have the ability to handle market crises and shocks. Such factors require strong 
macroeconomic principles as suggested by Jenkins and Thomas.
173
 In the instance of Eastern and 
Southern Africa, the closest to a monetary union has been the trilateral monetary agreement 
among the governments of Lesotho, Swaziland, and South Africa, which established the 
Common Monetary Area on April 1, 1986 and links member states of SACU (excluding 
Botswana in the case of the Common Monetary Area).  
 
The literature reviewed the benefits of a monetary unification model which entailed a monetary 
policy managed by a regional central bank and fiscal policies managed with national 
governments, as in the case of the EU.  Keith Jefferis, in studying the SADC region, observed 
that not all macroeconomic convergence processes are designed to support the processes of 
monetary unions.
174
 There are both economic and political costs associated with monetary union 
formations. Such costs are high for some states, since ceding levels of autonomy in the fields of 
monetary and exchange rate policy could have various implications at the national level.
175
 At the 
economic stage, implications may be associated with reducing and minimising economic policy 
instruments, which could have been previously available to bear the burden of adjustment to 
economic shocks for national economies. But as the OCA literature highlighted, a monetary 
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union must have the flexibility over fiscal policy to compensate for the loss of policy instruments 
such as monetary and exchange rate policies.
176
  Jenkins and Thomas also observed that efforts to 
grow economies in Africa through regions have generated slow growth due to the huge 
differences in economies, geography, technology advances and poverty levels. Therefore, efforts 
of trade liberalisation must become the driving force to effect growth. Converging currency could 
lead to divergence in economic growth. Africa’s states are not ready to manage macroeconomic 
convergence, which requires sound macroeconomic principles. Such principles must be informed 
by macroeconomic policy, fiscal adjustment, foreign investment, and socio-economic policies 
that are able to support infrastructure and education, export promotion, and compensatory 
mechanisms.  
 
Moreover, policies should be aligned with and coordinated between domestic economic policies 
and reform strategies in trade reforms.
177
 Jenkins and Thomas further suggested that more 
emphasis should be placed on economic and trade policy reforms at national level. At the 
regional level, a medium-term coordinated approach should be underpinned by the direct effects 
of cross-border transactions.
178
 Richard Gibb observed that “regional integration has been a 
contested issue in Africa, but there is no doubt that the level of intra-regional trade provides a 
useful indicator of economic integration and regional convergence”.179 “RECs boost regional 
trade through tariff reductions and limit non-tariff barriers.”180 The neoclassical growth model 
also stresses the importance for governments to focus more on physical investment to expand 
national outputs. Investment in equipment and research is critical to advance technology; equally 
important is investment in infrastructure (roads, ports and railways).
181
 The literature reviewed in 
this section outlined the benefits of a monetary unification model, which entailed a monetary 
policy managed by a regional central bank and fiscal policies managed with national 
governments. The literature review also outlined that not all macroeconomic convergence 
processes are designed to support the processes of monetary unions and COMESA and SADC are 
still at the phase of converging trade protocols. These two blocs are also confronted with member 
states belonging to more than one regional grouping, which the literature review next assesses.  
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2.4 Multiple memberships: divergence and convergence  
 
Regional integration is important for convergence of COMESA and SADC’s integration efforts – 
these two blocs are challenged by member states belonging to more than one regional economic 
community. Multiple memberships have consequently been seen as both a hurdle and also as a 
positive step towards integrating regional schemes.
182
 This section of the theoretical framework 
examines the literature and theories in relation to multiple memberships and trade agreements in 
regional integration efforts of COMESA and SADC. Gathii highlights that multiple memberships 
are created by states when governments use the market as a means to benefit domestic 
economies. This Gathii attributes to the proliferation of multilateral trade agreements which lead 
to divergence in regional integration efforts.
183
 Rodriquez and Rodrik also noted that trade 
growth and growth rates will diverge to the extent that trade policies are reinforced and trade 
volumes increased; therefore other forms of integration will be pursued by states in an attempt to 
remedy skew trade in order to protect infant industries.
184
  
 
Robert Gilpin
185
 provides an expanded view framed in the neoclassical realist approach, whereby 
states use the market as a means to achieve and exercise power. The state can use the market (or 
the market is used) as a means to gain wealth; the state and the market are therefore seen as 
inseparable, and both are important entities for economic interaction and influencing the direction 
of the market due to distribution of power and wealth in a global economy. Gilpin further 
indicates that regional integration can exploit the effects of functional spillover, and integration 
of regional markets can create economies of scale. Gilpin is of the view that to exploit 
opportunities for comparative advantage, state policies must inform outputs of production and 
distribution of production. Such policies then need to take into account the extent of the state’s 
political interests (in terms of its partners/agreements and economic interests) which can 
ultimately affect the overall regional economy. On the other hand, Jens Haarløv
186
 argues that 
developmental integration could rectify the “anomalies or discrepancies” of open regionalism, in 
considering three aspects: a) changing the objectives of the integration process; b) changing the 
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timing and level of interstate binding commitments; and, c) changing the distribution of costs and 
benefits of cooperation. Venables
187
 posits that “states belonging to a free trade agreement and 
that have a higher income member relative to the other members within that FTA and also 
relative to the world average than the lower income members, are likely to converge with the 
high income partner and benefit from such an FTA”.188 In further explaining the benefits of 
economic integration within the multiple membership debate, chapter (5) of the thesis will 
discuss how developing countries can be better served by “north–south” than by “south–south” 
free trade agreements, as observed by Venables, and whether this will hinder or promote regional 
integration.  
 
The assessment is expanded by a discussion of economic convergence in the neoclassical 
economic approach of open trade in regional trade agreements within SACU with the presence of 
a regional hegemonic state (South Africa). Further employed is the theory of Barro and Sala-i-
Martin to provide an understanding of economic growth convergence by outlining two levels of 
convergence models as a basis for their theory. These are defined as beta-convergence (β) or, 
absolute convergence (also defined as the catch-up process), and sigma-convergence (ơ) (when 
the dispersion among a group of countries tends to decrease over time).
189
 Two variables are 
therefore relevant and used in chapter (5): total trade as a percentage of GDP and growth of total 
trade over a long-run period of nine years. The long-run convergence is tested over nine years 
(2005–2013).190 In terms of north–south trade, the assessment takes into account South Africa (as 
a high-income partner relative to the world), and smaller economies (as low-income countries 
forming an FTA with a high-income partner, that is, South Africa). This discussion contributes to 
understanding the benefits of integration within a multiple membership framework and 
attempting to address the key research question posed in the thesis how COMESA and SADC are 
managing multiple memberships.  
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Ravenhill discusses the “domino theory” of proliferation of membership. Preferential trade 
agreements increase once exporting interests of disadvantaged groups in a region are contested. 
Similarly, Ravenhill notes that the proliferation of trade agreements between East Asian 
governments was in part a response to the government policies which disadvantaged business 
groups.
191
 Ravenhill also contends that while an increased interdependence among East Asian 
economies had been largely responsible for the growth seen in inter-governmental collaboration, 
among their economies these benefits were not evenly spread within Asia.
192
 Views expressed by 
scholars have been mixed; while some view multiple memberships as positive, others adopt a 
more pessimistic stance. According to Arvind Panagariya, a proliferation of regional agreements 
has occurred, since states are trying to circumvent or replace the non-discriminatory Most-
Favoured Nation (MFN) tariff associated with the WTO regulations for trade by “crisscrossing 
FTAs”.193  
 
The research by Gathii and Panagariya is particularly useful and the thesis will examine in 
chapter (5) how COMESA and SADC can better manage multiple memberships. This should also 
help assess whether multiple memberships are useful for regional integration. To gain a further 
understanding of the economic benefits of multiple memberships in regional integration, the 
thesis will expand how COMESA and SADC (by both institution and member states) are 
managing the issue of multiple memberships within the Tripartite bloc. Also included in this 
analysis is the EAC, since its member states also belong to both COMESA while others are in 
SADC as well as in other economic schemes on the African continent.  
 
Furthermore, the COMESA–EAC–SADC Tripartite agreement in 2008 had adopted a variable 
geometry approach, which is an incremental process that allows member states to relax tariffs at a 
slower pace than others, according to an agreed process of liberalisation commitments. The 
Tripartite bloc has also adopted a market-led strategy of free trade – a neoclassical economic 
approach of open markets, and relaxed tariffs, amidst multilateral international agreements that is 
in contrast to the principles of variable geometry of protecting member states against 
discriminatory free trade. Hence, the forces of globalisation of open markets and trade create a 
contradiction for the Tripartite Agreement’s regional integration approaches. These 
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contradictions are not adequately supported within the neoclassical economic approach theory of 
open trade and regional integration divergence and convergence debates discussed in the 
literature reviewed. The thesis identifies this as a gap in relation to the theories and deploys a new 
theory in support of the literature reviewed in this chapter, defined as: neoclassical economic 
regional integration, which will help in supporting the findings provided in chapter (5). But as 
Keohane and Nye observed, the process of economics theory does not have a theory of 
international regime change.
194
 Neoclassical economic analysis was developed not as a faithful 
description of reality, but as a simplified explanation for suggesting policies to increase economic 
efficiency and welfare. Economists have therefore focused on economic theory, without 
considering issues that centred on power, which is further outlined below in the neoclassical 
realism approach.   
 
2.5 Neoclassical realism approach: Security  
 
The neoclassical realist approach will be an appropriate theory to use in the thesis in helping to 
understand and examine the interactions of member states, since the neoclassical realist approach 
incorporates both domestic and systemic factors. It will similarly help explain the convergence of 
COMESA and SADC in managing regional security. The neoclassical realism approach is a 
modification of the realist approach, which has evolved since the 1970s.
195
  
 
“Realism as a theoretical approach analyzes all international relations as the relations of states 
engaged in the pursuit of power. Realism cannot accommodate any non-state actors within its 
analysis. Neorealism evolved since the 1970s and recognizes that economic resources in addition 
to military capabilities are a basis for exercising influence. The most significant change in 
neorealism was in abandoning the concept of a single international system in favour of there being 
many issue-specific systems, each characterised by their own power structure. [For example] 
Saudi Arabia may be the most powerful state in the politics of oil, while Brazil is the most 
powerful in the politics of rainforests.”196          
 
Classical realism had built its concepts of international relations on the literature of the Melian 
dialogue and Thucydides’ account of the Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta. 
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Thucydides noted that the resolve of Athens was to remain in power and act in the self-interest of 
the state. The Melian dialogue provides an understanding of how powerful states create and join 
institutions in self-interest, based on their domestic concerns.   
 
Political realists’ view of the nation state is that of a malign hegemon (regional superpower) that 
has as its principal gain self-interest; hence realists’ analyses of self-interest are associated with 
dominance and mercantilist strategy. The political realists view the hegemonic state as a 
powerful, strong economy that sets the rules of the game in economic relations, and always has a 
greater advantage over its partner states. But the downside is imperial over-reach through greed 
for power and wealth, with the state seeking more international influence than it can maintain, 
leading to the decline of the hegemon’s dominance.197 
 
Gideon Rose provides a critical approach to understanding the concept of neoclassical realism. 
Neorealism consists of two theories of foreign policy: offensive and defensive realism. Defensive 
realism theory provides switches between systemic and domestic factors as causal variables of 
foreign policy.
198
 In this regard it is argued that while systemic factors explain some foreign 
policy decisions, domestic factors are the drivers of the state’s external decisions.199 Offensive 
realism, on the other hand, argues that systemic factors are the main determinants of foreign 
policy decisions. Offensive realism also argues that the anarchic nature of the international 
system, combined with the state’s relative capabilities, drives and shapes foreign policy 
decisions. Such policies are historically linked to African states associated with state formation 
and sovereignty. Realism is situated in mercantilist policies that are not primarily economic, but 
policies subjected to force economic policies into the service of power. Mercantilist policies are 
closely linked to state struggle and survival to help achieve unity through the centralisation and 
concentration of power. 
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The main link to the mercantilist political economy is external trade through foreign exchange 
and economic development. Hence state power is able to increase levels of economic 
development through the supply of foreign exchange by increasing the volume and types of trade 
and policies. Thomas Callaghy observed that the mercantilist political economy is situated in 
development projects that “foster the well-being of the ruling group, designed primarily to 
expand the control capabilities of the state, increase exports, regulate imports and promote 
economic autarky”.200  Therefore, what offensive realism postulates, is that domestic factors do 
not carry much weight in influencing foreign policy, since offensive realism is often offset by 
international pressures.  For example, member states of COMESA and SADC regional blocs are 
largely aspirational developing states; they therefore may at times have to consider their domestic 
situation in relation to how they engage in liberal trade agreements regionally and globally, which 
may or may not be based on their domestic situation. Similarly, this will affect how they engage 
with regional and external actors. These issues becomes more complicated for states when faced 
with complicated security concerns like some of the COMESA and SADC member states and are 
discussed in chapter (6) of the thesis.  
 
In building on the Melian dialogue, neoclassical realists argue that relative material power 
establishes the basic parameters of a country’s foreign policy as noted by Thucydides: “The 
strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.”201 As Rose points out, there is no 
immediate or perfect transmission belt linking material capabilities to foreign policy behaviour. 
“Foreign policy behaviour and foreign policy choices are made by political leaders and elites, and 
so it is their perceptions of relative power that matter, not simply relative quantities of physical 
resources or forces in being.”202 Attempts made by SADC and COMESA in building a security 
community were hampered by several obstacles. Agostinho Zacarias
203
 outlines these obstacles in 
his literature on defining a security community like Southern Africa, and draws on various 
constraining factors that impeded earlier attempts at building a security community. These 
impediments Zacarias defines as: “regional instability, political fragmentation, economic 
imbalances, and fears which weakened the security system, particularly in relation to 
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SADCC”.204 The thesis finds the literature by Zacarias relevant in comprehending the security 
evolution of the divergence of SADCC and PTA during their rationalisation processes. The 
literature also provides greater insight in respect of how security relations unfolded between 
COMESA and SADC. 
 
What drives states in conflict regions, and why do states play one region off against another, or 
one state against another? In the realist debate, the region has been seen as the instrument to gain 
power and wealth. As asserted by Edward Mansfield, in unstable regions, the effects of political–
military factors affect bilateral trade and regional integration. In examining how state conflicts 
and security conditions can affect trade relations, alliances can help to minimise the damages of 
state conflict to the benefit of the regional integration process through trade and spillover into 
wealth generation.
205
      
 
Zartman’s view of regional security is seen as a perennial problem that is still embroiled in past 
roles of former colonies in Africa’s post-colonial government security apparatus and structures. 
Zartman notes that Africa’s security development is therefore still hampered by and indicative of 
past internal systems that have infiltrated the existing (new government system) internal 
workings of the state. External relations of the formative years (such as colonial links) have 
continued into the new state, with linkages in the history of the new state, which makes 
understanding regional security quite complex.
206
  
 
Therefore, Zartman defines regional security as a complex phenomenon that has various 
dimensions involving not only neatly defined “military and security dimensions”, but which also 
involves economic, military, political, and social and international actors and factors. Zartman 
suggests that stable states with legitimate regimes have often faced territorial insecurity within 
the first few decade of independence, such as border conflicts. In the 1990s, for instance, regional 
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security evolved into secessions, and regions disengaged from weak and oppressive state 
systems.
207
 Moreover, regional security became interwoven, given the lack of security 
mechanisms within the new state, with states having to “borrow power” from outside, providing 
an opportunity for external powers to become embroiled in African conflicts.
208
 This borrowed 
power allowed external powers and former colonial regimes access to newly independent states, 
contributing to the complexity of Africa’s security architecture.    
 
Similarly, Ajulu makes a key observation that regional conflicts in Africa have been generated by 
ruling elites, therefore any emerging security architecture ought to address the issue of political 
power and political will. A question that is necessary, then, and ought to be considered, is to 
analyse whether there is sufficient political will from the main players to address regional 
conflicts, and if not, then what kind of institutional arrangement will assist or force conflicting 
parties to reconsider their adversarial stance?
209
  
 
Defining regional security through the integration lens has elicited a multi-dimensional approach 
that also centres on the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) framework that encompasses potential 
actors under three pillars: prevent, react, and rebuild. Africa’s regional economic communities, 
like the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), are participating in an emerging 
African R2P-oriented security culture, but not all its members appeal to the R2P doctrine like 
Sudan does. John Siebert notes that: “the striking characteristics of the R2P security model shift 
emphasis from state sovereignty to state responsibility for the wellbeing of citizens, with an 
obligation placed on the international community to intervene in specific humanitarian 
interventions like genocide, where a country is unwilling to protect its citizens”.210 RECs are seen 
to be making concerted efforts, like SADC and ECOWAS, to include R2P in their frameworks 
for securing regions.
211
 Hany Besada, Ariane Goetz and Karolina Werner, however, view the 
concept of R2P as a security intervention that has undermined the state’s sovereignty and 
strengthened the role of the international community. R2P, in their view, is largely a top-down 
approach and not an inclusive one where all parties are significant to the conflict. The framework 
                                                 
207
 Zartman, “African Regional Security and Changing Patterns of Relations”, 1996, p.55. 
208
 Zartman, “African Regional Security and Changing Patterns of Relations”, 1996, p.57. 
209
 Rok Ajulu, “African Security: Can Regional Organisations Play a Role?”, in, Shannon Field (ed.), Peace in 
Africa: Towards a Collaborative Security Regime (Johannesburg: Institute for Global Dialogue, 2004), pp. 265-280.    
210
 John Siebert, “R2P and the IGAD Sub-region: IGAD’s Contribution to Africa’s Emerging R2P-oriented Security 
Culture”, in, Hany Besada (ed.), Crafting an African Security Architecture (Burlington: Ashgate, 2010), pp. 89-108. 
211
 Siebert, “R2P and the IGAD Sub-region: IGAD’s Contribution to Africa’s Emerging R2P-oriented Security 
Culture”, 2010. 
79 
 
seems to lean more towards peace enforcement ideals, and does not take into account the wars 
and violence in regional conflicts associated with economic and resource disputes which involve 
both internal and external actors and militia groups.
212
       
 
Peter Vale’s analysis of security and sovereignty premises that the core understanding of the 
security discourse cannot be built on representations of sovereignty alone. Vale expands his 
views on the 1980s security conditions in Southern Africa and posits that regional security in the 
case of Southern Africa has been too easily dismissed as a “security community”. According to 
Vale, security and sovereignty are both unstable concepts, since both are socially constructed. 
Vale notes that security should not be too loosely associated with community building in regional 
frameworks to resolve regional conflicts. Such a view would be problematic and would offer a 
false perspective of the reality of the past when dealing with present and future security 
dynamics. Security studies should therefore be conceptualised in terms of a realist security 
framework that can accurately reflect the regional nomenclature framework. Vale notes: “The 
epistemology offered by realist security studies genuflects toward the statist taxonomy that gave 
Southern Africa its current form.” This “powerful ensemble of science, the bureaucratic state, 
individualism and continuous advancement”213 offers no place for people, only for power.214 
With reference to Deutsch,
215
 Naison Ngoma outlines a security community as a belief in 
common institutions and practices to resolve social problems through peaceful change.  
 
Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver view regional security as a situation when both sides in a conflict 
are dependent on the same power, and it is consequently possible for such a power to pressurise 
the conflicting parties to peace processes.
216
 Therefore, Buzan and Wæver suggest a clearer 
description of a regional security system to be “the possibility of systematically linking the study 
of internal conditions, relations among units in the region, relations between regions, and the 
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interplay of regional dynamics with globally acting powers”.217 These factors further determine 
the structural logic of the region, as regional security operating at four levels of a security 
constellation simultaneously: the international world, domestic factors, regional factors, and 
global factors.  
 
States in regions are to some extent linked to security interdependence and may join regions for 
security reasons. For the Frontline States, security objectives were largely driven by “the 
structure, distribution of power, and the state of relations among nations in the international 
system”.218 In assessing the literature by Khadiagala,219 a key observation is made central to the 
role of the FLS; as small states their behaviour evolved within an asymmetrical and a hierarchical 
system of power relations. These behaviours are defined in the theory of alliances and describe 
how “subordinate states in these systems augment their power capabilities to confront the 
interests of dominant actors”. The thesis will further explore the literature on “alliances”, which 
provides an understanding of the historical relations of COMESA and SADC member states and 
the various intricacies and dynamics in state behaviour of PTA and the FLS as highlighted by 
Khadiagala.  
 
While Buzan and Wæver’s theory should assist the thesis, based on the conceptual literature 
review, the theory on RSC will not be able to explain the convergence of COMESA and SADC 
in managing regional security which the literature review identifies as a gap. Hence, in support of 
the literature review and to help the thesis’ analysis, the thesis deploys a new theory defined as: 
neorealist security convergence. This theory of neorealist security convergence will be deployed 
and will expand on Buzan and Wæver’s regional security complex theory to better understand the 
complexity of regional security. This complex nature of regional security have moved beyond 
conflicts between states, to wars within states, poor governance, corruption and greed for 
economic wealth through the plundering of natural resources within a country. The discussion in 
the thesis in chapter (6) will also further expand the discussion how COMESA and SADC 
manage security in their respective regions, by providing specific case studies confined to the 
period 2008–2015. This analysis also includes the presence of a hegemonic power (South Africa) 
with a strong military presence assisting managing regional conflicts. The neorealist security 
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convergence theory deployed alongside the literature review in chapter (6) will strengthen the 
analysis in assessing the main conflict drivers and conflict-prone and problem countries in the 
two RECs within the convergence years of COMESA and SADC since 2008.  
 
2.6 New concepts and definitions 
 
2.6.1 Neoclassical economic regional integration  
 
The assumption of the new theory of neoclassical economic regional integration is that owing 
to free trade being promoted and conducted and within the logic of trade creation and diversion, 
empirically it is envisaged that regional economic groupings, when opening their markets, should 
yield positive results in increased levels of trade. However, the divergence and convergence of 
such regional groupings cannot be adequately explained through a single lens without 
considering neoclassical economics. Since, neoclassical economics is largely premised on open 
markets and free trade concerned with economic growth and an approach used by a regional 
grouping/s the research study must take this into account when discussing divergence and 
convergence of regional integration of such blocs. A further assumption is that while neoclassical 
economics has a primary focus of growing poorer economies through open markets, there may 
also be unequal growth that occurs during such a process due to bilateral agreements that are tied 
to regional blocs, hence polarisation of trade will occur for the bloc/s. The divergence and 
convergence of regional integration literature is not able to adequately support the research 
arguments of trade and the extent of trade divergence as a stand-alone theory.  
 
A further assumption is that as globalisation dictates open markets and trade, a contradiction of 
the COMESA-EAC-SADC 20008 Tripartite Agreement’s regional integration approaches of 
variable geometry further contradicts and does not adequately support the neoclassical economic 
approach theory as a stand-alone as well.  
 
Therefore, under the neoclassical economics debate and in discussing multiple membership of 
divergence and convergence theories in the literature reviewed further above, this thesis 
underscores that globalisation of open markets and trade as defined in neoclassical economics 
contradicts the Tripartite Agreement’s regional integration approaches of a market-led strategy 
(neoclassical economic approach) of free trade and relaxing tariffs, amidst the acceptance of 
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multilateral international agreements of its member states within the Tripartite bloc and are 
further contradictory to the principles of variable geometry of protecting member states against 
discriminatory free trade.  
 
On the one hand COMESA and SADC and the EAC have converged (joined forces and have 
come together) to trade and to promote regional integration; but on the other hand they are also 
faced with open markets and free trade as neoclassical economics outline. The thesis identifies 
this as a gap in relation to the theories on regional integration, divergence and convergence and as 
here discussed and to support the literature review and to also adequately support and explain the 
findings of the thesis, the new theory of neoclassical economic regional integration will be 
able to assist the thesis’ findings applied in chapter (5) of this thesis.  
 
2.6.2 Neorealist security convergence 
 
The assumption of the new theory of neorealist security convergence underscores that owing to 
the presence of a hegemonic power within a regional bloc that has both a strong economy and has 
military strength
220
 with geopolitical interests will intervene in regional security issues that are 
linked to its own national interests of both security and economic concerns. In-so-doing, the 
hegemon has the ability to converge the security apparatuses of other member states within a 
regional bloc.  
 
Regional security is important in securing the region for enhancing economic growth. Hence, in 
support of the RSC, the thesis deploys and defines a new theory: neorealist security 
convergence.This theory of neorealist security convergence will support and better equip the 
thesis in its discussions on regional security and also to further support the literature review on 
security as discussed in the literature reviewed above. Khadiagala’s theory on alliance provides a 
good basis for the historical study in Chapter 3. This includes the FLS and sets the stage for the 
convergence debate in Chapter 4. Buzan and Wæver’s regional security complex, as well as 
Amitav Acharya’s observations on regional security within regionalism, provides a further lens 
for examining how COMESA and SADC are dealing with the issue of regional security within a 
regional security complex framework. However, as indicated in the literature review under 
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security that the theory on RSC will not be able to adequately explain the convergence of 
COMESA, EAC and SADC member states in managing regional security, which the literature 
review and conceptual framework identifies as a gap. This theory of neorealist security 
convergence is expanded in chapter (6) of the thesis. 
 
In concluding chapter (2), the analysis of the regional transformation processes of eastern and 
Southern Africa, the literature review, and theoretical and conceptual framework provided a 
focused review of general and specific literature on the concepts of regional integration, 
divergence, and convergence. In this context, the chapter located regional integration within the 
larger divergence and convergence debate. The discussion provided an understanding of the 
politics and economics surrounding the two concepts. This further laid the foundation for the 
examination of the different meanings, goals and specific approaches employed in regional 
integration in contemporary divergence and convergence discourse. The literature reviewed on 
regional integration also provided a broad scope within which multiple memberships and regional 
security were discussed. The thesis articulated two analytical frameworks, the neoclassical 
economics approach that conceptualised the literature review and in support of the review, 
deployed a new theory defined as: neoclassical economic regional integration and its assumptions 
was outlined above under new concepts and definitions. Under the neoclassical realist approach 
the thesis conceptualised the literature review and deployed a new theory defined as: neorealist 
security convergence, which will also serve as principal indicators for understanding and 
interpreting economics and security respectively in the research findings also defined above and 
its assumptions explained under new concepts and definitions above.  
 
This turns the discussion to the next chapter (3) that assesses COMESA and SADC’s integration 
models and provides a historical account of its divergence and convergence before and during its 
rationalisation process, which leads the thesis’ expanding on evolving integration processes and 
frameworks of the two RECs: COMESA and SADC towards convergence (coming together and 
joining forces to conduct trade) in chapter (4). 
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Chapter 3 
Historical Overview: SADC and COMESA 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter provides a historical account of SADC and COMESA. The FLS was created in 
1975, and SADCC was formed in 1980; both were precursors of SADC. The PTA, created in 
1981, was a precursor of COMESA, formed in 1993. In discussing the formation of SADC and 
COMESA, the literature reviewed (in Chapter 2) on divergence and convergence will help 
provide an understanding of the evolving regional integration processes of these two regional 
communities, and their awkward relations with apartheid South Africa. The chapter further 
outline the formations of the two blocs and leading up to their rationalisation process.  
 
3.2 Pan-Africanism  
 
Both the PTA and SADCC have their roots in pan-Africanism. Born out of this pan-African 
ideology, Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah noted the importance of seeking a political union for the 
continent, though he was a solitary figure among the leaders of Africa’s newly independent 
states. All the rest of Africa’s independent states sought functional regionalism through regional 
organisations that were to become economically and politically independent through freer trade 
and interlinking customs unions in order to build strong economies. The Maghreb Federation in 
May 1945 included three independent states in that grouping - Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco. 
This was a region until April 1958, when Algeria’s National Liberation Front (FLN) joined the 
Federation. More states joined the Federation as they gained independence, including Libya, 
Mauritania, the French Sahara, and Spanish North Africa.  
 
It was against the background of pan-Africanism that the East and Central African states formed 
the Pan-African Movement for East and Central Africa (PAFMECA) in Tanganyika in 1958.  
The PAFMECA grouping, which later included the Horn of Africa states, Somalia and Ethiopia, 
fought white supremacy in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia by supporting the liberation 
movements of South Africa, as well as those of South West Africa, Northern and Southern 
Rhodesia, and Mozambique.
221
 FRELIMO in 1962 replaced the rival nationalist groups - the 
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National African Union of Independent Mozambique (UNAMI), the National Democratic Union 
of Mozambique (UDENAMO), and the Mozambican African National Union (MANU).
222
  
 
3.3 The front line states and the making of an alliance 
 
The main goals of the founding leaders of the FLS - Tanzania’s Julius Nyerere, Zambia’s 
Kenneth Kaunda, and Botswana’s Seretse Khama - were to create political cohesion and a 
stronger security regime to support the region’s national liberation movements, gain political 
freedom from colonial rule, and overthrow white minority rule.
223
 Zambia (formerly known as 
Northern Rhodesia), and Malawi (formerly known as Nyasaland) were colonised in the late 
nineteenth century by the British South Africa Company; they both gained independence in 
1964.
224
 In response to South Africa’s apartheid government and in support of liberation 
movements, the Front Line States were created in 1975, comprising the governments of Angola, 
Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia. These were formed in support of the national 
liberation movements, South Africa’s African National Congress (ANC), Namibia’s SWAPO, 
the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the Mozambique Liberation Front, 
the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), and the Zimbabwe African People’s Union 
(ZAPU) (the latter two attempted to unite, but failed).
225
 The Southern Africa states that were 
directly affected by apartheid South Africa’s destabilisation policies, and those states that gained 
independence and vociferously fought for the liberation movements included Angola, Botswana, 
Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.  
 
In forming the Front Line States, the major socio-economic constraints that confronted Southern 
Africa were weak states and fragmented domestic political situations. A security society, to some 
scholars like Zacarias, is seen as “the first stage in building a security community”.226 Headley 
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Bull,
227
 identified a security society as a group of states “where states are in regular contact with 
one another, and where ... there is interaction between them [that is] sufficient to make the 
behaviour of each a necessary element in the calculations of the other”228, and a society of states 
“where a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a 
society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their 
relations with one another”.229  
 
The FLS was carefully designed, which was primarily directed at coordinating political, 
economic, diplomatic, and security objectives. The objectives of the FLS were defined by the 
hierarchical systems of power relationships among the group of states. But the alliance could 
only be as strong as its members. The FLS was formed when members of its group were already 
involved in economic ties with the state (South Africa) that they fought against. As suggested by 
Khadiagala: “In addition to geographical contiguity and economic interdependence, political 
interaction in the subsystem led to increased organizational expression of common and also 
conflicting interests.”230 Khadiagala contends that the member states of the Southern African 
system were conscious of their own relations, and their relations and behaviours within the 
subsystem, which was critical for its demise or success.  
 
When the FLS was formed, Angola and Mozambique were still under Portuguese colonial 
control. The independence of Angola and Mozambique brought about regional violent conflict 
and war that provoked a regional nervousness for the South African government as it feared that 
a Marxist power could be unleashed to dominate the entire region, jeopardising the apartheid 
ideology.
231
 Radical members of Angola’s MPLA supported Zaire’s secessionist forces by 
invading Zaire twice, in 1977 and again in 1978, which effectively destroyed relations between 
the leaders of the two countries. Zaire’s Mobutu Sese Seko responded with support from his 
Western allies, the United States, France, Belgium, and his African counterpart, Morocco.
232
 The 
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United States provided $5 million in funding towards upgrading the Beira port and railway line in 
Mozambique, while also openly supporting UNITA to overthrow the government of Angola. 
 
The earlier moves in the formation of the FLS during the1970s were “non-confrontation” and 
“non-aggression”, which evolved out of interactions with the former South African President 
Vorster, and former Zambian President Kaunda, the former whom Kaunda called the “voice of 
reason for which Africa and the rest of the world have been waiting”.233 Portugal’s precipitous 
departure from Mozambique, which was brought about by the April 1974 Portuguese coup, 
created a security vacuum that left both Rhodesia and apartheid South Africa vulnerable and 
exposed to regional and international politics. Kaunda capitalised on Rhodesia’s impasse with 
Mozambique. Rhodesia’s situation was two-fold: a security vacuum and the importance of the 
transport trade routes. Rhodesia shared a 700-mile eastern border with Mozambique, which 
provided access for 80 percent of land-locked Rhodesia’s trade exports through the transport 
network of Mozambique’s port facilities of Beira and Lourenço Marques. On the South African 
side, Vorster was left unshielded and exposed by the removed buffer zone between the belligerent 
armed forces of Mozambique’s nationalist movement, FRELIMO, which had collaborated 
closely with ZANU and operated from Mozambique’s Tete province, and which also showed 
solidarity with the black Rhodesian majority by militarily rebelling against Ian Smith’s white 
regime in Rhodesia. From the Namibian side, Nujoma led SWAPO in the years of struggle for 
Namibia’s independence. From 1975, SWAPO worked closely with the MPLA,234 as well as with 
FRELIMO, and later in the same year moved its headquarters from Lusaka, Zambia to Luanda, 
Angola.
235
 On the Rhodesian side, the Rhodesians had previously relied heavily on the 
Portuguese military support in fighting FRELIMO, and in trying to fill the military vacuum, 
called on the support of Vorster.
236
 Through a calculated move, and having weighed up the costs 
of war with Mozambique, Vorster refrained from conceding to Rhodesia’s request, and instead 
Vorster pushed for a non-aggression pact of non-intervention and non-interference with offers of 
economic incentives for the regional states of Southern Africa.  
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Zambia furthered its regional support strategy to include Botswana, Mozambique and Tanzania in 
the region’s diplomatic quest, as Zambia’s first line of defence was engagement with racist 
minorities and in so doing supported the liberation movements to achieve the region’s goal. 
Aside from Lesotho, and Swaziland’s close economic affiliation with South Africa, which was 
linked to the SACU 1969 agreement,
237
 the FLS sought to wean Lesotho and Swaziland from 
deeper economic relations with South Africa. Pretoria’s strong opposition did not deter the FLS, 
and Lesotho nevertheless diversified its political and economic relations by establishing 
diplomatic relations with Cuba in 1979 and with the Soviet Union in 1980.
238
   
 
During the early years of the formation of the FLS, the roles between alliance members and the 
apartheid government of South Africa became one of dual dependence. South Africa was 
dependent on the Southern African region to export its trade. For example, in 1973, SACU was 
listed as one of the 22 top exporters for 41 commodities in the Standard International Trade 
Classification (SITC) categories 5-8 for Eastern and Southern African markets. These trade 
commodities were exports such as paper and board, glass and metal-working machinery, 
diamonds, basic inorganic chemicals, unworked metals and the least advanced iron and steel 
products, which found access to major international markets.
239
 Similarly, Zambia was listed as 
one of the 20 largest importers, since Zambia received 39 percent of South Africa’s exports in 
1973.
240
 SACU member states saw South Africa as the means of extracting benefits from 
cooperation through the SACU agreement on trade.  
 
3.3.1 Political and economic courtship - Policy of détente 
 
This section outlines the awkward co-dependence and balancing roles of the FLS’ governments 
with the apartheid government of South Africa. The alliance was a regional subsystem with 
distinctive units that assumed a pivotal role in international relations. The primary emphasis of a 
regional subsystem, according to Khadiagala, is one that embraces geographic regions and is 
characterised by patterns of relations of levels of cohesions, types of communications, and a 
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configuration of power structures that are divided by boundaries and constrained by behaviour. In 
building on the concept of the subsystem, the preponderance of race and class conflict subsumed 
the formation of the regional cluster of states and economic linkages that bound the subsystem 
together, and which had no outer limits. Mel Grutov similarly suggested that Southern Africa’s 
governments did not speak with one voice, nor did they act in unison, which allowed South 
Africa, and the West, easy entry into the region. Gurtov suggested that “for realists, power is the 
essential ingredient of politics ... the instinctive goal of persons ... A paradigm of the philosophy, 
strategy, and objectives that define the national security state, that complex of institutions, special 
interests, and powerful bureaucracies that govern all societies”.241   
 
The interaction between South Africa and some of the FLS leaders like Kaunda and Banda was 
meaningful for the Southern African states, and a farce for the South African government as 
Mugabe recognised when he said: “The coincidence of interests between Zambia and South 
Africa of avoiding confrontation in Southern Africa set the stage for new attempts as a peaceful 
resolution through meaningful accommodation”.242 These attempts became popularly known as 
regional détente. Khadiagala noted “ … Southern Africa’s political lexicon was a logical 
corollary to Pretoria’s reassessment of her relationship with Rhodesia for the explicit purpose of 
establishing a different kind of relationship with neighbouring states”.243 According to 
Khadiagala, secret negotiations between Zambian and South African officials emerged in mid-
1974 as a détente scenario. A Zambian official noted the engagements as an undertaking to use 
the détente exercise to buy Vorster’s confidence in resolving the Rhodesian conflict.244 This 
position - détente - later became the basis for the Organisation of African Unity’s Dar es Salaam 
Declaration on Southern Africa. 
 
Détente also came under fire when South Africa used it to make diplomatic inroads throughout 
Africa, and the OAU member states became disgruntled by this move, criticising Kaunda for 
spearheading the policy. Furthermore, Kaunda did not envisage the problems that détente could 
engender, like the conflict division that erupted when a militant wing of ZANU, led by Mugabe 
(prior to his becoming Zimbabwe’s president), rejected Muzorewa’s leadership and resumed 
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guerrilla infiltration in north-eastern Rhodesia. Mugabe too criticised the FLS for having used 
détente, which he viewed as “political chicanery”, which “stampeded the Zimbabweans in a false 
unity.
245
 The détente engagements made varied political and economic inroads. Kaunda and 
former president Houphouët-Boigny of the Ivory Coast were at the forefront to assist Jonas 
Savimbi, the UNITA leader in Angola’s fight against the MPLA in Luanda.246 While Zambia 
indicated strong calls for a government of national unity in Angola, President Kaunda was also 
siding with the UNITA radicals. For Zambia, what mattered most was to secure export routes and 
trade from South Africa, given the major obstacles that the Zambian government faced with its 
economy during 1975. For instance, Lusaka’s balance of payments deficit was Kwacha 180 
million and its foreign exchange reserves dropped from £370 million to £12.4 million. Zambia 
therefore turned to South Africa for assistance and negotiated was an export credit agreement of 
one quarter of Zambia’s import oil bill.247  
 
Many other complexities also arose through the regional détente policy of making inroads 
through concessionary practices. Vorster provided loans to Malawi of R14 million for building a 
new capital in the centre of the country, at Lilongwe (the capital city was not completed until 
much later, largely by international donors). Vorster also gave Malawi R11 million for a railway 
line to connect Mozambique with the port of Nacala to facilitate the transport of Malawian 
migrant workers to South Africa. These numbers increased from 50,000 in 1966, to 100,000 in 
1971.
248
 Malawi’s behaviour also appeared contradictory, with a despondent civil service on its 
doorstep and government technocrats backing Southern Africa’s liberation leaders, while its 
president was backing South Africa. As Douglas Anglin
249
 pointed out, the FLS presidents’ 
motives were to extend the hand of friendship to their less resolute comrades in the hope that they 
thereby be weaned from their errant ways. Other controversial roles were seen in the issues dealt 
with by the international community. The IMF and World Bank forced Malawi to work with 
South Africans and the heads of Malawi Railways and Press Holdings were both South Africans. 
Malawi went as far as allowing the Mozambican National Resistance (Resistência Nacional 
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Moçambicana) (RENAMO) to use the country as a rear base to launch invasions, even though the 
same militant group had destroyed Malawi’s second rail link to the sea, Nacala.250       
 
As noted by Khadiagala, the FLS welcomed Malawi into their circle and suggested that Malawi 
cultivate cordial relations with its neighbour Mozambique for its trade outlets (ports). The 
suggestion was, “ … rather than treating him as an outcast, we showed our goodwill ... Like the 
prodigal son, we [FLS leaders] told him: [Banda] ‘Come back home’”.251 Various contradictions 
similarly prevailed in the region, as was seen in Mozambique’s 1976 support of US sanctions 
against the Ian Smith regime and closure of its borders, while also allowing Soviet assistance and 
a military presence in the country to thwart South Africa’s regional destabilisation. Between 1976 
and 1979, Mozambique paid a heavy price for backing South African and Zimbabwean liberation 
movements, when it experienced attacks from Ian Smith’s Rhodesian regime and from 
RENAMO.
252
 Paradoxically, the United States, while enforcing sanctions against Southern 
Rhodesia, supported proxy wars backing the South African-led UNITA army in Angola.
253
 The 
US/South Africa relationship was further concretised when Fidel Castro (former Cuban leader) 
sent thousands of its troops to assist Angola.
254
 As described by William Lindeke, economic 
interests in Africa were deep entrenched in mining and petroleum and “coexisted with security 
ones, sometimes in complex ways such as in Angola”.255  Mobutu Sese Seko, through fuelling 
rebels in Angola, too had reaped huge profits through UNITA in diamond-smuggling trade deals 
with the United States that were conducted via the Kamina airbase in Southern Zaire and 
amounted to $5 billion per year.
256
 This powerful backing allowed UNITA to control the 
diamond fields of Angola and mine $3.7 billion worth of diamonds during the 1990s.
257
 
 
The FLS alliance had a number of awkward relations among its members and with South Africa. 
Victor Olorunsola and Dan Muhwezi noted that varying degrees of state power and mercantilist 
policies were used as “pretence” for bottom-up integration. These subterfuges entailed a degree 
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of government corruption of unaccounted government funds. In the case of Tanzania, 
unaccounted funds stood at 327,000 shillings in 1967-1968, this amount increased to 43 million 
shillings from 1977-1978. These figures further advanced to a total of 437 million shillings in 
1980 to 1981.
258
 African governments were also faced with economic realities of under-
development, of race and class formations, and ethnic divisions that spilled over into the political 
economy of the state. These complexities gave rise to new pressures, with governments trying to 
maintain political officialdom combined with high living standards in Africa’s post-independence 
era.
259
 Therefore, the African state was absorbed in maintaining political power, and also 
maintaining exorbitant lifestyles at the expense of its people. Ruth First noted in 1970, “  …the 
resources of the new states were being devoured by a tiny group whose demands distorted the 
budgets and economies of the states they governed ... ”260 Owing to the regional environment, 
and in forming an alliance, at times its members could be challenged by resources, as Khadiagala 
noted in his work on FLS history, that an alliance  “ ... might have to pay the price of a drain on 
domestic resources and some significant loss of national autonomy”. It was inevitable therefore, 
that alliance members would pursue certain foreign-policy goals that could assist them, as small 
vulnerable states, when the costs became too high for their domestic situations.
261
 Zacarias also 
noted that the divergent political interests were a mere expression of survival, rather than an 
expression of cooperation among states with similar values. Khadiagala also highlighted that 
when the costs and benefits became too large for the alliance members, states pursued other 
interests.
262
  
 
3.3.2 The FLS and external actors 
 
This section expands on the weaknesses of the state and the exploitative roles of external actors 
on the resources of fragile states. Extra-regional actors contributed to the weakness of the 
region’s economies. The FLS constituted a group of states eager to create adequate mechanisms 
for addressing violent conflict without the initial intervention of great powers, but their weakness 
                                                 
258
 Victor A. Olorunsola, and Dan Muhwezi, “State Responses to Disintegration and Withdrawal: Adjustments in the 
Political Economy”, in, Donald Rothchild (eds.), Africa in the New International Order: Rethinking State 
Sovereignty and Regional Security (London; and Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996), pp. 189-207. 
259
 Stephan, Power, Hervey and Fonseca, The Scramble for Africa in the 21st Century: A View from the South”, 
2006, pp. 320-321. 
260
 Ruth First, Power in Africa (New York: Pantheon, 1970), p. 110. Cited in, Stephan, Power, Hervey and Fonseca, 
The Scramble for Africa in the 21st Century, 2006, pp. 320-321. 
261
 Khadiagala, Allies in Adversity, 1994, p. 9. 
262
 Khadiagala, Allies in Adversity, 1994. 
93 
 
forced them to draw on external powers to fulfil and realise their goals.
263
 There was also the 
self-interest of external actors, and which too was involved for their own needs and not so much 
for wanting to assist regional states. Instead of assisting the region after the end of the 
Rhodesia/Nyasaland Federation in 1963,
264
 the World Bank approved an investment of 80 
million British pounds to develop Rhodesia’s railways for Britain to have access to the region’s 
resources, given British interests elsewhere in Southern Africa.  
 
With the World Bank’s refusal to complete the Tazara railway, Chinese funds of $450 million 
helped fund its completion.
265
 British investments and capital were enormous in Rhodesia, like 
the Rhodesian Iron and Steel Corporation (RISCO), with proceeds of £24 million. Other British 
firms in Rhodesia were Salisbury Portland Cement; Marley; Tate and Lyle; Brooke Bond; 
Unilever; Cadbury-Schweppes; and Lonhro and BP Industries. The United States had a chrome 
mining plant, Union Carbide and Foote Minerals at £20 million. Other countries with interests in 
Rhodesia were France, Germany, Switzerland, Austria and Japan.
266
 Namibia was also a 
contested state because of its wealth in diamonds, and was managed by the South African 
government when its Union was formed in 1910.
267
 The US’s relations with Southern Africa did 
not only concern security issues; America had over one percent of foreign investments and bank 
loans in South Africa and a $7.6 billion share ownership.
268
 Currently (2014), approximately 60 
percent of Namibia’s diamond exports go to Japanese and US markets.269  
 
South Africa’s Anglo American Corporation was the key mining conglomerate extracting 
diamonds in Namibia’s mines. In order to gain international purchasing power, Anglo American 
Corporation made large offshore investments through its Minorco company, based in the US, 
with mining interests in South Africa.
270
 In terms of oil exports, before Angola’s independence in 
1975, the country produced 135,000 barrels of oil daily. By 1985, Angola’s oil production had 
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increased to 278,000 barrels per day, with oil trade that amounted to $2.5 million. Angola’s 
major oil-trading partners and private businesses were the United States’ Chevron, Texaco, and 
Mobil; Belgium’s Petrofina; Italy’s Agip; France’s Total and Elf Aquitaine; Spain’s Hispanoil; 
the United Kingdom’s British Petroleum; Germany’s Diminex; and Brazil’s Petrobras.271 With 
such huge investments it appeared that the US government and its private businesses had a lot to 
lose in Angola’s conflict, since the US had a $600 million investment in Angola in its Chevron 
oil company between 1975 and 1985.
272
  
 
The South Africa government was a contributing force towards the neighbouring states’ foreign 
exchange budgets in mine wages.
273
 As early as 1942, South Africa had 215,000 mineworkers 
from the region working in its own mines: in 1971 - 86,000, in 1970 - 100,000 Mozambican 
miners worked in South Africa, while Malawi had over 100,000 migrant miners in South Africa. 
These numbers decreased when President Banda required more labour for his own country’s 
tobacco plantations in Malawi.  Mozambique also reduced its number of miners to 60,000 after 
its independence. However, South Africa also crippled Southern Africa’s manufacturing mining 
sector by taking labour away from the region’s own mines, and therefore less gold and fewer 
diamonds were produced in those Southern African states. Even though Angola, Botswana and 
Namibia, as well as Zaire, were gold, diamond and other mineral and precious metal producers 
(as is still the case), South Africa for the period of 1984 exported to these states amounts totalling 
R11,684 million in gold; R2,387 million in diamonds and precious metals; and R5,515 million in 
other minerals and mineral products. In 1984, other exports from South Africa to the region 
included fruit, grain and vegetables (R480 million); other agricultural products (R833 million); 
and chemicals (R672 million).
274
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On its part, Southern African states benefited from labour migration and this trend continued, 
since it provided worker remittances to an amount of $350 million due to labour migration, which 
comprised 40 percent of the non-South African mining force.
275
 While South Africa was 
befriending Banda, it also crippled Malawi’s economy. South Africa also came to Malawi’s 
rescue by giving the Malawian government 5 million kwacha worth of fertiliser. Yet, South 
Africa destroyed a 600-kilometre Beira railway line that resulted in additional transport costs for 
the government of Malawi of 16 million kwacha on imports. Malawi was then faced with 
stockpiling of 130,000 metric tonnes of sugar and shortages of fuel and fertiliser.
276
  
 
As Keohane and Nye
277
 observed, in complex interdependence the role of a military can exert 
substantial power and authority through other means: 
 
If there are no constraints on one’s choice of instruments …  the state with superior 
military force will prevail. If the security dilemma for all states were extremely acute, 
military force, supported by economic and other resources, would clearly be the dominant 
source of power. Survival is the primary goal of all states, and in the worst situations, 
force is ultimately necessary to guarantee survival. Thus military force is always a central 
component of national power.
278
  
 
Keohane and Nye also observed that besides using state military to gain power, other multiple 
issues in their foreign policy agenda would be used to force control over weaker states, such as 
energy, resources, environment, population, and territorial rivalry. Adebayo Adedeji believed that 
the trade routes of Southern Africa would not be ideal for economic development for SADCC 
states and they would be subjected to a problematic South Africa. At the time of setting up the 
PTA, the Southerners were not interested. He patiently sought to get the states of Southern Africa 
to join the PTA and tried to secure funding through the European Commission with which he had 
had several meetings while he was setting up the PTA. He had worked on a plan for ten years as 
well as a framework for Eastern and Southern Africa’s states.279  
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3.4 The formation of SADCC 
 
This section discusses the formation of SADCC and its determination of coordinating trade and 
infrastructure linkages for its member states. As aptly described by Zacarias when he observed 
that SADCC was a strategy to create economic relations in the region that were not driven by 
market forces; it was a deliberate choice of incorporating the majority of the Southern African 
states into its organisation to reduce dependence on South Africa. The political values of its 
member states were heterogeneous, and Zacarias outlined: “liberal democracies of Botswana 
coexisted with Malawian dictatorship, and the monarchies of Lesotho and Swaziland, Marxist 
regimes of Angola and Mozambique, and single-party states with mixed economies such as 
Tanzania and Zimbabwe, all coexisted alongside one another”.280 This coexistence of 
heterogeneity of different political values was a sensitive point that could jeopardise the SADCC 
configuration, and these dynamics also demonstrated the inability of the Southern African states 
to develop a supranational functional institution.
281
 Kaire Mbuende, a former executive secretary 
of SADC, outlined the phases of regional integration that had characterised the process of 
Southern Africa.
282
 These phases of integration entailed a phase of political solidarity when the 
FLS joined in the liberation struggle against colonialism. It was this sense of a common cause 
that led the first members to meet initially in Lusaka and form SADCC. The Organisation 
allowed for a strong tradition of solidarity among members, enabling a cohesive organisation. 
The second phase of regional integration was coordinating and consolidating programmes in 
transport and communications. Critical sectors for regional development were introduced, 
including agriculture, energy, and human resources, and which constituted programmes for 
regional development coordinated by SADCC.  
 
The independence of Africa’s states represented the beginning of Southern Africa’s opportunity 
to boost the performance of its economies. The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and 
Madagascar
283
 were the first to gain independence, in 1960.
284
 The momentum of independence 
subsequently increased, with Tanganyika gaining independence in 1961 and Zanzibar in 1963, 
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which then together formed Tanzania in 1964; Malawi and Zambia both gained independence in 
1964, followed by Botswana and Lesotho in 1966. As a successor to the FLS, in April 1980, the 
leaders of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and 
Zimbabwe met in Lusaka, Zambia, to adopt the “Southern Africa: Toward Economic Liberation” 
declaration and formed SADCC in 1980.
285
 In July 1981, the SADCC structure was ratified at a 
summit of Heads of State meeting. SADCC adopted the SADCC Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU)
286
 that provided members states with an institutional framework. The headquarters were 
established in Gaborone, where they are still located.  
 
The SADCC Summit of Heads of State and government oversaw policy-making and met on an 
annual basis.
287
 The SADCC Council consisted of ministers tasked to oversee the economic 
affairs of the region. Sectoral Commissions comprising the Southern African Centre for 
Cooperation in Agricultural Research (SACCAR), the Standing Committee of Officials 
(SATCC), and the Secretariat were the other structures completing SADCC.
288
 In 1987, SADCC 
states had a total gross domestic product of nearly $20 billion, 68.7 million compared to South 
Africa’s GDP of $54.4 billion and a population size of 32.3 million.289    
 
While SADCC was formed to promote cohesion among its members and wanted to assist its 
economies in becoming less economically dependent on South Africa, various views and 
opinions existed concerning its creation. Anglin, for example, noted that the EEC and certain of 
its officials served as the midwife to SADCC, discreetly promoting the birth of SADCC.
290
 
External actors and international donors also provided 90 percent of SADCC’s budget; however 
sometimes these funders played ambiguous roles. For example, between 1980 and 1986, the US 
government indicated that it did not see the Southern African region developing without 
apartheid South Africa’s participation, owing to its strong economy.291 For example, funding 
from the United States during the 1980s for SADCC’s regional transport and communications 
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sector, which was overseen by Mozambique, was limited. The US refused funding as 
Mozambique was a Marxist-led country at that time and the US was averse to Marxism.
292
 
 
As noted by Mbuende, in 1980 an economic dimension was added to political cooperation 
through a different entity, which allowed for broader membership within SADCC.
293
 SADCC’s 
member states had always envisaged a democratic South Africa as eventually being part of its 
organisation. Both the ANC and the Pan-Africanist Congress had observer status at SADCC’s 
annual Summits and annual Consultative Conferences. Although SADCC was formed to build 
confidence among its member states, SADCC member states were unable to provide one another 
with sufficient goods and services. Members were also not at the stage of converging trade 
policies. Trade encompassed transport; agricultural goods such as animals and animal products; 
animal and vegetable fats; vegetable products; foodstuffs and beverages; mineral products; 
chemical products; plastics and rubber; hides, skins and leather; wood; pulp and paper; textiles; 
footwear; stone; jewellery; base metals; machinery and appliances; vehicles; and optical 
equipment, among other items
294
 necessary to support independence.  
 
Key to SADCC’s regional integration efforts was the adoption of its action programme, which 
was seen as an important vehicle to promote and obtain regional cooperation. SADCC member 
states were tasked to oversee sectoral and sub-sectoral activities, at both national and regional 
levels.
295
 The SADC Programme of Action (SPA) was viewed as a means to achieve the 
participation and involvement of all SADCC members. In mid-1993, the SPA had 464 projects 
requiring funding of $8.8 billion, with only 22 percent of those projects truly regional (also as is 
later discussed in this chapter under the rationalisation period). By the late 1990s there were 19 
sectors and the SPA had 380 projects. Although the main goal was to retain regional projects 
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with adequate funding, only 49 percent of funds were secured. Similarly, members failed to 
provide the required resources for the adequate functioning of the SADCC Secretariat.  
 
The lack of sufficient funds, coupled with insufficient staffing of the Secretariat, made it difficult 
for SADCC, and later also for SADC, to fulfil its regional role adequately. SADCC soon realised 
that financing was difficult to manage, and even more difficult to coordinate through its 
Secretariat. Only 20 sector co-ordinating units were truly regional, and the rest lacked a regional 
focus. This led to the adoption of a new strategy beginning in 1985,
296
 focusing on coordination 
through a more robust emphasis on sectoral regional activities. Sectoral activities were very 
important to SADCC’s efforts in fostering security for the region through political and economic 
stability. The sectoral activities were coordinated nationally through member states’ national 
ministries.
297
 The decentralised approach adopted by the SADCC action programme became 
problematic for the region, negatively affecting the integration process. These problems faced by 
SADCC member states varied. For example, donors preferred to fund the sectoral activities and 
projects that they deemed most important, while failing to fund sectoral activities that SADCC 
member states deemed equally important for the region. Levels of competence also varied among 
SADCC member states, with some states being more effective than others in executing sectoral 
responsibilities. Lobbying for sectoral funding also occurred in advance, with member states 
seeking donor support unilaterally and not adhering to SADC procedures. Therefore, SADCC’s 
annual consultative conference, held with its international partners, was described by Garth le 
Pere and Elling Tjønneland as a dress rehearsal for discussions on donor support.
298
 While 
SADCC was faced with regional instability, it was conducting more trade with the rest of the 
world and divergence in intra-regional trade was hampered at these early stages of SADCC 
owing to the damaged infrastructure of roads and railway lines. Figure 3.1 highlights SADCC’s 
trade with global markets, as seen in the exports of agricultural trade from SADCC to the rest of 
the world for the period 1985 to 1989. While, this trade with external markets demonstrates the 
ability for SADCC to produce agricultural exports, and trade externally, it also shows the 
inability for regional integration and for trade convergence between member states during this 
period in its history.  
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Figure 3.1: SADCC’s agricultural exports to the rest of the world 1985 to 1989.  
Source: Data provided by the African Development Bank (AfDB) on SADCC’s regional growth 
indicators for trade, GNP, GDP versus regional trade and overall economic growth based on, 
AfDB, “Economic Integration in Southern Africa”, vol. 2, 1993, pp. 80-84, and 90.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These are all primary products as per the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) 7 - 
export amounts from SADCC to the rest of the world for the period 1985-1989 totalled: coffees 
and teas - $241,639 million; sugars - $95,156 million; fish and fish preparations - $56,417 
million; textiles - $174,425 million; skins and fur skins raw - $11,800 million; and smaller 
agricultural commodities for the same period - $105,793 million.  Besides the sectoral 
coordinating structures, SADCC also faced internal organisational problems and in its security 
and secretariat structures as is next discussed.   
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3.5 SADC institutional architecture
299
 
 
This section outlines the main factors in the institutional journey of SADCC which became 
SADC and the restructuring of it Secretariat. SADCC’s evolving security architecture embarked 
on a difficult journey. Defence and security issues were initially a sub-structure under the FLS. 
The Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC), the security leg of the FLS formed in 
1976, was operating with no formal charter or institutional framework. Zimbabwe held the chair 
of the FLS and played an integral role in the ISDSC. SADCC’s key hegemonic player between 
1975 and 1990 was Zimbabwe, and was viewed as the economic and military giant. With South 
Africa joining the Southern African fraternity in 1994, SADC had new battles to fight that did not 
encompass a political agenda of racism and colonialism, but was instead a battle over a clash of 
personalities,
300
 evident in Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe and South Africa’s Nelson Mandela’s 
relations. Robert Mugabe was the longest serving head of state in Southern African as well as 
chairperson of the FLS, with Zimbabwe therefore having significant regional status. The issues 
between these two presidents varied. Mugabe remained wary of South Africa’s new political 
transformation; Mandela, on his part, had misgivings about human rights and democracy issues 
in Zimbabwe.  
 
Robert Mugabe and Nelson Mandela’s disagreements and discontent further divided the region 
and issues pertinent to regional security became problematic. Issues arose where SADC member 
states were left choosing between South Africa’s (Mandela) advocating for an Organ on Politics, 
Defence, and Security (OPDS) integrated regional security approach, incorporated into SADC 
and reporting to the Summit. Mugabe, on the other hand, strongly opposed South Africa’s idea 
and felt that the Organ should be autonomous and have its own Summit, while security should 
not be integrated into the SADC structures. Overall, member states felt that security needed to be 
part of the SADC agenda.
301
  
 
Member states were generally unhappy with the role that the Secretariat played, particularly with 
the inadequate staffing structure. By 1996 the Secretariat had 10 professional staff and 20 
administrative staff. SADC’s security architecture was further challenged by Zimbabwe when it 
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sent troops to the DRC with Angola and Namibia and signed its own Mutual Defence Pact with 
all three states.
302
 To pull the region’s member states together and attempt to converge SADC’s 
security policies, in June 1996, at a SADC summit meeting in Gaborone, Botswana, the SADC 
Organ on Politics, Defence and Security was established.
303
 Since the establishment of SADC’s 
OPDS in 1996, the Organ’s mandate has been to oversee conflict prevention; establish a regional 
peacekeeping force; coordinate foreign and security policy of member states; strengthen 
democracy and human rights; and establish a mutual defence pact. The establishment of the 
OPDS showed a tentative commitment by member states to consolidate SADC’s regional 
security policies. Even with the establishment of the Organ, it too had no clarity how it would 
relate to the wider SADC structures and how it would report to the Executive Secretary or under 
SADC.
304
 In August 1999 (three years later, and after the SADC 1996 Summit), at a Heads of 
State meeting in Maputo, Mozambique, SADC’s foreign and defence ministers met to develop 
the sub-region’s collective security system.305 In an attempt to further consolidate cooperation 
and trust among SADC member states, two bodies were established: the Inter-State Politics and 
Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC) of sub-regional foreign ministers, and an ISDSC from the FLS, 
comprising ministers of foreign affairs, defence, public security and state security.  
 
SADC experienced many difficulties in the operationalisation of the OPDS mandate.
306
 While the 
objectives of SADC were stipulated in its founding treaty of 1992, these objectives define the 
economic and political values of the institution and include the promotion of defence and 
security. Issues arose also with the manner in which the executive secretary executed his duties 
and the infighting within the Secretariat led to the public dismissal at an SADC Summit of its 
independent-minded executive secretary, Namibia’s Kaire Mbuende, in 1999. A substantive 
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executive secretary, Mauritius’s Prega Ramsamy, was appointed only in 2001 (and served in this 
capacity until 2005).
307
  
 
Further concerns were raised concerning the vague work programme and lack of focus that could 
not be reconciled with SADC’s overall objectives.308 In 2000, at an Annual SADC Consultative 
Conference held in Ezulwini, Swaziland, the meeting highlighted that the defence and security 
committee, in comparison with the foreign affairs committee, appeared to be more effective.
309
 In 
2001, SADC’s organisational structure still appeared inadequate in terms of resources and 
staffing. In addition, the political tensions and divisions that emerged between Zimbabwe and 
South Africa threatened the Organisation’s security work. As a regional economic community, 
SADC is able to legally address security functions.
310
  
 
Hence, in August 2001 at a summit of heads of state in Blantyre, Malawi, the OPDS was 
restructured into the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (OPDSC) providing 
SADC members with an institutional framework to coordinate policies and activities in the areas 
of politics, defence, and security.
311
 The 2001 Summit also recommended improvements and 
changes to SADC’s institutional framework for it to execute its original 1992 mandate and SADC 
staff increased to 384, comprising 194 professional and 190 support staff.
312
 The OPDSC 
comprises the chairperson and the office of the chairperson, the troika, the ministerial committee 
(MC), the ISPDC, and ISDSC. Together the MC, ISDSC, and the ISPDC are the SADC Organ’s 
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MC.
313
 The Organ was also brought under the authority of the SADC Summit and chairmanship 
and became rotational from being solely chaired by one country, Zimbabwe.
314
  
 
A further SADC extraordinary meeting in January 2002 in Blantyre mandated the Organ on 
Politics and Defence Cooperation to provide guidelines for its Protocol on Politics, Defence and 
Security Cooperation. Hence, the Strategic Indicative Plan of the Organ (SIPO) was created by 
SADC focusing on four main areas: the political, defence, state security, and public security 
sectors.
315
 Also approved were the Terms of Reference (TOR) for the development of SIPO, and 
a Task Force comprising the Troika of members was established, with a one-year rotating chair to 
coordinate SADC’s security policy.316 SIPO provided a five-year strategic and activity guideline 
for implementing the OPDS Protocol. It covered a range of objectives and activities. SIPO also 
developed additional policy documents such as the Mutual Defence Pact signed at the August 
2003 SADC Summit. SIPO still had to operationalise and develop an implementation apparatus 
and business plan to engage with its politics, defence and security remits effectively. In August 
2003, the Mutual Defence Pact was signed, committing member states to develop both individual 
and collective defence capabilities and to cooperate on defence training, research and intelligence 
issues.
317
 
 
SIPO
318
 had a broad understanding of security through its governance and democratisation 
objectives as well as its defence and security issues, but with divergent opinions and approaches. 
Hence, some member states in the region placed more emphasis on state security issues, while 
others placed more emphasis on human security.
319
 SADC’s security convergence of its member 
states’ various protocols took five years since the establishment of the security Organ in 1996 - 
the Organ received guidelines only in 2004 through SIPO.               
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SADC’s security convergence gained support with the availability of donor funding, “which 
always got SADC member states to respond” (as a SADC Secretariat official indicated).320 By 
the end of 2004, the Secretariat managed to appoint the heads of its four directorates and staffing 
for each directorate to the extent of ten officials per cluster. Previously, the most basic 
administrative resources such as adequate access to email and communications had been 
hampered at the Secretariat. A relationship gap between the Secretariat and member states 
remains a challenge, since the mandate of the Secretariat is mainly administrative, with no 
political decision-making powers. An additional secondment was made from South Africa to the 
Organ’s Chair in 2005. Persistent problems still existed with the relations between the Organ and 
the Secretariat. This remains a major challenge, with both the Organ and the Secretariat sharing 
the same support staff, but having entirely different governing structures.
321
 
 
SADC social and economic areas are supported by the Integrated Committee of Ministers (ICM), 
the Council of Ministers, the Troika (past, current and incoming Chairs of SADC) and the 
Summit. The ICM lacked the ability to provide direction on programmes and activities for the 
various sectors and similarly lacked the ability to provide strong policies and a coherent flow of 
information between government departments at the national level.
322
 According to Tjønneland, 
Isaksen, and le Pere, the Council of Ministers spent much of their time and capacity on 
administrative detail and seemed to lack overall leadership.
323
 The Troika system had also failed 
to provide strong political leadership between the meetings of the ICM and the Council of 
Ministers. 
 
To narrow this gap between rhetoric and implementation, SADC established a Committee of 
Ambassadors in February 2005 in Gaborone, Botswana. The Organ has its own Troika.
324
 The 
Organ operates at the level of heads of state, consisting of three heads of state with its own 
Troika, and it reports to the SADC Summit. How this works in practice, is through the ministerial 
committee, which in turn reports to the Troika and makes the key decisions. The ministerial 
committee consists of ministers of defence, police, and intelligence from SADC’s 15 member 
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states. The Organ’s operational work is carried out through the two committees of senior 
officials, the ISPDC and ISDSC. The main responsibility of the Organ is security cooperation for 
member states, based on principles of common and collective security and mutual defence, and it 
provides a framework for operationalising the SADC Brigade. The protocol for the OPDSC 
empowers the Organ to deal with both inter-state and intra-state conflict such as civil wars, 
military coups, or gross human rights violations. The SADC OPDSC was put firmly under the 
control of SADC and a small Secretariat of the Organ was established at the SADC Secretariat in 
Gaborone.
325
 
 
The SADC Troika system - sometimes referred to as the Double Troika - has an incumbent 
chairperson, an incoming chairperson who also serves as the deputy chairperson for one year, and 
an immediate or previous chairperson who can take quick decisions on behalf of SADC that are 
not taken at SADC’s regular policy meetings. The Summit of Heads of State and Government 
Summit meet annually, while the Council of Ministers meets biannually. These meetings occur in 
February to approve SADC annual budgets, and also in August to prepare the Summit agenda. 
Provision is also made for extraordinary Summit and Council meetings if and when the need 
arises. The Troika is also applicable at the level of the Standing Committee of Senior Officials 
comprising the permanent or principal secretaries accounting for government offices and 
ministries. These rules of engagement also apply to the Troika of the OPDSC. The chairperson of 
the Organ does not hold the chair of the Summit simultaneously.  
 
SADC’s National Committees (SNCs) were established according to its Treaty of 1992, to 
coordinate programmes and policies for its government, civil society organisations, and the 
private sector. The SNCs are mandated to ensure that SADC programmes are implemented at a 
national level. The reporting line for state-directed SNCs is to the SADC Secretariat. This posed 
a problem for the Secretariat, since the SNCs are state directed at national level and therefore 
accountability to the Secretariat became a challenge. The Secretariat’s lack of power and 
authority could not hold SNCs accountable at national level. Furthermore, the SNCs do not exist 
in all SADC member states (this is still the case)
326
 and those that do exist are largely 
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dysfunctional, lack technical capacity, and have ineffective coordinating mechanisms and 
inadequate resources.
327
 
 
SADC officials noted that as soon as funding was imminent from the EU, it would be linked to 
restructuring of the Secretariat.
328
 At a SADC Summit in Maseru, Lesotho, in August 2006, two 
important decisions were made: first, to establish a task force on regional economic integration; 
and second, to strengthen the role of the Secretariat, and to review the role of the Integrated 
Committee of Ministers.  
 
At a further consultative meeting in April 2008, in Port Louis, Mauritius, SADC’s role was re-
examined to address the organisation’s capacity and performance issues against the commitments 
made at its 1992 Windhoek Declaration. Furthermore, the Council of Ministers instructed the 
Secretariat to participate in an evaluation of all its staffing positions with an attempt to realign the 
Secretariat’s organisational structure with SADC’s priorities. Evaluations were conducted by 
KPMG, and also by the Ernst and Young auditing firm, which undertook an institutional 
assessment of the Secretariat, which focused on operational policies and procedures. Germany 
financed a similar evaluation through GTZ and inWent (Germany’s capacity-building 
international organisation), focusing on SADC’s capacity needs.329  
 
The evaluation findings observed that the need to address capacity constraints of the organisation 
was critical. The findings of the evaluators also noted that SADC’s Secretariat remained weak, 
lacked human and financial management capacity, and was not able to facilitate strategy 
development and policy harmonisation within the region.
330
 The February 2008 SADC Council 
of Ministers’ meeting proposed a number of changes to the internal structures of the Secretariat. 
The main purpose of the meeting was to clarify the lines of authority and to improve the 
coordinating activities of the Secretariat’s senior management. Hence, the vacant post of chief 
director was to be eliminated and replaced by positions of two deputy executive secretaries.
331
 
The deputy executive secretary for regional integration was made responsible for regional 
integration within the technical directorates: Trade and Industry; Finance and Investment; Food, 
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Agriculture and Natural Resources; Infrastructure and Services; Health; Labour and Skills 
Development; and Policy, Planning and Resource Mobilisation. In addition, the deputy executive 
secretary for regional integration also provides direction to the Secretariat by recommending 
regional policies, and by providing strategic impetus and coordination with other RECs. The role 
of the second deputy executive secretary for finance and administration oversees two directorates 
and is responsible for the Human Resources and Administration, and Budget and Finance 
clusters.  
 
The August 2008 Mauritius conference also proposed a Capacity Development Framework for 
SIPO. The assumption was that should the Secretariat embrace the priorities of the Framework 
encompassing both the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) of 2003, and 
the 2004 SIPO. The priorities should therefore also include functions such as i) a think tank to 
guide members on the implementation of SADC’s common agenda; ii) a principal regional 
coordinator of policies, strategies and programmes for regional integration; iii) a provider of 
support services to the technical directorates and convenor of annual consultative conferences for 
SADC’s decision-making structures; and, iv) a professional programme manager to facilitate, 
implement and systematically prioritise programmes within a business plan and budget. 
Furthermore, the SADC Capacity Development Framework included ten intervention areas to 
strengthen the SADC Secretariat’s capacities and for a bridging facility through which donor 
funding could be channelled. The Bridging Fund Facility was to address the needs of the 
Secretariat, other SADC treaty-established institutions such as the SADC Tribunal (but this 
institution was cancelled in 2011), SADC subsidiary institutions such as the Regional 
Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC) and the Development Finance Resource Centre.
332
  
 
SIPO was revised into SIPO II in 2012 - a detailed programme of activities against key political, 
defence, public security sector (policing), and state security objectives. The current structure of 
the SADC Secretariat had been revamped to a staff capacity of 400 personnel. 
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Figure 3.2: SADC’s restructuring and organogram.  
Source: SADC Secretariat, < http://www.sadc.int/english/sadc-institutions/sadc-Secretariat /> 
 
A special Project Preparation Facility Fund was established and funded by South Africa’s DBSA. 
The purpose of the Project Preparation Facility Fund was to assist SADC member states, in an 
intermediary capacity, to develop projects, up to the point that they were at a “bankable stage”.333 
The EU commissioned an institutional assessment of SADC that strongly recommended that 
SADC bring its financial management up to international standards.  
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3.5.1 Funding SADCC and SADC 
 
This section discusses the involvement of donors through funding that was provided for the 
functioning of the Secretariat (which still is the case). SADCC members relied heavily on the 
support of external actors for funding; this was seen as a continuation of the FLS to reduce 
economic dependence on South Africa. Transport and infrastructure were vital to the survival of 
the SADCC economies. In 1984, which was four years after the donor conference, SADCC had 
generated 250 projects, an estimated $5 000 million, but had obtained only 20.8 percent of 
required funds.
334
 SADCC had its origins in the diplomatic initiatives of African and Western 
states, and envisaged a huge programme of reconstruction in Southern Africa after the years of 
war, with a sort of Marshall Plan for the region.
335
 As suggested by Øostergaard;
336
 Anglin;
337
 
and Leys and Tostensen,
338
 donors remained involved in SADCC and also in SADC.  
 
The funding for SADCC was a two-pronged approach: SADCC’s dependence on foreign aid and 
the Nordic countries’ political and economic interests in Southern Africa. Previous instances had 
been during the post-Cold War era, when Southern African states received US aid of $53.7 
million between 1975 and 1979; and $154.4 million between 1980 and 1984.
339
 Global events 
such as the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 resulted in a further increase in aid by the US, which 
played a supportive role to promote countries evolving into democratic regimes, such as Malawi 
($58.4 million) and Zambia ($41.7 million), and assisting with the resolution of civil wars in 
Angola ($29.4 million) and Mozambique ($102 million).
340
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SADCC formed the SATCC, which was to integrate all transport systems with the four regional 
ports of Dar es Salaam in Tanzania, Lobito in Angola, Beira in Maputo, and Nacala in 
Mozambique, for which the donor community pledged $650 million.
341
 In 1988, estimated costs 
for 188 main projects were $4.6 billion; 42 percent ($1.9 billion) was fully secured, with $241 
million under negotiation. Such challenges increased for SADCC when national policies 
conflicted with regional policies, as in its regional food security projects proposed by Zimbabwe. 
In 1986, SADCC had to abandon its agrarian programme when it shifted focus from transport to 
production of goods and services in the industrial, mining, and trade sectors under the 1987 
SADCC theme, Investment in Production, which also conflicted with regional as opposed to 
national policies.
342
 
 
As noted by Øostergaard, Friedland, Anglin, and Meyns, OECD governments of Britain, France, 
Canada, West Germany, and Japan funded only 21.2 percent of SADCC’s total sectoral 
distribution and contributed in the transportation and the communications sectors.
343
 SADCC 
required funds to establish plants to produce cement, paper and packaging, natural and synthetic 
textiles, and salt, as well as farming requisites such as tractors, chemical fertilisers, and 
pesticides/insecticides for enhancing food production, which would have led to stronger 
economies and seen an increase in its per capita income.
344
 At the 1985 SADCC Summit held in 
Arusha, the report on the SADCC Programme of Action was tabled, covering the period July 
1984-July 1985, which provided results for five years of cooperation for economic liberation in 
Southern Africa. Of the nearly $2.3 billion, over fifty percent was secured by donors.
345
 The 
Council of Ministers on the Nordic/SADCC initiative provided a report that detailed expanding 
and deepening relations between the two regions in the areas of development assistance, trade, 
industry, investment, finance, and culture. The Joint Declaration on Expanded Economic and 
Cultural Cooperation between the Nordic countries and the SADCC member states was signed in 
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January 1986,
346
 as well as the Memorandum of Understanding for the Programming of Regional 
Cooperation Funds under the Third Lomé Convention for the African Caribbean and Pacific 
(ACP) Group of States of Southern Africa that provided for the joint programming of regional 
resources, including food security, transport and communications. These two agreements were 
important for SADCC member states, and the funding and joint venture programmes assisted the 
Southern African states to withstand the attacks by the South African apartheid government on 
their trade transport routes.  
 
Total Nordic (Denmark, Sweden, Finland and Norway) funding support received in 1985 for 
SADCC projects was $369 million. While funding was provided, there was also trade conducted. 
For example, trade from Nordic countries to SADCC for 1986 totalled $4,328 million and total 
exports from SADCC to Nordic countries totalled $4,267. The trade amounts between Nordic 
and SADCC countries during the 1980s did not reflect a major difference.
347
 Trade with SADCC 
was only to ensure that Nordic countries’ motives for funding SADCC served as a form of 
cushioning for Nordic markets in instances of vulnerability, owing to the Nordic countries’ 
relatively high ratios of foreign trade to their gross national product (GNP).   
 
On the part of SADCC, the items traded from SADCC to Nordic countries had potential for 
specialisation within the region to boost trade prospects. Exports from SADCC to Nordic 
countries were: Angola (coffee); Botswana (live animals); Lesotho (mohair, textiles); Malawi, 
and Zimbabwe (tobacco); Zambia and Tanzania (coffee and tea); and Mozambique and 
Swaziland (sugar). Also suggested at the SADCC Summit of Heads of State meeting held in 
Luanda, Angola, on 22 August 1986, was for member states to consider the intra-SADCC trade 
programme that incorporated a system to direct trade and bilateral trade agreements, multi-annual 
purchase agreements, and counter purchase preferential import licensing.
348
 The SADCC Summit 
in 1986 also addressed the exchange trade preferences among member states that needed to take 
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into account their existing obligations and a supplementary financial mechanism for intra-
SADCC trade to ease the constraints arising from foreign exchange difficulties. Therefore, the 
Summit meeting of August 1986 considered the establishment of a regional export credit facility 
and a national export refinancing revolving fund to promote trade.
349
 SADCC’s Nordic 
agreement in 1986 expanded to include both economic and cultural cooperation, which was as a 
result of the stalemate in the UN programme for a New International Economic Order (NIEO).      
 
Denmark’s trade to SADCC in 1986 amounted to 506 million Danish krone and consisted of 
machines, metal goods, transport equipment, and chemicals. SADCC’s exports to Nordic 
countries met none of the real funding objectives of SADCC, which were to enhance trade 
conducted within the region and to obtain meaningful integration.
350
 Such real objectives lacked a 
reduction of economic dependence, mainly on South Africa; mobilisation of resources that 
reflected promotion and implementation of national, interstate and regional policies; and a lack of 
effort to secure international cooperation within the framework of its strategy for economic 
liberation. Nordic funding commitments also moved to bilateral funding later on in 1987 and 
1988. For example, Nordic countries’ commitment to the Beira system amounted to $37.4 
million; and $575 million for the transportation development plan for Angola’s Lobito corridor 
and for the critical food shortages programme. The Nordic countries’ move in providing the 
funds allowed SADCC to accept and make quick decisions in embracing a developmental 
integration approach, which called for a regional industrial strategy.
351
   
 
As indicated in the literature on regional integration, Bremmer argued that growing economies 
through an integration strategy had been equally daunting for regions when governments used 
state assets to regulate the markets, and used the markets to bolster domestic and political 
positions.
352
 Regional integration becomes affected by state capitalism and state inter-relations, 
places a damper on regions, and stifles trade liberalisation, in particular that of weak markets. 
Tanzania’s private sector development accompanied massive privatisation, as was the case in 
most other African economies alongside deregulated import-export regimes.
353
 African markets 
in SADCC were very weak and opening of its markets led to a massive export sector with a weak 
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local manufacturing sector that invariably provided a link for external trade. Furthermore, these 
economies experienced dumping from capitalist countries, and a meagre surplus was made 
available for implementing development programmes.
354
 Crawford Young notes that a declining 
state loses its credibility when “its ability to transform allocated public resources into intended 
policy aims”355 fails.  
 
Not all Nordic funding was directed purely to commitments in SADCC’s sectoral programmes. 
Tanzania received the lion’s share of total Nordic donor funds for its national projects, which 
were listed and categorised as SADCC projects. A case in point was the Mufinidi Project that 
received $187 million in 1987. SADCC’s industrial projects received only $66 million, which 
was the balance of the total SADCC industrial projects’ amount of $253 million of Nordic 
funds.
356
 SADCC needed to improve its industrialisation base,
357
 which required not only funding 
and resources, but also the willingness of member states to industrialise. However, as observed 
by Elaine Friedland, since the world-wide supply of most raw materials exceeded demand, it was 
not possible for SADCC member states to export on a sufficient scale and to simultaneously fund 
industrialisation projects. SADCC’s member states, Angola, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, 
Zambia, and Zimbabwe had trade with the EEC in 1987 that amounted to $4,267 million, while 
exports from the EEC to SADCC totalled $4,328 million.
358
  
 
At the Lusaka SADCC Summit in 1984, the Canadian International Development Assistance 
(CIDA) noted that they were evaluating progress before funding SADCC to determine whether it 
would go the same way as the EAC had done, which had failed owing to a heavy centralised 
bureaucracy. The funding received from donors for SADCC sectoral projects was an apt 
opportunity for the region to develop its technology and skills, with spillovers that could have 
enhanced economic growth as well as improved trade opportunities. For example, Malawi was 
considered an important source in technology transfer in the fishing industry.
359
 During 1989 and 
1990, SADCC faced huge food shortages in the Southern African region. At the 1990 and 1991 
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SADCC Summits, particular concern was expressed by governments at the extreme low levels of 
regional food shortages, with food deficits of an estimated 2.8 million tonnes for cereal and 
grain.
360
 Therefore, the use of donor funds to develop comprehensive regional approaches for 
agricultural production and food security programmes could have advanced the expansion of 
production given the complementary, comparative advantage in Southern African states. SADCC 
states declined a US offer to fund an $18 million dollar regional sorghum and millet research 
project, which had the potential for the coordination of field tests and applied research. However, 
the agreement did not sit well with SADCC leaders, since the US had a proviso attached that 
excluded project components from Angola, Mozambique and Tanzania.
361
  
 
The US also showed little interest in initially funding SADCC and contributed only $50 million 
to SADCC programmes between 1980 and 1985; only much later during the late 1980s did the 
US provide funding as mentioned earlier.
362
 Besides the objections of SADCC in relation to the 
US and its $18 million offer, such agreements could have been beneficial to regional economic 
growth in the long run, as highlighted by economists like Robert Baldwin.
363
  
 
Neoclassical economic models have succeeded amid the growth of massive privatisation schemes 
and alongside import-export regimes that resulted in perpetual underdevelopment of Africa’s 
economies. The model de-emphasises the role of the state in economic development. The 
importance for SADCC members to boost intra-SADCC trade promotion programmes in 1986, 
was to assist with low levels of production in the region.
364
 But, as noted by Khadiagala, 
Southern Africa’s regionalism had also been largely tied to external intervention from the West 
that was mainly linked to interventions via Bretton Woods institutions, the World Bank, and the 
IMF.
365
    
 
Controversial aid from donors also funded South Africa during the apartheid regime as well as 
post 1994. South Africa received an annual amount of aid from the US of $112 million for the 
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period 1995-1996 that made it the largest American aid recipient in Southern Africa.
366
 Also, 
between 1989 and 1994, South Africa received $75.3 million in annual funding from the US to 
work with the African National Congress regime towards a multiracial democratic society.
367
  
 
At a two-day conference held in Windhoek in September 1993, the focus was on development 
issues and the future role of aid in the Southern African region. Government actors promoted the 
conference with a view to economic reforms through donor commitments and aid and trade 
packages. In attendance at the Windhoek September 1993 meeting were the OECD and the 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Chairman, Alexander R. Love, and Swedish 
Ambassador to Namibia, Sten Rylander, among 20 leading experts from the Southern African 
region. These included Z. Ngavirue, Director-General of the National Planning Commission; 
Attorney-General Hartmut Ruppel, Minister of Agriculture, Rural Development and Water 
Affairs; and Kaire Mbuende. Also included were representatives from SADC and PTA. SADC 
officials were trying to lobby for financial assistance for SADC’s sectoral action programme. 
Love noted: “It will be important that the donor community reconfirms its long-term commitment 
to provide aid to Africa, both timely and commensurate with the needs of the countries moving 
towards political reform and economic liberalisation.”368       
 
Funding allocations were therefore determined and done by the donors. For example, if the 
funding for governance and security were not provided, the Secretariat would cancel its regional 
security and governance programmes, and project implementation would be delayed and 
hampered at national and regional levels. Similarly, funding of Millennium Development Goal 
(MDG) projects at the regional level was delayed because of the embargo on funds.
369
 
Furthermore, if the donors, upon evaluation, were not satisfied with the outcomes of the 
programmes funded and rolled out at the Secretariat level, funding would be stalled, and the 
integration programmes would not be rolled out.
370
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The discussion now proceeds to provide a historical account of the formation of the PTA which 
became COMESA and was a very different history to that of SADCC as outlined and discussed 
below. 
  
3.6 Formation of the PTA 
 
Africa had prioritised regional cooperation efforts through the pursuit of several strategies with 
the assistance of UNECA and through the creation of its regional economic communities within 
its five sub-regions: Western, Central, Northern, Eastern, and Southern Africa. Regional 
integration efforts also stemmed from historical development ideologies, largely prioritising 
“good governance” principles and structures, as well as stable economies. One of the main 
reasons for creating the RECs in Africa was to promote such structures with sustainable 
economic schemes to address the imbalance of weaker economies against stronger ones within 
regional clusters. As Anglin noted, UNECA was designed to “force the pace of cooperation 
among African states in trade, transport, and industry through the mechanism of sub-regional 
coordinating bodies”.371  In 1965, at a Lusaka meeting, Eastern African states met to harmonise 
industrial development and establish an Economic Community for East and Central Africa with a 
Secretariat based in Lusaka. However, within two years it dissolved. The next attempt to create 
the EAC was in 1967, comprising Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda, but collapsed in 1977.
372
 The 
next attempts at regionalism were the joining of the Eastern and Southern African states. The 
cooperation framework was designed by the Economic Commission for Africa, which sought to 
promote regional economic cooperation that could eventually evolve into common markets 
through the establishment of multi-national programming and operational centres (MULPOCs) in 
Africa’s five sub-regions. The funding for MULPOCs was extensive and consumed an annual 
budget of $7,045,393 over four years in financing projects in statistics, industry, national 
accounts, transport and communications, and integration of women in development.
373
  
 
The PTA member states had relatively stable economies, aside from the impact of regional 
conflicts, such as the intra-state conflicts in Ethiopia and Somalia’s Ogaden War, fought from 
1977 to 1978; the intra-state conflict in Rwanda from 1993 to 1994, which led to the genocide in 
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which 800 000 people were killed through “ethnic cleansing”; the border dispute between Eritrea 
and Ethiopia from 1998 to 2000; and the military coup in Sudan in 1985, which brought General 
Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir to power.
374
 But these conflicts did not affect the PTA’s vision of 
forming an economic community and a free trade area. As shown in Table 3.1 below, PTA 
member, Kenya had the highest per capita GNP of $7,500 with its average growth 3.8 percent of 
GDP between 1980 and 1987 and its population in 1987 was 22,097,000 million and almost half 
of that of Ethiopia’s, which had a population of population in 1987 of 44,788,000 million people. 
Ethiopia had the second highest GNP of $5,537 and its annual growth rate for the period 1980-
1987 was 3.8 percent of GDP.  
 
Table 3.1:  PTA: Countries: Main Economic Indicators, 1987 
 
Country Population 
(000) 
 
 
 
Mid-1987 
GNP  
Million 
US$ 
 
 
1987 
Average
375
 
Annual 
Growth 
Rate of GDP % 
 
1980-1987 
GNP per capita 
 
 
 
 
1987 
Burundi 4978 1205 6.6 250 
Comoros 424 160  380 
Djibouti - - - - 
Ethiopia 44788 5537 3.8 130 
Kenya 22097 7500 4.3 340 
Lesotho 1629 270 12.9 370 
Malawi 7629 1233  160 
Mauritius 1042 1524 10.9 1490 
Rwanda 6454 2008 2.5 310 
Somalia 5712 1656 -0.5 290 
Swaziland 713 496  700 
Tanzania 23884 5202 -3.5 220 
Uganda 15655 3550 -0.9 260 
Zambia 7196 1696 0.8 250 
Zimbabwe 9001 5265 1.8 590 
 
Source: German Institute of Global and Area Studies: Institute of African Studies (GIGA). “The 
Preferential Trade Area (PTA) for Eastern and Southern Africa: Achievements, Problems and 
Prospects” Spectrum, vol. 24, no. 2 (1989), pp. 157-171. 
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PTA members and observers also pledged towards MULPOCs: Botswana pledged $12,000 
towards the ECA MULPOC, as well as Tanzania, while also informing the ECA during that time, 
that the country would be settling the arrears of $298,000 in 1985 and in addition would 
contribute in 1985-1986 an additional Tanzanian shillings of 1,800,000 to the fund. Angolan and 
Zimbabwean representatives also promised contributions to the MULPOC fund after consultation 
with their governments during that period.
376
 However, some slight success was achieved through 
the MULPOC programme, namely the establishment of the Intergovernmental Authority for 
Drought and Development (IGADD) and the Eastern and Southern African Management Institute 
(ESAMI). It also evolved into four years (1977-1981) of negotiations among leaders of Eastern 
and Southern Africa that culminated in the establishment of the Preferential Trade Area in 1981, 
one year after the formation of SADCC in 1980.  
 
Focusing on regional and sub-regional cooperation in industrial policy and programming, the 
PTA became the cornerstone for rapid industrial development in Africa. With relatively stable 
economies, ten member states (Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Somalia, 
Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe) of the 20 potential members of the PTA signed up 
on 21 December 1981. (Zimbabwe ratified the COMESA treaty in 1998 when the PTA became 
COMESA; Mauritius left the Treaty and joined again much later.)
377
 The PTA was also formed 
on the basis of increasing intra-regional trade for the states of Southern and Eastern African. 
Opportunities to join PTA were important for some SADCC member states since SADCC did not 
have a trade protocol and the ideologies of SADCC were different from those of the PTA. 
Eligibility for PTA membership was defined by UNECA’s geographical scope outlined for 
Eastern and Southern African states, with Comoros, Djibouti, Mauritius, Lesotho, Swaziland and 
Zimbabwe receiving temporary exemption from the full application of certain provisions to the 
Treaty. Zambia and Malawi joined the PTA when it was established in June 1981.
378
 Tanzania 
was an active participant in the establishment of the PTA but in the end did not join the PTA and 
instead asked for an abstention. According to Anglin, Tanzania was averse to sharing trade 
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relations with Kenya, owing to the breakdown of their relations during the collapsed EAC and the 
trade difficulties it had had with Kenya.
379
  
 
During the preparation years of 1981-1984, the PTA experienced various obstacles. SACU 
members were still linked to South Africa through the SACU 1969 agreement (as still is the 
case), and the BLS states were hesitant to sign the PTA, while Botswana refused to sign the 
Treaty. Comoros was reluctant to be part of the PTA because of its trade relations with France. 
The Marxist-Leninst countries, Angola, Madagascar, Mozambique and Seychelles also refrained 
from signing the PTA treaty.
380
 Mozambique did not join PTA because of the civil strife, adverse 
climatic conditions and continuing destabilisation by MNR and South Africa. The major critique 
of the PTA, as noted by Nomvete,
381
 was that the PTA was seen as a misnomer and not 
synchronised with one of its major objectives - that of promoting cooperation and development 
through trade liberalisation. The PTA’s regional integration approach was similar to the 
neoclassical economic approach of trade liberalisation through growth, which was associated 
with regionalism of open markets and north-south trade liberalisation.  
 
The PTA took a functional approach which entailed a step-by-step mechanism designed 
sectorally and inter-sectorally. As Nomvete also noted, the PTA, “combined the careful balancing 
of the project-by-project approach within each sector, with inter-project and inter-sectoral 
programmes of trade promotion mechanisms that [were] aimed at gradual integration of all 
sectors in all countries”. Furthermore, as suggested by Nomvete in 1983, “it is not trade 
promotion or trade liberalisation measures that will increase the volume of intra-PTA trade, but 
self-reliant, and self-sustaining development through agricultural [and] industrial production, and 
transport and communications”.382    
 
Intended to be one of Africa’s main regional institutions, the PTA had seven main objectives: 
(i) Simplifying trade liberalisation and customs procedures and regulations; collection and 
dissemination of trade data. 
(ii) Providing local currencies for intra-PTA business transactions; a clearing and payments 
system to formulate and implement measures to harmonise monetary policies and programmes. 
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(iii) Having complementary transport and communications policies and systems for cross-border 
movement of goods, capital, labour, and services. 
(iv) Improving on enterprise efficiency and product quality through specialised research 
development and training facilities designed to complement the PTA’s productive sectors. 
(v) Increasing standards of living within PTA member states in order to promote intra-PTA trade 
and growth.  
(vi)  Establishing a common market by the year 2000. 
(vii) Contributing to the progress and development of other African states. 
 
At the end of 1992, the PTA had established 17 legal instruments pending ratification by its 
member states. Angola, Comoros, Djibouti, Mozambique, Somalia, and Sudan ratified some 
instruments. The other member states ratified none. The PTA clearinghouse was established 
alongside the PTA to create a set of accounts in the unit of account of the Preferential Trade Area 
(UAPTA) (equal to one standard depository receipt), mainly used as travellers cheques enabling 
credit and debit balances between members’ central banks and in turn reflecting imports and 
exports financed by their national commercial banks. Debit limits were set at 25 percent of the 
average value of a country’s total trade. Other finance arrangements included a traveller cheque 
facility, from 1992 to 1996; limited currency convertibility and an informal exchange-rate 
union;
383
 and fully fixed exchange rates, between 2000 and 2024. National fiscal and monetary 
policy was to be coordinated by a PTA monetary institution. By 1996 a 50 percent tariff 
reduction was envisaged, which by 2000 was to be further reduced to zero tariffs. Another 
important factor was rules of origin of goods in trade, which were to ensure that the maximum 
advantage was to be afforded to those exporting companies owned and managed by member 
states. Furthermore, multi-national corporations had to be managed through majority national 
ownership, with a percentage of equity owned by foreign nationals that was not to exceed 40 
percent; neither could foreign nationals account for more than 60 percent of the cost of materials. 
Because of external relations with foreign companies, this arrangement did not work for the PTA, 
as it meant a loss for businesses and new business partnerships; this arrangement was revised in 
the 1992 COMESA treaty and later the 40/60 national ownership and foreign national model was 
completely abolished. 
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Open general import licences had been a major problem for the region since the 1970s. With 
exchange rates over-valued, Africa’s states resorted to implementing import permits and quotas 
as a principal means of importation.
384
 Transport had remained an important regional 
infrastructure issue, as moving goods around in the region was expensive owing to inadequate 
infrastructure. Access to finance for foreign exchange remained an enormous problem for the 
states of Africa, though the clearinghouse put in place by the PTA eased this burden 
considerably. But PTA member states became disgruntled, complaining that the contribution was 
not reflective of the actual economic strengths of member states. Mozambique noted on its part 
that it would only join PTA if the Treaty provided derogations with regard to member states’ 
contribution to its budget, which PTA acceded to, adopting a resolution granting these 
derogations. This resolution paved the way for Mozambique’s accession to the PTA in 1989.385 
From 1980-1989, total intra-PTA exports were $641 million, but declined to $579 million. 
Throughout the PTA, trade was significantly less than at its formation in 1978. While Kenya was 
the stronger economic state, it too experienced declining trade and between the periods 1980-
1989, exports to other member states within PTA declined from $340 million to $218 million. 
Similarly, Tanzania’s exports dropped from $56 million to $9.4 million. During the 1980s total 
PTA trade with the rest of the world was 93 to 95 percent and in 1989 totalled $25 billion.
386
  
 
Like SADCC and other regions, the weak versus strong economies diverted trade for smaller 
infant industries against the more industrialised member states. Djibouti complained that 
reducing the tariffs had drastically reduced their revenue, given its dependence on revenue. For 
the period 1986, the total value added for manufacturing in Kenya was $709 million; Zimbabwe, 
$1,444 million; Mauritius, $284 million; Tanzania, $227 million; Uganda, $152 million; Burundi, 
$102 million; and in Lesotho, $26 million. Exports from Kenya to PTA countries for the period 
1982-1987 totalled $1,236.2 million and imports from PTA to Kenya for the same period totalled 
$129.4 million.
387
 Hence dissatisfaction with PTA intra-regional trade signalled Mauritius 
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withdrawing at the beginning of 1986. Contributions by member states to the PTA organisation 
were based on the strength of member states’ economies, defined in PTA Article 36 as well as 
member states’ national budgets of GDP - 30 percent; per capita national income - 40 percent; 
and intra-PTA exports - 30 percent. The PTA gave SACU member states (Lesotho and 
Swaziland) a ten-year exemption from any tariff cuts undertaken by the PTA (which was for the 
period from 1982, when the PTA treaty was signed, until 1992, when the PTA treaty was to be 
revamped into COMESA).
388
  The starting range for these tariffs was to be from 30 percent for 
food items to 70 percent for capital goods (and manufactured and consumer goods), with 
particular emphasis placed on development.  
 
3.7. COMESA’s institutional architecture 
 
COMESA was formed in 1993 as the successor to the PTA. At this time the bloc consisted of 17 
member states: Angola, Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
Not much progress to trade liberalisation was made. COMESA was seen as a fulfilment of the 
PTA treaty to have a common market by 2000. By 1993, the COMESA bloc had 19 member 
states: Burundi, Comoros, DRC, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 
COMESA had a vast geography of 4 million square kilometres, with 220 million people, and a 
GDP of US$66 billion. 
 
COMESA and SADC aimed to achieve a free trade zone for its members to facilitate 
specialisation, elimination of barriers and non-discriminatory practices among its members. As 
Viner points out in his customs theory of trade diversion and trade creation, free trade agreements 
and arrangements are made to remove all tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade among member 
states within a regional grouping. With SADC member states having to implement tariffs 
according to SADC FTA protocols, this impacted on COMESA member states by either diverting 
trade or creating trade. Furthermore, international agreements allowing access to Africa’s 
markets, such as the Lomé Convention, had already been signed by COMESA member states, 
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and began affecting trade for the small, vulnerable economies within the COMESA and SADC 
blocs.
389
 
 
COMESA member states pursued a state-led market strategy with high tariff walls erected and 
supported by state subsidies, grants and protection from foreign competition. But COMESA’s 
industries were not able to gain economies of scale, lacked competition, and produced goods of 
poor quality with low levels of foreign direct investment.
390
 The apartheid South African 
government also affected and contributed to the low levels of growth in the COMESA region, 
notably within the member states Angola, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Zambia, and 
Zimbabwe. High levels of borrowing ensued, with a lack of foreign direct investment to back it 
up.
391
 
 
By 1993, COMESA member states negotiated a list of common goods and agreed to reduce and 
eventually eliminate customs duties and non-trade barriers. Initially the common list was 
effective from 1 October 1986 to 29 September 1992, with a 25 percent reduction in tariffs every 
two years, but not all member states could meet this target. So in 1987 the 25 percent reduction 
target was decreased to 10 percent, meaning that tariffs on the list of common goods would be 
reduced by 50 percent by 1996. The remaining 50 percent was to be eliminated in two steps: 20 
percent in 1998 and 30 percent in 2000. Non-tariff barriers pertaining only to the goods on the 
common list included quantitative restrictions, export and import licensing, foreign exchange 
licensing, and stipulation of import services.
392
 Each state had the liberty to negotiate and 
maintain its own regime of barriers against non-members, which meant that member states had 
their own set of tariff rates together with a built-in MFN rate, softening the blow for the small 
member states with infant industries. COMESA had to implement a common external tariff in 
2004 of 0.5, 15 and 30, but was held back by the EAC common external tariff agreed between 
Kenya and Uganda of 0, 10, and 25 percent.
393
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COMESA has institutionalised concrete steps to remove non-tariff barriers and to increase trade 
performance. Major remaining challenges include rent seeking by customs personnel, illegal 
roadblocks, and harassment of cross-border traders, activities that are not regularly reported by 
COMESA member states.
394
 Important COMESA trade facilitation programmes that have been 
implemented include harmonisation of road traffic charges, introduced in 1991, and implemented 
in 15 member states; final axle load limits are operational in sixteen member states; carrier 
licence and transit plates have been required in most member states since 1998; road transit 
declaration documents have been required since 1986; an advanced tracking system has been 
implemented to monitor the movement of cargo and equipment through ports, railways, roads, 
and lakes; a yellow-card vehicle insurance plan, covering third-party liability and medical 
expenses, is used by twelve member states; a customs-bond guarantee scheme has been 
developed to eliminate unnecessary administrative and financial costs associated with national 
customs-bond guarantees for transit traffic; and an automated data management system 
(ASYCUDA) has been implemented to record statistics on customs declarations, customs 
accounting procedures, examination controls, warehousing, import and export licences and 
permits, and foreign trade processing procedures. As a result of this timely generation of trade 
and customs revenue statistics, goods are now cleared more quickly, more accurately, and more 
reliably.  
 
In addition to the harmonisation of trade standards among its member states, COMESA had also 
implemented a uniform system for classification of goods; customs declaration documents used 
for clearance, transit, and warehousing of exports and imports have been simplified and 
standardised, replacing all declaration documents previously used by member states. A stance on 
common competition rules has been taken, and technical norms and certification procedures have 
been streamlined. In addition, business relations through strengthening of the Eastern and 
Southern African Business Organisation, chambers of commerce, and other trade promotion and 
business advisory groups have been enhanced. 
 
COMESA’s Regional Payment and Settlement System (REPSS) links member states’ national 
payment systems to regional central banks to effect payment and settlement of trade, and includes 
banks in Asia and Europe as well as Africa. REPSS is a complete and innovative online system 
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with standards based on those of the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial 
Telecommunication (SWIFT). The COMESA clearinghouse serves as the agent of the central 
banks in formulating bilateral agreements. All COMESA central banks are expected to facilitate 
payments for goods and services traded by transferring payments under the REPSS system. The 
dependence of COMESA and SADC member states on trade taxes is substantial and could be a 
major hurdle for liberalising tariff structures, since the majority of COMESA and SADC 
countries, aside from South Africa, are completely dependent on trade taxes to generate revenue. 
Eight countries are dependent on trade taxes for over 20 percent of their revenue; only Rwanda, 
Uganda, South Africa, and Tanzania generate less than 2 percent of their GDP through trade 
taxes. Given COMESA and SADC’s substantial dependence on trade-tax revenue, together with 
the 6 percent decline in total revenue anticipated from the SADC free trade area - liberalisation of 
tariffs requires sound macroeconomic policies.
395
 The regional payment mechanism would 
therefore benefit the region and serve as a support to those member states dependent on trade 
revenue, and contribute to their fiscus.   
 
3.8 Rationalisation of SADCC and PTA 
 
This discussion now turns to the rationalisation process of SADCC and PTA and the main 
circumstances that led to these two organisations to remain apart.  The section also discusses the 
dominant role of South Africa in both regions. In particular, the region’s manufacturing sector 
was dominated by South Africa, whose manufactured exports totalled $4 583 million in 1988 - 
nearly twice the value of manufactured exports from the whole of sub-Saharan Africa, at $2 505 
million that same year. Moreover, the thesis also provides an expanded discussion on South 
Africa’s manufacturing base in chapter 4 and this discussion will outline the relevance of the 
region to South Africa in a post-apartheid period beyond 1994, and what this means to the 
convergence debate (discussed in chapter 4). 
 
In terms of the rationalisation process and for the purpose of this discussion, in February 1991, 
when South Africa announced its decision to renounce apartheid governance and to embrace 
democracy, regionalism became centred on three regional schemes of the Southern African 
Customs Union, the Front Line States, and the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern 
African States. The SADCC and PTA regional blocs were very closely linked to geography and 
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colonial heritage.
396
 South Africa’s role became a major question for both PTA and SADCC, 
given the uncertainty about how it would conduct itself regionally and as a new player in the 
post-apartheid era. SADCC was grappling with the form and shape of a new South Africa and 
regional pressure concerned recent memories of the devastation of past disruption of regional 
trade routes.
397
  
 
Fear played a role in the policy formulation and in the interactions of Southern African states, 
which were previously subject to military and economic domination by South Africa. Divergence 
and convergence literature on economic growth models suggests that for poorer countries to grow 
their economies, industrialisation as well as trade liberalisation policies should be implemented 
simultaneously to allow for advancing technology and development among other endogenous 
growth factors such as skills development, which are equally important for economic growth.
398
 
 
Table 3.2: Composition of Manufacturing Value Added (MVA), 1987.  
Source: African Development Bank, Economic Integration in Southern Africa, vol. 2 (Oxford: 
Oxprint, 1993), pp. 249-271.  
Country Percentage of Composition of Manufactured Products per ISIC Category (MVA), 1987 
1 & 2 
Foodstuffs; 
beverages 
and tobacco 
3 - textiles 
and clothing 
4 - leather 
and 
footwear 
5 - wood, 
wooden 
products, 
and 
furniture 
6 - paper, 
printing, 
and 
publishing 
7 - non-
metallic 
minerals 
8 - 
chemicals, 
rubber, 
and 
pharma-
ceuticals 
9 - 
metals 
and 
metal 
products 
10 - 
machinery 
and 
transport 
equipment 
11 - other 
or not 
classified 
Angola 30 18 — 7 4 12 6* 6 16 1 
Botswana 54 9 — — 2 6 — 4 2 23 
Lesotho 71 12 1 2 1 6 2 3 — 2 
Malawi 34 14 3 2 7 24 7 3 3 3 
Mozam-
bique 
41 23 ** 8 ** 11 4 11 ** 2 
Namibia 65 6 3 4 4 7 6 2 1 2 
Swaziland 58 2 ** 2 12 10 4 1 9 1 
Tanzania 34 17 4 3 8 13 1 7 11 2 
Zambia 35 18 3 4 4 15 8 12 10 1 
Zimbabwe 33 12 3 3 6 14 4 18 5 1 
South 
Africa 
14 7 2 3 9 22 5 18 19 1 
Kenya 40 9 2 3 7 16 4 6 6 7 
Mauritius 27 51 8 1 1 5 1 3 2 1 
 
Notes: International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) categories: 1 = foodstuffs; 2 = beverages and tobacco; 
3 = textiles and clothing; 4 = leather and footwear; 5 = wood, wooden products, and furniture; 6 = paper, printing, 
and publishing; 7 = non-metallic minerals; 8 = chemicals, rubber, and pharmaceuticals; 9 = metals and metal 
products; 10 = machinery and transport equipment; and 11 = other or not classified. * Excludes petro-chemicals 
accounting for almost 50 percent of MVA. 
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While manufacturing in Southern Africa was dominated by South Africa during the 1980s,
399
 
South Africa’s manufacturing sector was not as developed as seen in Table 3.2 below, and had 
little value added to its manufactured products. Zambia had to rely on wire and cabling from 
South Africa for inputs into its copper manufacturing and electrical cabling. South Africa only 
scored the highest in percentage of manufacturing valued added composition as seen in ISIC 
Category 7 (non-metallic minerals) and was on par with Zimbabwe in ISIC Category 9 (metals 
and metal products). Most of the other remaining categories, as shown in Table 3.2, demonstrate 
that Southern African states scored higher than South Africa in value added to manufacturing 
goods. South Africa’s MVA was much lower than that of its neighbours, and comparatively its 
industrial base lacked sophistication and complexity.
400
  
 
South Africa’s reliance on manufactured exports had been much higher than that of its SADCC 
neighbours. This heavy reliance on the region, including the SACU member states, was a base 
from which to export its manufactured goods in extensively serving the needs of the domestic 
market. This had caused a decrease in the quality of South Africa’s manufactured goods, unlike 
the higher-quality goods of its neighbours (foodstuffs and beverages; tobacco; textiles and 
clothing) as shown in Table 3.2. The following statistics should be considered in future relations 
between COMESA and SADC in order to strengthen the trade framework and regional 
integration. According to the World Bank
401
, the combined total manufacturing value-added 
(MVA) of SADCC and South Africa was $23 billion in 1989 - one-third that of Brazil and Spain, 
and less than half that of South Korea. Moreover, in 1988, SADCC and South Africa’s 
manufactured exports constituted only 4.5 percent of total production in SADCC and South 
Africa - compared with 11 percent for all developing countries in the world, ranging from 16 
percent for all of Asia, and 8 percent for all of Latin America and the Caribbean. MVA levels for 
SADCC and South Africa were largely attributed to substantial labour, skill, and resource 
deficiencies.  Also in 1988, 88 percent of total exports went from South Africa to SADCC. In the 
1990s, Botswana, for example, lost to South Africa in a bid to host an auto assembly plant for 
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South Korea’s Hyundai Corporation.402 SADCC states have not yet had the opportunity to 
address economic policies that could alter low levels of development and technology, and these 
have not remedied the region’s weak economies either.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3: SADCC’s agricultural exports to South Africa 1989  
Source: African Development Bank, Economic Integration in Southern Africa, vol. 2 (Oxford: 
Oxprint, 1993), p. 90. 
 
A SADCC review report on public and private sector cross-border investment projects observed 
that there was a huge skills deficit in technology and skills levels between SADCC and 
industrialised countries. Angola, Mozambique and Malawi had widespread skills shortages. The 
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report also noted a general skills shortage observed in Botswana (with the exception of public 
administration, agricultural technology, and mining engineering), Lesotho (with the exception of 
agricultural and metallurgical engineering), Swaziland (with the exception of mining engineering 
and agricultural research), and Zambia (with the exception of senior management and the 
financial sector).
403
 Figure 3.3 shows that SADCC member states conducted trade in agriculture 
in fish and fish preparations $65 493 million, (mainly Malawi and Angola) and in cereals and 
cereal preparations ($147 490 million), textiles and wastes ($129 240 million), and ores and scrap 
metal ($228 223 million), constituting opportunities for future manufacturing and trade 
agreements in the region.
404
 South Africa’s accession into SADCC and later SADC was to allow 
for integration and economic convergence. But convergence was commensurate with policy 
implementation at the national level of the state. Such policies included domestic trade and 
regional policies, to improve on movement of goods and services by rail, road and port, but these 
policies that could determine growth were not implemented. As outlined by David Dollar,
405
 
effective trade policies can promote convergence in trade openness. The implications for Africa’s 
political economy have been due to monopolistic behaviours seen in the post-colonial era that 
was still linked to the African economy, which have been perpetuated and have opened avenues 
for exploitative practices and been exacerbated by the adoption of neoclassical economic 
approaches of liberal trade policies.
406
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Table 3.3: South Africa’s regional trade, 1984 (million rand)  
Source: Joseph Hanlon, Beggar Your Neighbours: Apartheid Power in South Africa (London: 
Currey, 1986), p. 281. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
While African states have pursued various models of economic development, the progression of 
economic structural adjustment programmes of the 1980s exacerbated the political and economic 
weaknesses of the state.
407
 Khadiagala observed that the weakness of the state is central to the 
wealth of power. In 1987 SADCC states had a total GDP of $23 billion, an area of over four 
million square kilometres and a population of about 25 million people.
408
  
 
In 1984 South Africa dominated most of the sectors of the Southern African economy, for 
example, trade import and exports (see Table 3.3). SADCC was most dependent on the region’s 
transport infrastructure, and as observed by Khadiagala, South Africa was dependent on the 
region’s leading export markets in 1990 with bilateral trade that was conducted mainly with 
Zimbabwe for its exports (see Table 3.4). 
 
 
                                                 
407
 Ninsin, “Three Levels of State Reordering: The Structural Aspects”, 1988. 
408
 Khadiagala, Allies in Adversity, 1994, p. 231. 
South Africa’s regional trade  Exports Imports 
Machinery 309 6,397 
Transport equipment 169 2,653 
Chemicals 672 1,785 
Gold 11,684 — 
Diamonds and precious metals 2,387 129 
Other minerals and mineral 
products 
5,515 1,721 
Textiles 762 1,037 
Other manufactures 808 2,980 
Fruits, grains, and vegetables 480 996 
Other agricultural products 833 801 
Other 1,766 3,254 
Total 25,395 21,717 
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Table 3.4: South Africa’s leading export markets in Africa, 1990 
Source: African Development Bank (1993) “Economic Integration in Southern Africa” Volume 
2. 
 
Countries  1990 Exports  
(US$ m) 
1990 Imports 
(US$ m) 
Zimbabwe 403.5 167.8 
Zambia 187.8 2.5 
Zaire 172.1 8.2 
Mozambique 164.2 11.5 
Malawi 143.7 30.1 
Mauritius 114.5 5.4 
 
 
South Africa’s trade to the rest of the world, shown in Table 3.5 below, was quite extensive in 
1990, despite the imposition of Western sanctions because of its apartheid policies. A number of 
institutions in South Africa played an important role in its trade drive. Examples were the South 
African Foreign Trade Organisation (SAFTO) and its Chamber of Commerce.
409
  During the 
rationalisation discussions and meetings there was a strong regional sentiment that was focused 
on the regional trade that a new South Africa could integrate into SADCC, with equitable 
agreements put in place in respect of trade, transport and investment.
410
  
 
As a start to the run-up to the rationalisation process, the 1991 SADCC Summit meeting deemed 
it important to establish a Joint Planning Committee (JPC) comprising Botswana (Chairman), 
Mozambique, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, and the ANC and PAC.
411
 The JPC commissioned two 
consultants,
412
 and were tasked to identify, analyse and assess the interests and concerns of the 
SADCC member states. While the SADCC member states were contemplating how to 
incorporate South Africa into a new SADC, member states were also urged to refrain from 
contact with South Africa. The international community had placed sanctions on the South 
African government until a new political dispensation could be formed in the country.  
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Table 3.5: South Africa’s Trade To the Rest of the World, 1990 (US$ millions) 
Source: African Development Bank, Economic Integration in Southern Africa, vol. 2 (Oxford: 
Oxprint, 1993), p. 29 
 
Goods Imported Value 
1990 (US$ 
millions) 
Goods Exported Value 
1990 (US$ 
millions) 
Machinery and equipment 5,196.35 Machinery and equipment 542.88 
Unclassified goods, mainly 
oil and arms 
2,291.31 Unclassified (mainly gold, 
platinum, uranium, and 
arms) 
9,733.62 
Vehicles and transport 
equipment 
2,225.07 Vehicles and transport 
equipment 
439.41 
Chemicals 1,865.95 Chemicals 736.32 
Mining and quarrying 
(excluding precious stones 
and metals) 
1,329.74 Diamonds and other 2,253.73 
Agricultural products  939.94 Agricultural products 1,742.21 
Textiles 781.68 Textiles (including wool) 628.68 
Rubber and plastic 740.77 Base metal 3,538.47 
Professional and scientific 
equipment 
710.50 Machinery and equipment 542.88 
Pulp and paper 486.88 Pulp and paper 642.95 
Intermediate manufacturing 
materials 
236.42 Intermediate 
manufacturing materials 
443.00 
Miscellaneous 
manufacturing articles 
190.28 Other 231.70 
Other 271.60   
Total 17,266.49 Total 21,475.85 
 
With varying economic strengths among the SADCC members, the main concern was to provide 
an integration process that considered economic integration that encouraged development, while 
taking into account the differences in size of member states’ economies. South Africa was in a 
different and much higher economic structure than the other member states in SADCC. Simba 
Makoni, executive secretary of SADCC, expressed his position clearly, that “a democratic South 
Africa, free of apartheid and the dream of economic and military hegemony over its neighbours 
134 
 
would be welcome to join the Organisation”.413 During the rationalisation period, SADCC was 
also faced with the challenge of huge food shortages of around 2.8 million tonnes recorded for 
the periods between 1991 and 1992. With the prospect of South Africa’s joining post 1994, 
SADCC member states agreed that the current dominance of South Africa over the rest of the 
region would be both undesirable and unacceptable, and also undesirable even with a democratic 
South Africa as a member. During these deliberations, there was also uncertainty with regard to 
Namibia’s ports and offshore islands. Namibia had gained its independence in 1990, and was still 
battling to retrieve Walvis Bay and the offshore islands from South Africa, and which were 
integral to Namibia’s economic development. SADCC stressed the need for the international 
community to pressure South Africa to restore sovereignty over Walvis Bay and the offshore 
islands to Namibia.
414
  
 
With a new South African dispensation after 1994, the SADCC JPC recommended that the 
restructuring of SADCC’s existing arrangements should be negotiated in “baskets or calabashes 
of issues” with a strong coordinating mechanism to facilitate trade-offs across the different 
baskets (calabashes) and that ensured overall growth and development for the region as a 
whole.
415
 The SADCC JPC’s Macro-Framework Study Report was a broad policy and strategy 
document, which was seen as an important instrument to facilitate the smooth engagement of 
incorporating South Africa into future regional relations.  
 
Makoni reiterated the importance of the Macro-Framework Study Report as a regional instrument 
to be taken into account and incorporated into future protocols or agreements envisaged by 
SADCC and its successor organisation, SADC. The importance of having a partner state was 
significant for the SADCC leaders. In 1989 for example, the average per capita GNP was $647 
among SADCC states.
416
 Local industries in several SADC member states were not well placed 
to compete against the increasing imports from South Africa’s industries. A more comprehensive 
study conducted on income convergence that focused on 28 regional integration agreements 
(RIAs) since the notification of the GATT/WTO, analysed the effects on trade liberalisation in 
South-South and North-North trade cooperation. This was conducted by Fabrizio Carmignami 
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and also included SADC, COMESA, and SACU RIAs. The results indicated no evidence for 
income convergence among COMESA countries, and weak convergence in the case of the SACU 
and the SADC blocs.
417
 Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia had extremely low 
levels of per capita income in contrast with South Africa’s $2 530.418  
         
Besides integration of a democratic South Africa into SADC, there were also discussions centred 
on the PTA and SADCC’s restructuring role and how South Africa would impact on these two 
organisations. Open regionalism can be broadly defined as trade liberalisation that has easy 
market access in trade of goods and services, with a few exceptions for sensitive products. Open 
regionalism also has proponents of commitment to the most-favoured nation clause and principle 
as per the WTO rules for regional trade arrangements. Within the region, open regionalism, 
which signifies liberal trade, had reduced not only tariffs in trade, but also transaction costs at the 
borders. Deep integration goes beyond the mere issue of multilateral agreements. It means first 
and foremost an attempt at and willingness by Africa’s leaders to integrate and to conduct trade. 
According to Nomvete,
419
 implementation guidelines for deeper integration were already in force 
and agreed to by African leaders when UNECA was established. At the May 1963 meeting that 
inaugurated the OAU, leaders had viewed economic cooperation as a critical development 
strategy for addressing Africa’s weak economies. Furthermore, at four OAU Summits in 1970, 
1973, 1977, and 1979, it was decided that to establish an African Economic Community, five 
successive stages would be necessary: a Preferential Free Trade Area, Free Trade Area, Customs 
Union, Common Market, and Economic Community; these would begin at the regional level of 
western, eastern, southern, central and northern Africa.
420
 The European Union integrationists did 
not adopt the strict linear progression model of region building that SADC and PTA embarked on 
in terms of trade liberalisation at the regional level. Europe embarked on three phases: 
“Firstly a customs union was formed which eliminated tariffs and established a common external 
tariff between 1958 and 1968; then came a period of relative stagnation in the 1970s, when a 
number of non-tariff barriers prevented further progress; and thirdly, only much later in the 1980s, 
the single European market programme of 1992 was created.”421        
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Africa’s integration journey started in April 1980 at the first extraordinary OAU Economic 
Summit that was held in Lagos. At this summit, African leaders agreed to implement the 
guidelines adopted at the various OAU meetings during the 1970s and to incorporate a sound 
plan of action - the Lagos Plan of Action where all African governments had to belong to 
regional economic communities by 1990. This would later be followed by an African Continental 
Community.  For the PTA bloc, it meant that SADCC would naturally join the PTA 
organisation.
422
 The decision to merge these two organisations was discussed in January 1992, at 
a PTA Summit meeting in Lusaka. PTA considered itself a “better organised grouping”. PTA 
covered a geographic territory with a larger market and opportunities for economies of scale, and 
felt superior to SADCC in this regard. Previously, SADCC had been concerned about regional 
sectoral coordination; PTA, on the other hand, had concerns regarding regional trade 
liberalisation, and the two organisations’ roles differed. But with SADCC taking on a trade role 
when it created SADC, major rivalries of competition and competing conflicts of interest in trade 
and investment were unleashed.         
 
According to Meyns, the SADC August 1992 Summit appeared to be a rushed decision, with the 
change of an old SADCC to a new SADC organisation, and from a 10-member state to a formal 
regional grouping. The old SADCC was largely concerned about how it would justify its 
existence and manage its donor agenda; it had concerns regarding donor fatigue in competing 
against the Eastern bloc countries of the PTA. As suggested by Meyns,
423
 the erstwhile SADCC 
hastily formed SADC and believed to have happened to forestall PTA (and the planned 
establishment of COMESA). Also noted by Meyns, was that an added factor to the precipitous 
transformation was the view that there had been no prior discussion of the SADC draft agreement 
among a broader public in the member states and hence it was believed that SADCC had decided 
to form the organisation without gauging public opinion.
424
 There was also a major concern in an 
old SADCC to be seen competing for funds from donors and justifying its existence, programmes 
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and goals in a new dispensation, since SADCC was no longer fighting for the liberation 
movements and against the apartheid regime in a post-apartheid South Africa. SADCC therefore 
needed a new raison d’être within a new SADC.  
 
However, Makoni contended
425
 that the transformation of SADCC to SADC occurred during the 
rationalisation process that considered two major issues (PTA and SADCC’s merging, and South 
Africa’s joining either organisation). It had less to do with donor funds, but rather wished to 
address how South Africa would fit into Southern Africa after its democratic elections. SADCC 
was largely concerned with the huge shortage of food in the region during this time.
426
 At the 
SADCC Summit of 17 August 1992, the member states accepted the report of the Joint Council 
of Ministers on the re-formalisation of SADCC and agreed that the report adequately addressed 
the issues and concerns of the region with regard to South Africa’s admission. The Summit 
agreed that the JPC report formed a sufficient basis to strengthen SADCC and provided the new 
SADC with appropriate legal status and other necessary instruments to create a regional 
economic community of Southern African states. Hence the 17 August 1992 Windhoek Summit 
immediately approved and signed a new Declaration, a Treaty, and a Protocol committing 
member states to more formal arrangements for cooperation and integration under the framework 
of a new organisation, SADC. The SADC Treaty specified six important factors and 
considerations.
427
 The importance of South Africa’s joining the organisation was reaffirmed at 
the August 1992 Windhoek Summit. The Summit “agreed that it was necessary to clarify that 
relations between SADCC and South Africa will be normalised only when a democratically 
elected government was in place”.428  
 
The August 1992 Windhoek Summit also approved a 1993 SADC Annual Consultative 
Conference, namely, “SADC: A Framework and Strategy for Building a Community in Southern 
Africa”, which articulated regional issues and proposed a timetable as well as the necessary steps 
required to build an economic community for Southern Africa. The August Windhoek Summit in 
1992 outlined clear objectives for the region’s future engagements. It acknowledged: i) that the 
SADC Treaty should provide an agreement on protocols on specific areas of integration, which 
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should set out principles and objectives for integration, and determine the rules under which 
member states were to conduct relations; ii) member states were required to sign the follow-up 
plan of the Treaty, which provided a timetable for negotiations and protocols; iii) priority had to 
be provided by member states for popular participation in ensuring that SADC citizens formed 
part of the regional integration process and were informed of the direction of the SADC 
integration process; iv) movement of people within the region was to be facilitated and 
encouraged; v) member states had to work toward progressively removing all barriers to the flow 
of capital, goods and services; and, vi) regional peace and security processes were to be 
prioritised by member states. These principles of engagement set the tone for member states for 
future engagement in regional integration. Also expressed at the August Windhoek 1992 Summit 
was the hope that a democratic South Africa would join SADC in order to build a new economic 
order based on balance, equity and mutual benefit.
429
 
 
Furthermore, the August Windhoek 1992 Summit acknowledged the proposal of the Authority of 
the PTA for Eastern and Southern African states that requested SADCC and PTA merge into 
COMESA. The SADCC member states at the August Windhoek 1992 Summit objected to this 
proposal of PTA’s calling for a merger, and reaffirmed their position that the two organisations, 
SADCC and PTA, had different objectives and mandates and should therefore continue to exist 
as autonomous but complementary entities.
430
 In the end, and as documented in SADC’s 
Windhoek Declaration of 1992, there was consensus that SADCC and the PTA conduct an 
independent commission to study SADCC and the PTA, and advise on how best to harmonise 
relations between the two regional communities, and also to address in the process and in going 
forward, how to establish the African Economic Community.
431
 Also, avoidance of duplication of 
efforts in the activities of the two organisations was to be an important consideration in the joint 
independent commission study.
432
  
          
At the 5 September 1993 SADC Summit in Mbabane, Swaziland, acknowledgment of the macro-
framework study, namely: the JPC on Regional Relations Post-Apartheid,
433
 and acceptance 
thereof by the SADC member states were made in agreeing to South Africa as the 11th member 
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state of SADC. The macro-framework study report was regarded as a broad policy and strategy 
document for future evolving arrangements for the smooth engagement of a democratic South 
Africa, and as an important input to planning for the integration of SADC member states, both for 
South Africa and the cooperating states and partners. The macro-framework study was seen as a 
resource to be used for future SADC discussion, analysis and policy formulation on future 
regional relations.
434
  
 
Member states considered an SADC Resident Mission comprising diplomatic and trade missions 
of SADC countries in South Africa important, and this was established in Pretoria to monitor 
closely the events as they unfolded in achieving a democratic government in South Africa.
435
 
There were regional fears that donor sympathies would become lukewarm post 1994, when South 
Africa joined.
436
 As noted by Fadzai Gwaradzimba, SADC faced three major options with the 
new South Africa: South Africa could join SADC and assume its economic leadership role; South 
Africa’s hegemony could be appealing to the BLNS member states and as members of SACU; 
and SADC could also be faced with an FLS membership that might entail a redefinition of goals 
to address membership overlap with South Africa’s bilateral deals.437 At the SADC Swaziland 
Summit in 1993, member states expressed their concern at the lack of funding for the SADC 
programme of action that initially had 518 projects, but had dwindled to only 464 by July 1993, 
and that required a budget of more than $8.8 billion.
438
 There were also growing concerns with 
regard to Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland’s emergency drought relief strategies. In 
1994 Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia, were the worst hit by the adverse climatic 
conditions, with those regions experiencing huge food shortages and in particular a shortfall in 
cereal production.
439
  
 
The rationalisation of SADCC and the PTA’s existing regional mechanisms centred on “what 
programme and approach to be adopted in building cooperation and integration and how 
organisational activities were to guide a rationalised regional organisation that takes into account 
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different approaches of these two institutions”.440 At the meeting it was asked, “Should a 
rationalization/merger be undertaken in anticipation of the entry of a democratic South Africa or 
should it be something that occurs in the process of or after South Africa’s admission?”441 The 
timing of this debate was significant, happening just one year prior to both triumph and tragedy 
in April 1994 - the democratic elections in South Africa, the civil war in Burundi and the DRC 
that started in 1996 (involving seven African states: Angola, Burundi, Namibia, Rwanda, 
Uganda, and Zimbabwe; and also Chad), and the onset of the genocide in Rwanda. Angola and 
Mozambique were also emerging from domestic intra-state violent conflict and Angola from civil 
war. At the February 1993 meeting between SADC and the PTA, the PTA favoured a merger. As 
discussed earlier under the PTA, Zimbabwe and Mozambique had doubts about the usefulness of 
the PTA (but they later joined). Botswana refused to join the PTA. The JPC also adopted the 
Council of Ministers in January 1994 - a strategy and policy framework for regional relations and 
cooperation post-apartheid.
442
 During the SADC/COMESA rationalisation process, South Africa 
was going through its own rationalisation processes of its SANDF, its police force, and foreign 
and trade ministries. Democratic and political transformation, and socio-economic issues and 
security, were more pressing issues for the country. The Southern African bank – and the 
Independent Development Trust (IDT) was also being transformed into the DBSA, to engage the 
region by helping address regional infrastructure development in particular.
443
 South Africa had 
major setbacks in its socio-economic disparities in 1994 and these remained huge. Eighty percent 
of South Africa’s economy was still owned by four conglomerates from the apartheid era (Anglo 
American, Rembrandt, Sanlam, and SA Mutual).
444
   
    
South Africa was faced with domestic challenges and diverging interests in its own foreign policy 
- a dilemma that was confronted with a plethora of highly powerful business elite groups and 
conglomerates against a huge labour-intensive working class. South Africa was also 
simultaneously negotiating trade agreements with Europe. South Africa was eager to find the 
correct balance at the regional level to serve its national interests.
445
 The post-apartheid 
government’s national interests were dominant in its working class, who were strong supporters 
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of its ANC party and trade union, Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) that was 
formed in 1985.
446
 South Africa also confirmed its standing and did not want to be saddled with a 
merger and focus on a joint COMESA and SADC when it was going through a difficult 
transition. It also had concerns around its military, police and security sector reform processes. 
During South Africa’s deliberations, the government was presented with a political compromise 
in its regional role. It was also important to consider market cooperation as a regional approach 
that could benefit South Africa’s business elite while also benefiting its own working class. 
These discussions were documented in Gavin Maasdorp’s report on which way the pendulum 
swayed for South Africa’s regionalism.447 Rob Davies, South Africa’s Minister of Trade and 
Industry, was previously part of the Macro-Economic Research Group (MERG) and held views 
in support of COSATU and labour unions during the 1990s.
448
 The decision makers in South 
Africa’s regional developmental cooperation comprised the ANC-dominated government, guided 
by its RDP;
449
 COSATU, representing labour; South Africa’s members of parliament, with the 
former chair of the trade and industrial policy group, Ben Turok; and Rob Davies, former chair of 
the portfolio committee on trade, also representing labour; also included were the Afrikaners, 
under the banner of the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut (AHI) represented the Afrikaner business 
elite. The English business elite was represented by Anglo American, with Gavin Reilly as 
executive, and called for an ad-hoc regional integration approach as he noted that “ ... political 
reform in South Africa has opened up further opportunities for cooperation in the fields of 
tourism, transport, electricity supply, and the development and use of scare water resources ... 
sinews that bind ... the region ...  need progress [and not] castles in the air”.450 Trevor Manuel, 
former South African Finance Minister, advised that South Africa should steer away from joining 
any regional grouping.
451
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Furthermore, there were two parallel sets of trade negotiations happening simultaneously relating 
to SADC and the European Union. South Africa’s Industrial Development Corporation (IDC), 
reinforced by the Development Bank of Southern Africa, both opted for a SADC free trade area, 
since South Africa stood to gain and increase its GDP through total exports and manufactured 
exports. SACU countries were to fall short and be negatively affected in de-industrialisation trade 
processes. The DTI also supported the regional developmental approach led by former DTI 
minister Alec Erwin, who noted, “there is an acknowledgment that there are unequal starting 
points and that in the long run the benefits are better for all if the economically weaker partner is 
assisted to develop in the early stages”. Faizel Ismail, South African Deputy Director of the 
DIRCO and former Chief Director of Foreign Trade Relations, noted that the South African 
delegation to the EU should be “diplomats in service of development”.452 Maasdorp’s 1993 study 
outlined several problems that South African farmers within a SADC FTA could face, which 
related to “sensitive agricultural subsidies and clothing imports from Zimbabwe specifically and 
for South Africa’s textile and footwear industries that would be economically strained”.453 With 
regard to Europe, the trade negotiators also highlighted strain on South Africa’s labour-intensive 
industry in areas linked to textiles, cars, television assembly and parts, oil production from coal, 
footwear, small arms and ammunition, dairy products, beef and veal, and sugar. South Africa’s 
alignment of its regional developmental approach with its own trade deals with the European 
Union ultimately led to the Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) in 1999. 
As one government official noted: “We are not in the Father Christmas business … surely, it is 
imperative that South Africa looks after its people who have suffered for centuries instead of 
bailing out corrupt bureaucrats who got freedom decades ago.”454    
 
A report of the Joint Study on Harmonisation, Coordination and Rationalisation of the activities 
of the two organisations was studied
455
 at the Gaborone SADC Summit of 29 August 1994, the 
decision was unanimous that the current Preferential Trade Area should be divided into two 
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regions: i) A Preferential Trade Area for the South comprising all SADC member states. 
Preferential trade arrangements in the South region were to be carried out under the auspices of 
SADC. The process of separating the two regions into North and South was to evolve over time, 
and the modalities regarding which area SADC member states would wish to belong to, had to be 
determined by individual member states as their sovereign right; and ii) a Preferential Trade Area 
for the North comprising non-SADC countries.
456
  
 
A decision was taken that SADC and the PTA should be split into North and South. The region 
that covered the geographical area of COMESA should be split into PTA North and PTA South, 
the latter comprising the current SADC member states. At the August 1995 Summit, however, 
SADC agreed to the proposal of the COMESA Authority for a joint SADC/COMESA Summit 
meeting on the future of the two organisations. In 1995 the PTA sent yet another proposal 
requesting to merge SADC with COMESA. Again it was agreed at the August 1995 meeting that 
SADC reaffirmed its previous position and decision to remain as separate institutions. Instead, a 
joint committee of ministers was appointed - five from each organisation, assisted by an equal 
number of officials from each side to address and recommend appropriate terms of reference for 
approval by the two chairpersons.
457
 SADC’s main concerns with regard to the merger were  
 
“… the many countries the PTA encompassed, and the geographical spread of the organisation, 
which made the PTA too complex and unwieldy to manage. The size and geographical spread of 
the organisation also made coordination and harmonisation of its activities very difficult. The 
situation would be compounded if the SADC member states maintained dual membership of both 
organisations. … [The] Summit underlined … the political, economic and cultural diversity of the 
countries which constituted the PTA. This factor made cohesion difficult; and cohesion was 
essential for meaningful and sustainable regional cooperation and integration.”458   
 
Furthermore, the SADC Summit heads of state had concerns about trade promotion within the 
PTA. The programme had not made satisfactory progress because member states were granted 
derogations from compliance under the provisions of the Treaty, principally to protect 
arrangements with third parties. This practice cast doubt on the viability of the trade programme 
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in the PTA. SADC was equally concerned with dual membership, which was costly for member 
states in terms of time, human, material and financial resources. The international cooperating 
partners were also disillusioned because of uncertainty and lack of clarity on the future of the two 
organisations.
459
 Members of SADC had to decide which organisation to join, and Seychelles and 
Mauritius (who attended their first SADC Summit with intentions of joining the organisation), 
were also given the option of which organisation to join.    
 
The joint SADC/COMESA Ministerial Committee met in Harare from 31 July to 1 August 1996 
to discuss and agree on an agenda and a programme for the Joint SADC/COMESA Summit. The 
SADC/COMESA Ministerial Committee was tasked to assess how best to harmonise relations 
between the two organisations and work towards the creation of an African Economic 
Community as was outlined in the Abuja 1991 Treaty.
460
 At the SADC Summit in Maseru, an 
agreement was reached among member states to allow the Joint SADC/COMESA Ministerial 
Committee complete its work, and for its report to be discussed once the work had been 
completed.
461
  
 
Within the new SADC of 1992, and as a legal organisation, South Africa was afforded a regional 
investment and financial coordinating role. Since May 1995, South Africa within SADC had 
exerted a coordinating responsibility for financial integration and investment. SADC was looking 
at working towards a well-coordinated approach to link its financial markets. For SADC, a 
macroeconomic policy to work effectively for a regional grouping that could promote trade 
through compatible financial systems was deemed important to increase trade; however this was 
too premature for the infant economies of SADC to implement.
462
  
 
SADC was struggling to liberalise trade and address rules of engagement and equitable trade 
exchanges amidst infrastructure weaknesses, and was not yet at the stage of conforming to 
macro-economic convergence. The Tripartite Common Monetary Area (between South Africa, 
Lesotho, Swaziland, and Namibia) was seen as a means that could inform implementation of a 
unified exchange rate structure for SADC in the future. The CMA was viewed as a possible 
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vehicle to facilitate financial integration for SADC member states and alleviate the debt burden 
and fiscal deficits. According to Ramos, central to macro-economic convergence for SADC 
would be careful consideration of five broad areas integral to the financial integration process. 
These areas entailed financial reform and development that could stimulate the liquid financial 
markets, provide incentives for trade, attract surplus capital, and guarantee investments, with 
focused attention on both long- and short-term markets; increased supervisory powers to protect 
investors and consumers; a database to assist SADC in creating a regulatory framework; formal 
and informal mechanisms towards a coordination of fiscal policies; and greater investment in 
human resource capacity building as well as greater access to funds in international markets.
463
 
However, these processes appeared to be superficial for SADC member states as outlined by 
Ramos, given the huge disparity in economic size and varying trade ratios. Ramos suggested that 
for a monetary area to work, a re-distributional arrangement to facilitate and expand trade and 
industry should complement regional integration.  
 
At the 1997 SADC Summit in Blantyre, the Summit provided a report on SADC/COMESA 
relations and expressed satisfaction that COMESA (the sister organisation) had amicably reached 
a common understanding on the need to co-exist, while ensuring maximum coordination and 
harmonisation of their respective programmes of action. At the 1997 SADC Summit it was also 
noted that the SADC Secretariat would liaise with the COMESA Secretariat on areas of mutual 
interest to avoid duplication of efforts.
464
 The year 1997 was also an important period for SADC, 
since it was the first time that OAU’s AEC had met in Harare. SADC in particular had made 
huge strides towards developing closer relations with the AEC as well as with the OAU and other 
economic groupings, as part of its contribution towards the establishment of a continental 
economic community.
465
 
 
3.9 Conclusion 
 
The literature on divergence and convergence covered in this chapter in respect of the history of 
the PTA and SADCC, confirmed that while trade was being conducted between these two blocs, 
the timing of the integration was not able to allow for convergence between the poorer and richer 
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economies. Southern Africa’s destroyed infrastructure of roads and railways was repaired at a 
snail’s pace because of high costs. While lower labour costs could lead to an increase in regional 
development, industries were producing similar products with very little diversity.   
 
The beginning of the chapter provided a historical account, and discussed the evolving regional 
integration processes that were linked to pan-Africanism, which was seen as an ideology for 
achieving political solidarity and economic independence through the PTA of 1981 and the 
SADCC of 1980. These two organisations were formed at a time when their members belonged 
to SACU as well as to a Common Monetary Area. SADCC took on a sector-led coordination 
approach to regionalism and the PTA took on open trade and liberalised markets in a step-by-step 
approach.
466
 As Khadiagala noted: “From the Mulungushi Club to the FLS and then SADCC, 
regionalism has been animated by the convergence of interests and decisions, among a core elite 
leadership.”467 SADCC further demonstrated that in liberalising markets, smaller economies 
confronted economic setbacks with cheaper goods flooding smaller markets; this was explained 
and expanded on in the literature on divergence and convergence.  
 
The events throughout the chapter related to various approaches of power, state and wealth 
incorporated into Africa’s states and economy. At times, external forces of trade liberalisation 
within the neoclassical economic framework of trade liberalisation policies of external actors like 
the Nordic countries with the aid for trade funding structures and in their relations with PTA and 
SADCC member states, did not strengthen these economies, but caused division among the 
members. The PTA’s approach to regional integration was defined in the debate of the 
neoclassical economic approach of trade liberalisation, which is associated with open markets 
and north-south trade liberalisation. Also mentioned was the PTA’s functional approach to 
regional integration in pursuing the self-interest of the state, as suggested by neoclassical realism. 
The functional cooperation approach of SADCC, defined in its sectoral coordination programme, 
and its developmental approach adopted when it became SADC, were also discussed. Also 
discussed were South Africa’s mercantilist policies in the SADCC region, prior to South Africa’s 
membership of SADC. Despite South Africa’s huge dependence on the economies of SADCC, 
the research demonstrated that PTA and SADCC member states were conducting trade among 
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themselves and with external world partners. The chapter outlined that eastern and Southern 
African states were converging with their respective newly formed institutions - SADC and 
COMESA - and were not at a stage to converge trade policy to improve their economies by 
capitalising on their own comparative and absolute advantages and uniqueness of trade that could 
further boost manufactured goods. The chapter also indicated that both PTA and SADCC 
member states had memberships in both communities when COMESA was formed in 1993, and, 
for example, three SADCC members (Malawi, Zambia, and Tanzania were active participants) 
before South Africa joined SADC in 1994. The chapter also noted that Zimbabwe later joined as 
a COMESA member in 1998. 
 
As discussed, in 1997 the SADC region was not in a position to merge with COMESA or sign 
any trade agreements owing to various internal and external factors and actors. It was also 
discussed that SADC was an organisation that was born out of the FLS and was formed to fight 
for the liberation of the region and against apartheid practices, and was unlike COMESA, which 
was created to conduct trade among its member states. During the rationalisation processes of 
PTA and SADCC, questions emerged with regard to South Africa’s potentially negative impact 
on COMESA, on SADC, and on SACU. Lesotho, Namibia, Mozambique, and Tanzania 
withdrew from COMESA because of the tariff settings of COMESA with which they could not 
conform. The position was that their economies were poorly equipped; this also led to SADCC’s 
sectoral division of labour becoming more national than regional in order to support the poor 
economies of SADCC. Zacarias also noted that the lack of cooperation beyond meetings and 
summits was associated with the poor institutional capacity of SADCC, which lacked political 
cohesion among member states. Member states were given a choice to join either organisation as 
their sovereign right.
468
 SADC made regional integration membership easy for member states in 
allowing those member states with bilateral trade agreements to continue with such trade 
agreements. South Africa was a newcomer to the region and brought its own sets of domestic 
problems into the fraternity of SADC. South Africa joined SADC in 1994 during a period of 
socio-economic domestic problems, which placed some pressure on South Africa and on the 
region.  
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This chapter also discussed the concept of power with powerful states such as South Africa and 
its democratic transformation processes, as well as its evolving regional position. The only 
stringent rule that SADC stipulated was to sanction member states that reneged on their 
membership fees.
469
 Eight SADC member states belonging to COMESA, namely, Angola, 
Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, and management 
of multiple memberships, were raised by SADC (and discussed further in Chapter 5 of the 
thesis). The chapter outlined the importance of the donor community to the liberation struggle in 
funding SADCC’s projects, although at times not all the projects had a regional focus. The 
example of Tanzania was provided in terms of regional policy diversion. Also noted was that 
SADC became a full, legally binding institution when it incorporated South Africa into its fold. 
The chapter outlined that South Africa took on a developmental approach that combined trade 
integration with infrastructural development to deepen regional integration and to derive benefits 
from such an integration process to assist its domestic socio-economic problems of poverty and 
under-development through its DBSA funding institution (which is further discussed in detail in 
the next chapter on COMESA and SADC’s convergence process). Next discussed is Chapter 4 of 
the thesis which provides an analysis and discussion of COMESA and SADC’s integration 
processes, in particular the convergence processes aligned with the convergence theory and 
debates. 
                                                 
469
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Chapter 4 
   
The Era of Convergence: COMESA and SADC’s 2008 Tripartite  
Partnership Agreement 
 
4.1 Chapter overview 
 
This chapter builds on the preceding chapter, which focused on the regional processes undertaken 
by SADCC that led to South Africa’s inclusion in SADC post 1994, as well as the historical 
formations and rationalisation processes of COMESA and SADC in their decision to remain 
apart. This chapter first assesses the period 1998-2008, since the last decision to remain apart in 
1997 was taken by COMESA and SADC. Assessed are the main actors and factors and the 
reasons that led to COMESA and SADC’s decision to regroup in 2008, and sign a Tripartite 
partnership, which also included the EAC, namely, the COMESA-EAC-SADC 2008 partnership 
agreement, which was adopted at a summit heads of state meeting in Kampala, Uganda, in 
October 2008.
470
 The intention among the three RECs was a joint effort to create a free trade 
area. Secondly, the chapter discusses the unfolding events between October 2008 (Tripartite 
Agreement), and June 2015 (the signing of the Tripartite FTA by 16 member states on 10 June 
2015) to assess the extent of the convergence among the RECs: COMESA and SADC. EAC is 
also addressed in the chapter. To better assess the convergence period 2008-2015, the chapter 
poses the following questions with regard to COMESA and SADC: 1) What were the main 
events that occurred during the 10 years (1998-2008)? Who were the main actors, and what were 
the main factors that led to the decision to regroup in 2008 and sign a Tripartite agreement? What 
did this mean for the region, for the continent, and for the rest of the world? 2) What have these 
two blocs, COMESA and SADC, managed to achieve with regard to the agreements and 
protocols outlined in their 2008 Tripartite agreement for the periods 2008-2015, and how much 
trade was achieved in terms of intra- and inter-regional trade since the adoption of the 2008 
COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite for the periods 2008-2015) Who were the main actors and what 
were the main factors that contributed to the progress?  
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The findings in this chapter illustrate the extent to which convergence had occurred in regional 
trade agreements in providing a detailed account of the progress of COMESA and SADC’s 
Tripartite agreement in relation to their roadmap. This assessment of their trade protocols and 
timeframes allows for an adequate account of how much convergence had occurred within 
COMESA and SADC. These findings are presented and directly aligned with the theme: situating 
regional integration within the divergence and convergence debate. 
 
Findings on regional integration, divergence and convergence are particularly relevant as they 
provide the contextual basis for understanding the issues prior to and after the formation of the 
2008 Tripartite Agreement of COMESA and SADC. These are the principal issues throughout 
the thesis, and connect regional integration with liberalisation of regional trade arrangements that 
are linked to economic growth. Findings on this theme also cover several dimensions, including 
an examination of the regional policies of the 2008 Tripartite and their performance, as well as 
how regional integration can be exploited through micro-regionalism linked to infrastructure 
development, trade, and endogenous growth factors of technology and skills.   
 
The findings in this chapter distil positive examples and carefully draw from the neoclassical 
economics approach that contends trade liberalisation is an important mechanism for 
convergence. Also considered is COMESA and SADC’s competitive advantage in supporting 
endogenous growth factors of inputs of semi-skilled and unskilled labour in energy production, 
and unskilled labour in agriculture; these are considered potential opportunities for regional 
production chains and intra-regional trade that moves up the value chain. The findings are 
presented in narrative, tabular, and graphic format, and further evidence is supported by 
interviews conducted in the region in some instances, and relevant literature that further 
underpins the evidence. Various regional and extra-regional events occurred between COMESA 
and SADC in a move towards a free trade arrangement (as discussed in chapter 3) since the 
rationalisation processes of these two blocs between 1991 and 1997. Next discussed is the period 
1998-2008.  
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4.2 The period: 1998-2008  
 
The section discusses the major events between 1998 and 2008 and leading to the 2008 Tripartite 
Agreement are issues that mainly concerned the Southern African region and SADC’s member 
states. During this period, COMESA’s member states,471 were trying to liberalise trade tariffs and 
form a free trade area, which was formed in 2000. Old intra- and inter-state conflicts emerged: 
the inter-state conflicts in Ethiopia and Somalia’s Ogaden Wars fought between 1977 and 1978 
re-erupted.
472
 Other conflicts included the Rwandan intra-state conflict during 1993 and 1994 that 
led to the genocide in which 800,000 people were killed in ethnic rivalry; the 1993 civil war in 
Burundi and violent conflict in the DRC 1997/8, and the border dispute between Eritrea and 
Ethiopia from 1998 to 2000, among other.
473
 However, these intra- and inter-state conflict-ridden 
states did not deter COMESA from realising its vision of forming an economic community 
towards a free trade area (discussed in Chapter 3 of the thesis). On the other hand, SADC signed 
its Trade Protocol in 1996, and it became effective only in January 2000 owing to the regional 
conflicts discussed below.
474
 SADC was also immersed in a restructuring of its Secretariat, 
concluded in 2009. COMESA was engaged in its own regional processes concerning trade, 
infrastructure, international financial institutions, and migration. On SADC’s part, member states 
were struggling with intra- and inter-state conflicts as well as an organisational security vacuum 
that was evident in its structures that lacked a security framework - the OPDSC
475
 became fully 
operational only in 2004, 12 years after SADC’s formation.  
 
Various conflicts flared up among the SADC member states, which warranted mediation and 
peacekeeping efforts. The earliest conflict was the border dispute over the island of Kasikili 
(Shedu) on the Chobe river between Botswana and Namibia, which ended in 1999 (and had 
commenced in 1992), with a mediation intervention strategy by Zimbabwe’s President Robert 
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Mugabe that eventually led to the signing of the 1999 agreement between the two countries and 
involved the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Hague.
476
   
 
South Africa was eager in being seen as a good neighbour, given the apartheid past of regional 
destruction. But the controversial military intervention that led to the attack on the Lesotho 
Highlands Water Project by South Africa’s National Defence Force (SANDF) undoubtedly left a 
bitter taste in the region. The attack resulted in the killing of 58
477
 members of the Lesotho 
Defence Force (LDF) and approximately 47 civilians. Lesotho also served (which is currently 
still the situation) as a provider of water for the Gauteng (encompassing Johannesburg and 
Pretoria) province of South Africa, and it appeared that South Africa had a great deal to lose by 
the attempted military coup that was staged in Lesotho during that time.
478
 This was the rationale 
for the push from South Africa to intervene militarily in Lesotho during 1998 with the assistance 
of Botswana.
479
 The DRC conflict also erupted during the same period, which led to the 
formation of a Mutual Defence Pact between Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe in 1998.
480
 The 
DRC conflict came to be known as Africa’s “First World War” in the Great Lakes region. The 
DRC was not yet a member state of SADC, but was a member state of COMESA, and turned to 
South Africa for military assistance. Civil war broke out in the DRC in 1996, and Tanzania was 
also involved in assisting to diffuse the conflict in the Great Lakes region, and worked with the 
Burundian government in attempting to restore peace.
481
 SADC’s restructuring and regional 
mayhem of conflict and violence emanated from the organisation’s inadequate security 
structures.
482
 As Khabele and Lotshwao have consistently argued: “In part as a result of the 
paralysis of SNCs and the inherent weaknesses of the Secretariat in Gaborone, SADC lacks 
visibility at national level of its member states. Thus, its relevance for the promotion of 
democratic governance, peace, security and political stability became flawed.”483  
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SADC’s member states experienced governance issues as well, with political elites of SADC 
viewed as a club of ruling parties whose main pre-occupation was to provide political solidarity 
to one another, and who were not inclined to criticism in instances where authoritarian tendencies 
threatened democracy, constitutionalism, and human rights.
484
 This was evident in how SADC 
dealt with the Zimbabwe experience that had massive political and economic crises of land 
invasions that were sanctioned by Robert Mugabe’s government, termed as “fast track” land 
restitution.
485
 The land programmes resulted in eviction of farm workers from farms that were 
predominantly white-owned. These events also brought about the collapse of the SADC Tribunal, 
since it became embroiled in the land disputes between Zimbabwe and the farmers. Former South 
African presidents, Mbeki and Mandela, opted to engage Zimbabwe through quiet diplomacy 
tactics, even though Zimbabwean activists called for stronger action to be taken against 
Mugabe.
486
 In May 2000 Mandela (who had grown much closer to Mugabe since their difficult 
relationship in 1994) (discussed in Chapter 3 of the thesis), and spoke out in favour of Mugabe.  
 
In defence of the quiet diplomacy approach adopted by South Africa, Mandela viewed this 
diplomatic stance as the best mechanism to resolve the violent political dispute over white land 
ownership in Zimbabwe.
487
 Mugabe ignored the judgements handed down in favour of white 
farmers in Zimbabwe by SADC’s Tribunal in 2008, which led to the effective dissolution of this 
body by the SADC heads of state in August 2011.
488
 Nathan noted that the Tribunal’s demise had 
weakened the regional body’s authority, which raised serious questions about SADC’s 
commitment to the rule of law. Nathan also argued that the Summit had little choice but to 
dissolve the court since its ruling for the farm owners fundamentally questioned the validity of a 
constitutional provision to confiscate land approved by Zimbabwe’s Parliament and courts, 
because of sovereignty of a member state taking precedence over the cause of justice.
489
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Chris Landsberg quoted Mandela as stating:  
 
“It is no use standing on hilltops and shouting about such a highly sensitive matter. An 
approach through diplomatic channels without much publicity, is more likely to bring 
about a positive result … I would personally support President Mbeki when he says we 
have diplomatic relations with Zimbabwe. Everything should be done through diplomatic 
channels.”490  
 
SADC’s double standards were evident in how it chose to execute its duties - different standards 
were adopted for Zimbabwe, as for the DRC and for Madagascar. With SADC leaders directly 
rejecting the new Malagasy leadership in Madagascar’s case, when Andry Rajoelina, a former 
mayor of Antananarivo seized power through a military coup on 17 March 2009, which led to a 
military directive making him president of Madagascar and ousted President Marc Ravalomanana 
and forced him into exile. This gave the High Transitional Authority (Haute Autorité de la 
Transition, or HAT) a monopoly of the economy and command of the island.
491
 On the other 
hand, SADC had adopted a more casual approach in its intervention in Zimbabwe’s security 
challenges, when at that time five million Zimbabweans were estimated to have suffered food 
shortages, and in some cases starvation, and Zimbabwe’s inflation rates were 619.5 percent in 
2001.
492
 Huge food shortages were reported in Zimbabwe’s Matabeleland and Masvingo areas in 
2001, when Zimbabwe reneged on payments to foreign debtors to the amount of $4 billion, and 
debt servicing fell behind by $690 million.
493
  
 
Nelson Mandela also sought to facilitate a peace agreement and attempted to end Angola’s 30-
year civil war. Further mediation efforts in the SADC region were conducted by SADC member 
states, Botswana, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe, to assist in Lesotho’s 
2002 elections that turned violent.
494
 Under Thabo Mbeki (former South African President after 
Mandela), South Africa negotiated the Sun City Agreement in Rustenburg in 2003, which cost 
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the South African taxpayer $20 million.
495
 Zimbabwe’s domestic disputes re-emerged in 2002, 
and SADC mandated Thabo Mbeki to mediate between the Zimbabwean government and the 
opposition, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), and a government of national unity 
was installed in 2009.
496
 Although the revised 2001 SADC Treaty
497
 provides non-military 
powers of enforcement, such as sanctions, these have rarely been employed. Southern African 
economies are estimated to have lost more than $36 billion in potential investments in Zimbabwe 
as a result of its economic crisis between 2000 and 2008, which saw living standards and life 
expectancy fall more rapidly than anywhere else in the world. In addition, SADC countries 
provided $200 million of credit to Zimbabwe in 2009. In June 2011, Botswana agreed a credit 
line of $76 million to assist struggling Zimbabwean companies. With an annual GDP of only 
$10.8 billion in 2012, and growth rates forecast at between 2.2 and 8 percent in 2013.
498
  
 
During this era (1998-2008), having joined SADC in 1994, South Africa had its own domestic 
situation in reforming its police force - an-old guard force which presented many challenges for 
the South African government amidst challenges of socio-economic inequalities.
499
 Adebayo 
Adedeji 
500
 indicated that within South Africa’s own backyard, a huge disparity between rich and 
poor (between the white majority and black minority) still existed. In a report of the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) he noted that under the Human Development Index 
(HDI), white South Africans averaged 0.878
501
 (in the league equivalent to the 29 most 
industrialised countries globally, which according to OECD rankings, included countries like 
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Italy, Spain, and Portugal); whereas blacks in South Africa rated 0.462
502
 (equivalent to an 
OECD league ranking similar to that of countries such as Botswana, Gabon, Swaziland, Lesotho, 
and Zimbabwe).
503
 With this mounting pressure, South Africa had to act swiftly in its efforts to 
deliver on social development and the South African Social Security Agency (SASSA) dedicated 
R66.6 billion
504
 in 2007 and 2008, and, R78 billion in 2009 and 2010, to improve socio-economic 
issues.
505
 During South Africa’s land reform process, only 3.6 million hectares of the 6.6 million 
hectares of farmland were transferred to black South Africans, with an official target of 30 
percent earmarked for land transfer by 2015.
506
  
 
4.3 States, markets, developmental integration and convergence: 1998-2008  
 
This section focuses on how states and markets performed regional integration within the arena 
of South Africa’s tackling of domestic challenges, and assesses the impact that these challenges 
had on the region. The discussion concentrates on the major actors and factors up until the 
Tripartite Agreement by the three RECs - COMESA, EAC, and SADC - in 2008. The section is 
largely devoted to COMESA and SADC’s performance, as two separate organisations during the 
10 years under discussion, with varying regional roles.  
 
This discussion on the importance of the region to South Africa, further notes that regional 
integration is also important for South Africa’s New Growth Path (NGP) (2011) and its National 
Development Plan (NDP) (2030). These two policies outline an economic growth policy that 
includes infrastructure projects across Africa.
507
 The National Industrial Policy Framework 
(NIPF) and the Industrial Policy Action Plan 2012/2013–2014/2015 sought to promote value-
added trade and industrial production that build employment and promote job creation, while the 
Trade Policy and Strategy Framework (TPSF) is an industrial policy instrument to support trade 
in favour of local manufacturing as well as to diversify the economy so that is not so heavily 
dependent on commodities and non-tradable services. South Africa’s approach was two-fold: 
firstly, a market-driven integration approach of bilateral trade agreements through SADC as a 
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vehicle,
508
 and secondly a micro-regional development-led integration in using two of SADC’s 
four Spatial Development Initiatives. These two approaches entailed enhancing transport projects 
in a micro-region with Mozambique through the formation of the Maputo Development Corridor, 
and electrical power generation through the creation of the Southern African Power Pool (SAPP) 
created in 1995, which linked 12 SADC power utilities.
509
 South Africa was also using the region 
creatively to solve Eskom’s financial difficulties, and improve its own domestic challenges of 
unemployment through SAPP, which became an important vehicle for the South African 
government.
510
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1: 2008 bilateral contracts in SAPP.  
Source: Alison Chikova, “Power Generation and Projected Demand in Southern Africa beyond 
2010”, The Southern African Power Pool (SAPP), <www.sapp.co.zw>.  
 
King-Akerele and Asiedu assert that micro-regions in regional integration can enhance growth, 
and are innovative steps to grow the economies of least developing countries; they are also a 
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mechanism to withstand global competition.
511
 For example, the Johor-Singapore-Riau Growth 
Triangle within the ASEAN bloc took advantage of Singapore’s skilled labour and developed 
infrastructure, Johor’s land and semiskilled labour, and Riau’s land and low-cost labour. 
Quebec’s large industrialised economy was another form of a successful micro-region that 
became economically independent and technologically advanced.
512
  The discussion now turns to 
South Africa’s micro-regional approach adopted in building on SADC’s Spatial Development 
Initiatives through SAPP, and the involvement of its parastatal, Eskom, which was providing 
power generation. 
 
Scholars like Tore Horve, Harry Stephan, Michael Power, Angus Fane Hervey, and Raymond 
Steenkamp Fonseca noted that Eskom had financial difficulties, and South Africa was attempting 
to address these problems by investigating means to remedy these difficulties. Figure 4.1 shows 
how micro-regionalism through energy generation formed strategic partnerships and created 
regional convergence among SADC member states.  
 
Table 4.1 SAPP’s Planned regional generation projects commissioned and funded up until 
2017   
Source: SAPP, Annual Report, 2014 <https:www.sapp.co.zw>.   
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Statistics in 1998
513
 revealed that Eskom, South Africa’s power utility, was the fifth largest 
power utility globally and had annual sales of $4.8 billion, 40 000 employees, a net income of 
$800 million, total assets of $14.4 billion, and a research and development department that was 
equivalent in size of the annual budget of many other power utilities in the Southern African 
region. In 2003, Eskom had a net loss of R719 million on revenues of R3.3 billion, in comparison 
with a R9 million profit on R2.9 billion revenues in 2002. In addition, Eskom had falling cash 
flows in operations, which declined from R324 million in 2001 to R285 million in 2003.
514
   
 
The partnership created among power facilities in the SADC region in electricity generation grew 
from 1995 into a trade market in 2001. The new market - a Short-Term Energy Market - is in the 
form of a day-ahead market (DAM).
515
 South Africa was able to also use this initiative for a 
number of domestic problems such as improving Eskom’s economic stability, and providing 
electricity for South African households. In the late 1980s, 85 percent of households in South 
Africa had no electricity; however by 2009, just about 85 percent households in South Africa had 
electricity.  
 
The 1995 SAPP agreement revised in 2006 and 2007
516
 pledged full recovery of costs and equal 
sharing of profits among SADC members, and also improved technology transfer in the region 
with the other power utilities. While there was convergence in the SAPP policy, it was not as 
equitable among its users. South Africa was the main consumer and consumed 78 percent of 
installed power-generating capacity, 84 percent of the regional peak load, and 85 percent of the 
electricity distributed, among only 23 percent of the overall Southern African population 
(1996).
517
 Between 2007 and 2027, SAPP envisaged an increase in SADC’s total electricity 
generated by 42 000 megawatts (MW).
518
 In 2007, SADC’s combined electricity capacity was at 
52 742 MW, of which 41 000 MW secured capacity was for consumer demand.
519
 Table 4.1 
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outlines the progress that SAPP had made in the region’s 12 committed and commissioned power 
utilities and the types of resources for electricity production and funding that were secured. 
SAPP, on the whole, had positive spinoffs for the region’s economy and South Africa’s viable 
market created a pull factor for outside investment interests in the region. Eskom had 34 regional 
networks in 2006, it was the leading driver of SAPP, and had technical and development 
expertise, as well as regional transmission systems and investments.
520
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Growth in micro-regions: Mozambique and South Africa.  
Source: SADC Mozambique report, < http://www.sadctrade.org/files/Intra-SADC-trade-
performance-review-2006-4-mozambique.pdf>, pp.86-87.
521 
 
 
Another example of the convergence leading to the Tripartite agreement was the success of the 
Maputo Development Corridor that was also spearheaded by South Africa through the 
Development Bank of Southern Africa and to which the government contributed $8 billion.
522
 
The MDC was able to facilitate trade between South Africa and Mozambique. Maputo became 
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South Africa’s largest trading partner in the region after Angola. Total trade increased from 
R899.5 million in 1992 to R7.4 billion in 2002, resulting in an exceptional regional spill-over that 
increased Mozambique’s economic growth from R47 million to R403 million over the same 
period.
523
   
 
Figure 4.2 highlights South Africa’s investment in the MDC and shows how the corridor was 
able to benefit Mozambique’s economic growth through the bilateral trade from South Africa to 
Mozambique. This enhanced economic growth for Mozambique, and increased investment, 
which further contributed to its GDP growth. Jenkins and Thomas argued that Southern Africa 
lacked a market for addressing factors for endogenous growth like technology and observed: “For 
the smaller SADC economies, the domestic market is too limited to generate significant 
endogenous development.”524 South Africa is a large economy compared with that of 
Mozambique, which allowed for economic growth for Mozambique as seen in Figure 4.2, 
through not only investments, but via a specific approach, which was to build a micro-region 
defined in the MDC. As shown in Figure 4.2, the exports of Mozambique had grown at an 
average of 20 percent per annum for the period 2001-2005.  
 
Mozambique’s trade had played a major role in Mozambique’s gross earnings from exports.525 
Over the last five years Mozambique has experienced gross earnings from exports of MZN15 330 
billion to MZN40 239 billion and these earnings could have been higher. However, during this 
period, Mozambique also faced sharp increases in world market prices for unprocessed cashew 
nuts, sugar and tobacco (the primary products of Mozambique). Also, since 2000 there have been 
a number of reforms introduced to Mozambique’s trading patterns, where approximately 12 tariff 
lines, with an average weighted tariff rate of 18.4 percent and a maximum tariff rate of 35 
percent; and a 40 percent tax exemption on cashew exports, were introduced.
526
 Despite these 
challenges, SDIs show how micro-regions could be corrective measures to address market 
exploitation. As the neoclassical economics approach of open market-driven trade and trade 
liberalisation suggests, countries can grow in economic strength; however, as discussed here, 
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public partnerships introduced in the formation of micro-regions have assisted in that economic 
growth.  
 
How market economies generate wealth is also dependent on effective trade policies, as noted by 
Hazelwood,
527
 and countries should consider the benefits of integration associated with open 
trade. Economic integration has largely been driven through free trade. Besides reductions in 
tariffs between states, there are other methods of lowering transaction costs, such as common 
currencies and lowering restrictions on labour and capital mobility. The MDC further expanded 
into the Maputo Corridor and Logistics Initiative (MCLI) and required funds of R1.9 billion for 
upgrades, which have been shelved until 2030 when funding becomes available.
528
 (This is 
further discussed under infrastructure, later in the chapter.) 
 
COMESA and SADC’s regional integration processes have both adopted a market-led strategy of 
free trade and have made efforts to converge policy and implementation, with a functional 
coordinated approach (an incremental approach) adopted to execute trade liberalisation.
529
 It was 
therefore a challenge to increase growth that could support projects for endogenous factors of 
technological spill-overs and knowledge production, for example, in agricultural research that 
could affect economic growth and support the negative effects of trade within liberalised tariff 
settings. The timing of the step-by-step functional approach of incrementally reducing tariffs 
worked against the rapid speed of the market of free trade and trade liberalisation policies. While 
open trade was considered a regional benefit by COMESA and SADC in their individual 
approaches in converging their policies at their own organisational level, trade diversion was 
experienced owing to the external trade partnerships, with agreements between South Africa and 
Europe leaving member states with little control over the market, and with goods flooding their 
markets through openness of trade. These experiences of trade diversion for weaker economies in 
COMESA and SADC made convergence and future deliberations between the two organisations 
difficult and created future challenges as discussed later. In 1999 South Africa as the strongest 
economy in the region, also signed an agreement with Europe, the EU-SA TDCA. This happened 
after four years of negotiations in an attempt to be accepted by Europe as a developmental 
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country under the Lomé Convention.
530
 South Africa was also a signatory to the SADC FTA in 
1996.
531
  
 
South Africa was conducting open trade with both SADC and Europe and with Europe being 
much wealthier than SADC states, consequently flooded the Southern African markets.
532
 
Southern Africa was no match to Europe, since half of the EEC’s budget533 of 126 billion euros 
was for subsidising and supporting a farming sector that employed only five percent of the 
working population of 70 percent of farm workers in Africa’s regions. Moreover, the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development spent $265 billion on farm subsidies 
in 2008 and only $4 billion on aid for agriculture in developing countries.
534
 Europe’s Common 
Agriculture Policy (CAP) was 55 billion euros (31 percent of the EU’s total budget) in 2013.535 
Hence, the EU-SA TDCA 1999 agreement created divergence in trade for COMESA and SADC 
blocs in the clothing and textile sectors and in the agricultural sectors such as beef and sugar.
536
 
COMESA warned South Africa that it would take action and prevent South Africa from trading 
in the region if trade were distorted by the South African market.
537
 Zimbabwe’s calculation was 
that it had a better competitive advantage over its regional COMESA partners than it had in 
SADC, which also led to the Zimbabwe government’s decision to align itself with COMESA.538 
The EU-SA FTA rules of origin for apparel had a two-stage conversion rule that required 
garments in South Africa to be manufactured from only South African or EU-produced fabric.
539
 
South Africa’s FTA offer to SADC evoked concern from the clothing and textile sectors that had 
a labour working force of 215,000.
540
 South Africa’s textile market was not spared by its own 
experiences of similar negative trade patterns with the AGOA trade agreement that it signed in 
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2000.
541
 South African Textile Federation spokesman, Brian Brink, noted that the South African 
textile industry was also affected by Europe’s free trade agreement with South Africa, as well as 
by the AGOA trade agreement with the US, seen in the negative growth and drop in textiles, 
from $562 million in 2000 compared with $392 million in 2001, and which dropped further to 
$95.6 million in 2007.
542
 Ron Sundry at the Trade Law Centre also noted that although exports of 
apparel from South Africa to the US grew 38 percent in the first year after the AGOA agreement 
was introduced in 2001, export growth was limited owing to the barriers of restrictive rules of 
origin introduced by neighbouring countries in COMESA and SADC, like the DRC, and once 
buyers diminished, interest declined.  
 
As was noted in chapter 3, that when South Africa joined SADC, the South African government 
was invited by SADC to oversee its infrastructure, and financial and investment regional clusters 
as it was thought it had the expertise to do so. South Africa had promoted SADC not only 
economically, but had also sought to provide a peacekeeping environment (discussed under 
security in Chapter 6 of the thesis) regionally, and allow for a stable market that was attractive to 
foreign investors.
543
 Since South Africa joined SADC, it had invested regionally with its own 
foreign direct investments. In 2001 and 2002 the South African investments entailed: $20 million 
(South African Airways); $6 billion (Eskom for the Inga project in the DRC, and in November 
2011 the governments of South Africa and the DRC signed an MOU that led to an October 2013 
treaty under which South Africa agreed to buy 2 500 megawatts of the Grand Inga III’s expected 
4 800 megawatts of hydroelectric output);
544
 $56 million (Sun International Hotel in Zambia); 
$142 million (Vodacom in Tanzania); and $53 million (Portland Cement in Zimbabwe, which 
was a merger business investment activity). These investments did not bode too well with the 
region since South Africa’s MNCs favoured their businesses and not the region entirely.  
As Soko suggests,  
 
“that regional integration in Southern Africa will not succeed unless South Africa, [which is] by 
far the largest and most diversified economy in the region, discharges its responsibilities in 
accordance with its hegemonic status. Whether South Africa can assume a hegemonic role will 
depend on three considerations: first, the extent to which the political elites are able to balance the 
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country’s regional obligations against domestic pressures; second, the manner in which the 
country deals with the legacy of apartheid South Africa’s historical destabilisation of the region, 
and third, the degree to which the country’s leadership credentials are accepted by other regional 
states.”545      
 
South Africa was also placed in a precarious position, which was to fill a regional security role, 
since its joining SADC. The South Africa government wanted to show its commitment towards 
“changing hearts and minds” towards South Africa so that it was seen in a positive light in the 
region.
546
 Christopher Clapham corroborated such views: 
 
“The conversion of organisations for economic integration into providers of some kind of regional 
diplomatic framework for military intervention is not, however, as bizarre as it may seem. It is 
rather mirrored by changing orthodoxies in the analysis of the reasons for African economic 
failure. Whereas analysts once concentrated on the rival merits of capitalist as against socialist 
development strategies, and subsequently went on to argue over the advantages as against the 
defects of structural adjustment schemes, they are now virtually united in emphasising the 
importance of political developments in accounting for Africa’s economic malaise.”547  
 
South Africa was an important actor in the convergence of COMESA and SADC in 2008 in 
signing the Tripartite agreement. The country had the largest economy regionally in terms of total 
GDP of $128 billion in 2000; by 2010 it had reached a total GDP of $228 billion.
548
 South 
Africa’s market approach was to remedy its domestic issues, as South Africa’s new government 
had major setbacks in terms of its socio-economic disparities.
549
 South Africa’s outward market 
approach with trade to Europe was extensive. In 2004, South Africa’s exports to the European 
Union were R20.50 billion, and total imports were R26.82 billion. The total South African 
exports to Africa were R7.01 billion and the total imports from Africa were only R2.43 billion.
550
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To benefit from trade and diversification, the UNCTAD 2012 report
551
 noted that global trade 
inequality warrants that developing countries are encouraged to diversify more, and produce final 
products as exports instead of exporting raw materials. What UNCTAD also noted, was that 
offshore finished goods require particular attention. Countries should therefore consider the 
increase in oil prices, which translates into increased costs in logistics and transportation. 
Therefore, developing countries should assess the supply chain risks and management costs, and 
reconsider manufacturing goods. This chapter suggests that agriculture could be equally 
beneficial to small economies. One such an approach is the sugar industry in the region. For 
example, smaller economies could benefit from South Africa’s agriculture market, which was 
$209.7 billion in 2011.
552
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Major sugar producers in COMESA and SADC  
Source: Adopted from Margaret C. Lee, The Political Economy of Regionalism in Southern 
Africa (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003), p. 122. 
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Figure 4.3 shows the quantity of sugar produced for the major countries over the period 1996-
2010. Production involved several rounds of negotiations to agree on a sugar protocol and rectify 
the impact of outside external trade agreements (trade between the EU and South Africa).
553
 The 
cheapest and most efficient producer of sugar is Zimbabwe, but South Africa is the largest 
producer. Simply having Zimbabwe refine the sugar will not be beneficial to South Africa, since 
in South Africa 130 000 people are directly employed in the sugar industry and in related 
production factories as shown in Figure 4.4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Sugar industry of direct employment (both COMESA and SADC member 
states)   
Source: Adopted from Margaret C. Lee, The Political Economy of Regionalism in Southern 
Africa (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003), p. 122. 
 
Member states could benefit from a regional sugar protocol that benefits the region instead of 
exporting raw sugar to Europe’s sugar refineries. Since SADC and COMESA member states with 
the EAC are concentrating on a framework to liberalise tariffs, a sugar agreement should be 
ratified that is able to contribute to economic growth regionally.
554
 While Southern Africa has the 
potential to industrialise and enhance its comparative position in production, agriculture could be 
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a significant convergence point for regional trade. Agriculture accounts for 18 percent of Africa’s 
GDP (compared with 7 percent for Asia and Latin America, 2 percent for Europe, and 1 percent 
for the United States), but Africa produces only 3.5 percent of the world’s food exports.555  
Regional agreements have not worked in favour of trade opportunities. For example, the impact 
of external trade agreements on sugar producers also affected and distorted trade in the region 
with both COMESA and SADC member states from 1998 to 2008. Economists like Krugman
556
 
and, MacMillan and Rodrik
557
 proposed that economic growth convergence in trade liberalisation 
has to consider production structures that first assess the risk and mitigating costs associated with 
labour, manufacture, high-productivity and low-productivity jobs and the impact of outputs 
versus inputs
558
. Sugar is the cheapest commodity to produce in the SADC region for nine SADC 
member states, some of which are COMESA member states as well. Sugar producers in the 
SADC and COMESA blocs should capitalise on and benefit from the agricultural products in 
future agreements with Europe in particular. At a continental level, the continent receives 1.8 
percent of global imports (an annual average of $174 billion from 2000 to 2010), and 3.6 percent 
of global exports (an annual average of $418 billion between 2000 and 2010).  
 
On the whole, intra-COMESA trade remains very low. For example, in 2011, Angola’s main 
trade exports (crude oil, diamonds, refined oil, gas, and coffee) to its main export trading partners 
(the United States, China, France, India, and Taiwan) amounted to $66 million. Angola had no 
trade that year with COMESA member states.
559
 While sugar is one example of how the 
Tripartite alliance members can converge agricultural policies that could lead to economic 
growth and that can derive benefits, other examples should also be considered, for example, in 
textiles and electricity. Aside from the role that trade has had in the convergence debate, the 
Secretariats of COMESA and SADC and their executives similarly had a significant influence in 
the events leading up to the 2008 Tripartite Agreement which the chapter next focuses on.        
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4.4 Diplomatic efforts of the main summits and meetings during the period 1998-2008  
 
This section of the chapter covers the major summits and meetings, as well as the major 
diplomatic efforts between the period 1998 and 2008. To spearhead the process of cooperation 
and harmonisation, the Chairpersons of the COMESA Authority and SADC Executive played a 
significant role in those efforts that led to the 2008 Tripartite Agreement and the signing of the 
Tripartite FTA in 2015.  
  
The regrouping of COMESA and SADC was sparked by the drive made by the OAU’s decision 
to revive the Yamoussoukro Declaration (YD),
560
 which was reinstated in 1999 and signed in 
2000 with a view to fully liberalising Africa’s airspace market by 2002.561 The harmonisation of 
regional policies is guided by the Abuja Treaty created in 1991, which outlines the need for a 
fully integrated internationally competitive regional economic community through an airspace-
driven liberalised market strategy, for free movement of people, goods and services and for RECs 
to harmonise regional policies.
562
 COMESA and SADC were invited to join the YD arrangement 
in 1999, and the EAC joined six years later, in 2005. To comply with the Yamoussoukro 
Decision, COMESA and SADC had to form a joint legal protocol and harmonise implementation 
of guidelines for a liberalised regional airspace, as well as harmonise their provisions and 
procedures for regulating airline competition. The harmonised policies were based on their own 
individual air transport liberalisation programme treaties: article 87 of COMESA’S Treaty;563 
article 9 of the SADC Protocol on Transport, Communications and Meteorology;
564
 and article 92 
of the EAC Treaty.
565
 The harmonisation process involved several meetings between 2001 and 
2005. The fact that a number of states were members of both COMESA and SADC presented a 
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challenge for the harmonisation of policies in the Yamoussoukro Decision process. To spearhead 
the process of cooperation and harmonisation, the Chairpersons of the COMESA Authority and 
SADC Executive met in Egypt in 2004 and agreed to set up a joint COMESA-SADC Bilateral 
Task Force at Secretariat level to discuss and agree on the harmonisation of programmes for an 
airspace market, initially for the two organisations, COMESA and SADC.
566
 
 
The COMESA-EAC-SADC 2008 Tripartite Agreement was further propelled by funding 
provided by the African Development Bank of $3.5 billion, and also with funding by the United 
States due to the events that occurred in implementing an African airspace. COMESA received 
$443 000 from the US Trade and Development Agency (USTDA) for a market-driven 
airspace.
567
 The offer to the two RECs was an attractive one because of the poor road and 
transport conditions in the COMESA and SADC regions.  
 
Inefficient and inadequate transportation in Africa impedes trade logistics, and poor infrastructure 
services have impeded both inter-regional and inter-continental trade. COMESA and SADC rely 
excessively on international trade, which constitutes up to 80 percent of their total trade, because 
of poor infrastructure. At the continental level, for the period 2000-2010, intra-African imports 
averaged 14.2 percent of total annual African imports, and intra-African exports averaged 10.4 
percent of total annual African exports.
568
 These low levels of continental and regional trade are 
directly linked to the costs associated with conducting trade in the region. For example, as of 
2014, the cost to ship a standard 20-foot container from Durban, South Africa to Lusaka, Zambia 
was $5000, compared with $1 500 from Japan to Durban. For a trader in Juba, Sudan, it costs $9 
500 to import a standard container through the port of Mombasa, Kenya, in addition to a two-
month wait for the goods to reach Juba.
569
 To comply with the Yamoussoukro Declaration, 
COMESA and SADC had to form a joint legal protocol and harmonise implementation 
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guidelines for a regional airspace, as well as harmonise their provisions and procedures for 
regulating airline competition.  
 
These harmonised policies involved several meetings over a period of time between 2001 and 
2005. During the meetings, the two organisations were confronted with multiple membership 
difficulties and the fact that a number of states were members of both COMESA and SADC, 
which presented a challenge in harmonising policies and working towards the Yamoussoukro 
Declaration process. In an attempt to address those challenges of multiple memberships, the 
Secretary-General of the COMESA Authority and the Executive Secretary of the SADC Summit 
met in Cairo, Egypt in 2004 and agreed to set up a joint COMESA and SADC Task Force at the 
Secretariat levels to discuss and agree on how to harmonise the programmes of the two 
organisations.
570
 EAC, which had a competitive airline, Kenyan Airways, showed interest in 
being part of the YD processes and was invited to the meetings with COMESA and SADC; this 
became significant to the COMESA-SADC integration process in 2005, when EAC joined, as it 
paved the way as a first step towards convergence of regional policies of COMESA, the EAC and 
SADC blocs. The Joint Commission and Task Force eventually led to the 2008 COMESA-EAC-
SADC Tripartite Agreement.
571
 This cooperation led to the emergence of the full-fledged 
COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Task Force (TTF), which focused on harmonisation of 
programmes for the Yamoussoukro Declaration process. The Task Force met several times under 
the guidance of the Chief Executive Officers (CEOs), to address how to collaborate and 
harmonise regional programmes.
572
 To address the issue of multiple memberships, the 
COMESA-EAC-SADC CEOs also tasked the COMESA-EAC-SADC TTF overseeing the 
Yamoussoukro Declaration, to additionally oversee the harmonisation of programmes and 
establishment of an institutional framework for cooperation that could move into deeper 
integration. Such deeper integration measures entailed creating an FTA and later creating a 
customs union, as it was hoped that this would also deal with the issue of multiple 
memberships.
573
 The three RECs commissioned a study in 2005, undertaken by an independent 
consultant from Leiden University, which helped COMESA, EAC, and SADC to jointly develop 
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terms of reference and guidelines for implementing provisions and rules of procedure for external 
relations for consumer protection.
574
 To discuss the Leiden report and recommendations therein, 
a joint COMESA-EAC-SADC aviation and legal experts meetings was convened in 2006 in 
Lusaka, Zambia; in Johannesburg, South Africa; and in Zimbabwe at Victoria Falls. The Joint 
Competition Authority (JCA) for a liberalised airspace was formed for the three RECs. The JCA 
was to oversee the full implementation of the Yamoussoukro Declaration for air transport in the 
three RECs, as well as for the harmonisation of programmes in the areas of trade, customs, free 
movement of people, and infrastructure development.
575
  
 
In November 2006, the TTF CEOs called a meeting with the COMESA, EAC, and SADC 
ministers of transport to adopt the guidelines, provisions, and procedures for the implementation 
of the competition regulations and to discuss how to launch the JCA for a liberalised airspace. 
These regulations were circulated to the member states through their respective Secretariats. 
Regional integration programmes for trade and economic development were also adopted, which 
received political endorsement and direction for the process of cooperation and harmonisation. 
The JCA guidelines were adopted in 2007 by the policy organs of COMESA, EAC, and SADC, 
and at individual Secretariat level. The recommendations were accepted by the COMESA 
Secretariat in May 2007, by the EAC Secretariat in June 2008, and by the SADC Secretariat in 
August 2008. Thereafter, the JCA was formalised at the first COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite 
Summit of Heads of State and Government meeting in October 2008 in Kampala, Uganda to 
which the discussion now turns.   
 
4.5    Diplomatic Efforts: At and after the 2008 Tripartite Summit, 20 October 2008,  
   Kampala, Uganda: Towards a Grand FTA 
 
This section outlines the progress that was made by COMESA and SADC in converging its 
regional policies since the signing of the 2008 Tripartite Agreement. The landmark meeting of 20 
October 2008 was the first Tripartite Summit with COMESA, EAC, and SADC heads of state. 
The COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite 2008 Summit binds the Tripartite group with a 
Memorandum of Understanding and outlines the harmonisation of trade and investment regimes. 
Article 2 of the MOU includes the following: 
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1) Establishment of an FTA among COMESA, EAC, and SADC. 
2) Enhancement of inter-REC economic cooperation. 
3) Enhancement of cooperation with multilateral and bilateral partners.  
4) Coordination of negotiations on multilateral issues.  
5) Promotion of industrialisation.  
6) Enablement of intra-regional investment.576  
 
COMESA, the EAC, and SADC include 26 of Africa’s 55 countries, with a combined population 
of approximately 632 million people (which is 57 percent of Africa’s population); and a GDP of 
$1.3 trillion as of 2014 (contributes 58 percent of Africa’s GDP).577 All three RECs were 
identified by the African Union’s 2000 Constitutive Act, and the Abuja Treaty, as the building 
blocks of the African Economic Community. The RECs are also key elements with the aim of 
integrating Africa’s trade and promoting African economic development, and with the goals of 
establishing a continental FTA by 2017, a continental customs union by 2019, a continental 
common market by 2023, and a continental economic and monetary union and pan-African 
parliament by 2028.
578
 Decisions of the COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite are made at Summit 
level. The Tripartite MOU was tabled at the second Tripartite Summit on 12 June 2011 and came 
into force on 19 January 2011.
579
 The MOU defines the free trade process and membership 
agreements. Article 1 of the MOU outlines: i) approval and expeditious establishment of an FTA 
encompassing the member/partner states of the three RECS (COMESA, EAC, and SADC) and an 
ultimate goal of establishing a single customs union (though no timeframe had been outlined); ii) 
that the three RECs (COMESA, EAC, and SADC) undertake a study incorporating among others: 
a) a roadmap for establishing an FTA which would take into account the principle of variable 
geometry; and b) a legal and institutional framework to underpin the FTA.  
 
A Tripartite Summit of Heads of State and/or Government must sit once every two years, as an 
interim measure of the pending MOU (the MOU came into force on 19 January 2011 and was 
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tabled at the second Tripartite Summit on 12 June 2011. The Tripartite 2008 Summit established: 
a) a Tripartite Council of Ministers to meet at least once every two years; b) a Tripartite Sectoral 
Ministerial Committee on Trade, Finance, Customs, Economic Matters, and Home/Internal 
Affairs; c) a Tripartite Sectoral Ministerial Committee on Infrastructure; and d) a Tripartite 
Sectoral Ministerial Committee on Legal Affairs. It also made provision for any other ministerial 
committees as established by the Tripartite Council of Ministers, which must meet at least once a 
year. Furthermore: 
i) The Tripartite 2008 Summit approved extraordinary meetings of the Tripartite 
Summit and Tripartite Council of Ministers to be held as and when necessary. 
ii) The Tripartite 2008 Summit established a Tripartite Committee of senior officials 
and of experts, which must meet at least once a year.  
iii) The Tripartite Summit 2008 finalised and ratified the TTF of the Secretariats of 
the three RECs that meet at least twice a year.  
 
4.5.1 Progress of the Tripartite MOU 
 
In 2008, the TTF finalised a regional integration strategy paper (RISP) and held several 
consultative meetings.
580
 These meetings included discussions with Britain’s Department for 
International Development (DFID) in London in January 2010, where an MOU was signed 
between the TTF and DFID in support of transport corridors and trade facilitation towards the 
Tripartite FTA. Funding had been secured for programmes including £400 000 for administrative 
and logistical support for Tripartite meetings.
581
 Furthermore, DFID announced continued 
funding for the COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite initiative over a period of an additional three 
years, from 2011 to 2014.
582
 
 
4.5.2 Regional infrastructure development 
 
The 2008 Tripartite Summit officially ratified the JCA on Air Transport Liberalisation to oversee 
the full implementation of the Yamoussoukro Decision on Air Transport in the three RECs, 
commencing in January 2009 as was discussed above.  
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The JCA comprises seven members: two members each from participating RECs and a rotating 
chairperson. To promote air transport liberalisation, the 2008 Tripartite Summit directed the 
RECs to put in place a joint programme for the implementation of a single seamless upper 
airspace within one year.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5: Overview of air markets of member states of COMESA, EAC, and SADC 
(2011).  
Source: InterVistas Consulting, “Transforming Intra-African Air Connectivity: The Economic 
Benefits of implementing the Yamoussoukro Decision” (July, 2014), pp.vi; 54. (Data adopted 
from source to provide table data.) 
 
Transport barriers are one of major impediments to regional trade, and rectifying infrastructure 
problems could considerably boost intra-regional and intra-continental trade. For example, South 
Africa’s Richards Bay port, which primarily concentrates on coal shipments, had been 
experiencing huge problems in handling shipment volumes.
583
 Figure 4.5 provides an overview 
of the major air markets for COMESA, the EAC, and SADC, and their total passengers in 2011.  
Traffic statistics are drawn from the “2011 World Airport Traffic Report”.584 An airspace market 
in Africa has the potential to develop 7 million jobs, including 257 000 direct jobs, which are 
worth about $67.8 billion of the continent’s GDP. Progress made on the Yamoussoukro 
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Declaration was discussed at the 2011 Tripartite Summit, and the JCA reported that it had 
finalised its main study on the unification of the Upper Flight Information Region (UFIR).
585
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.6: COMESA-EAC-SADC 2013 Total economic impact stimulated by airspace 
market liberalisation. 
Source: InterVistas Consulting, “Transforming Intra-African Air Connectivity: The Economic 
Benefits of implementing the Yamoussoukro Decision”, (July, 2014), pp.vi; 54. (Data adopted 
from source to provide table data.)      
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Although low-cost carriers have begun operating in Africa, intra-African airline service growth 
has been stifled because of a lack of liberalisation policy formulation between Africa’s member 
states. Figure 4.6 shows the total economic impact from air operations for 2013 of COMESA, 
EAC, and SADC member states and the benefits accrued in terms of consumer surplus, job 
creation, and number of passengers against percentage of GDP. Amidst the benefits of job 
creation, technology transfer, and skills development, infrastructure bottlenecks such as roads, 
ports, railways and borders the YD process has not been finalised. This is due to South Africa’s 
fear that its national carrier, South African Airways, would marginalise weaker carriers in a 
liberalised market.
586
  
 
The EAC had set the lead in establishing a civil aviation safety and security oversight agency and 
exchanged protocols with COMESA and SADC that could help to establish similar agencies for 
COMESA and SADC. Progress on an accelerated seamless inter-regional ICT broadband 
infrastructure network, a joint programme for implementation of a harmonised policy and 
regulatory framework that will govern ICT, and infrastructural development in the three RECs, 
has also been slow, owing to pledged funding initiatives that were not received.
587
  
 
4.5.3 Merger of one REC and progress of the roadmap 
 
The Tripartite Summit in October 2008 directed the Tripartite Task Force of the three Secretariats 
to develop a roadmap for the implementation of this merger for consideration at the June 2011 
Summit meeting.
588
 The Tripartite free trade area had incorporated an approval process and a 
roadmap towards the operationalisation and implementation of the FTA within the bloc. The 
roadmap entailed four stages. First came a preparatory period for consultations at the national, 
regional, and Tripartite levels that began early in 2010. Secondly, member states would discuss 
how to incorporate the legal and institutional frameworks from the draft roadmap as a basis for 
creating a single FTA. Thirdly, each REC would submit concrete recommendations for 
discussion. Finally, on signing the agreement, member states would have six to twelve months to 
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finalise national processes for ratifying the agreement as well as establish the required support 
institutions and adopt customs procedures and instruments.
589
 The Tripartite alliance is also 
examining how to incorporate a customs union for its member states at a much deeper level of 
regional integration. Within the customs union, member states will define a common process of 
abolishing tariff and non-tariff barriers among themselves, and in addition agree on a common 
external tariff for non-members.  
 
Each REC must also address its individual macroeconomic policies, since a monetary union for 
the Tripartite bloc requires macroeconomic convergence criteria to be considered that entail a 
number of processes. Such processes include: the formation of one FTA; harmonising of policy 
instruments and trade policies, processes and procedures, internal and external tariffs, rules of 
origin and customs documents for exporters and importers; consideration of phytosanitary health 
measures and safety; and elimination of tariff barriers. COMESA addressed macroeconomic 
convergence for its bloc. COMESA’s criteria entail consolidation of existing instruments of 
monetary cooperation and implementation of policy measures; an overall budget deficit against 
total GDP of not more than five percent; an annual inflation rate not exceeding five percent; 
minimising central bank financing of a budget deficit of zero percent; and external reserves of not 
less than four months of imports of goods and non-factor services. COMESA’s member states 
have to achieve and maintain stable real exchange rates, market-based real interest rates, and 
growth rates of real GDP that are not less than seven percent; a full monetary union by 2018 is 
envisaged at the regional level.
590
 The EAC is at a more advanced stage than COMESA and 
SADC in moving towards a monetary union as a bloc. For the EAC, fiscal discipline is one of 
most important elements as outlined in the EAC Treaty, the “Development Strategy 2006-2010”, 
and its “Common Market Protocol”. The EAC’s most fundamental principle entails 
implementing continued cooperation in a monetary exchange rate field during the period ahead of 
a monetary union.  
 
The East African Central Bank (EACB) has been implementing an institutional framework for an 
East African Monetary Union (EAMU). The East African Monetary Institute has been established 
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as the preparatory stage and framework for an EAMU.
591
 On its part, diversification of SADC 
member states’ economies to make them more resilient would require coherent policies and 
reforms aimed at how best to diversify their economies. The challenge of regional trade 
liberalisation that calls for harmonisation of a common external tariff should also be addressed. In 
2011 the SADC region recorded an average real GDP growth of 4.7 percent; in 2010 it was 5.5 
per cent. The current account deficit of the balance of payments improved marginally from 8.8 
percent of GDP in 2010 to 8.3 percent of GDP in 2011; the average fiscal deficit deteriorated to 
4.8 of GDP in 2011 while it was 3.2 percent in 2010. SADC’s member states’ debt remained at 
the level of 39 percent to GDP.
592
   
 
However, Jenkins and Thomas note in their discussion on macroeconomic convergence that 
emphasis should be placed on economic and trade policy reforms at national level first before 
considering regional efforts. At the regional level, medium-term coordination should be 
underpinned by the direct effects of cross-border transactions.
593
 On the other hand, other 
regional groupings, such as in Europe, had huge problems with smaller economies pegged to its 
monetary union during the global financial crises and the EU could not support the market 
shocks. As Fingleton, Garretsen and Martin have observed (as was noted in the conceptual 
framework in chapter 2), within the Eurozone, regions of the core closely connected with the 
economic powerhouse of German regions suffered less in terms of employment loss in contrast 
with those states of the peripheral regions (Ireland, Spain, the Baltic states, and Greece), fared 
worse during the great recession of 2008 and 2009, and experienced greater divergence. A 
monetary union could lead to regional divergence and greater disparity in regional vulnerability. 
Such underlying aspects are also informed by the theory on optimum currency areas, which 
Fingleton, Garretsen and Martin observed were not part of the European Union’s monetary 
framework. The OCA theory highlights the importance of incorporating symmetry, flexibility, 
and integration as key variables that ought to be considered in a monetary union.
594
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COMESA-EAC-SADC member states are still at the stage of harmonising trade policies. SADC 
member states have been very slow in moving towards reducing tariffs. Attempting to converge 
regional economic interests conforming to one trade treaty within a free trade area has been 
difficult. This is outlined in key objectives of trade in services, free movement of businesses, free 
movement of people, free movement of goods in trade, and removal of all tariff barriers and non-
tariff barriers in trade between COMESA and SADC member states. Under this framework, 
member states are also able to negotiate and maintain their own tariffs in trade against non-
members. Each member state is also at liberty to apply its preferred regime of tariff rates to third 
countries, customarily referred to as the MFN rate, and also involving complicated international 
agreements with external partners.  
 
The 12 June 2011 Summit noted while the FTA negotiations were underway, efforts were being 
made to complete the negotiations for a free trade area by June 2014 (that was within six months 
of the roadmap, but transpired a year later discussed below). The COMESA Executive Secretary, 
Sifiso Ngwenya, noted that the FTA roadmap presupposed that the 26 countries would need to 
engage in negotiations; it was also recognised that these countries already had preferential trade 
and free trade agreements in place. The COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite FTA is guided by a 
variable geometry approach: incremental liberalisation, and MFN treatment.
595
    
 
4.5.4 Efforts towards the establishment of a Grand Free Trade Area 
 
On 9 February 2015, the Tripartite Trade and Customs Committee (TTCM) held its third meeting 
in Lusaka and provided a progress report on the movement of business people.
596
 The Tripartite 
Technical Committee on Industrial Development (TTCID), established in accordance with the 
directive handed down by the second Tripartite Summit in June 2011, noted that it had developed 
a work programme and a Tripartite Industrial Development Roadmap. The TTCID also 
developed a draft modalities framework on cooperation in industrial development, which would 
foster value addition and improve production capacity. These issues were tabled and discussed at 
the Third Tripartite Summit in June 2015 in Egypt. Negotiations for the FTA were launched in 
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June 2011 after the second Tripartite Summit, and in December 2011 negotiations on Phase 1 
(the Market Integration Pillar) began, focused on trade in goods.
597
 Five out of seven meetings of 
the Tripartite Committee of Senior Officials (TCSO) were held. Ten meetings of the Tripartite 
Trade Negotiating Forum (TTNF) and 18 meetings of the Tripartite Technical Working Groups 
(TTWGs) established by the TTNF to assist in clarifying specific technical negotiating issues 
were held. 
 
In October 2014, the draft Tripartite FTA Agreement was agreed to but not finalised by all 
member states, and only 16 member states signed on 10 June 1015. The preamble and two 
articles - Article 1 on interpretations, and Article 28 on dispute settlement - was finalised at the 
TTNF extraordinary meeting in Egypt and at the Third Tripartite Summit by half of its 
members.
598
 Since the signing of the 2008 Tripartite Agreement, annexures have been concluded 
on non-tariff barriers (Annexure 3), customs cooperation (Annexure 5), trade facilitation 
(Annexure 6), transit (Annexure 7), technical barriers to trade (Annexure 8), and sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures (Annexure 9). Annexures on tariff schedules (Annexure 1), trade 
remedies (Annexure 2) and rules of origin (Annexure 4) are still under negotiation. Tariff officers 
had been prepared by 16 of the 26 countries as of the tenth meeting of the TTNF, in Bujumbura, 
Burundi in 2014. Since then, the SACU bloc has offered to open up 60 percent of tariff lines on 
which duties will be reduced to zero, while 15 percent of tariff lines will be reduced gradually 
over a period of five years. The 2015 meeting of the TTCM also noted that all the trade offers for 
a Tripartite FTA had involved 14 out of 15 COMESA member states only; thus launching the 
Tripartite FTA with only these members would not yield a true Tripartite FTA, but that a 
COMESA plus is what is required (since the member states were mainly from the COMESA 
bloc).
599
  
 
Fostering cooperation through establishing institutional arrangements and harmonisation of 
programmes is important to the member states of the three RECs and the 2008 Tripartite Summit 
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also directed the Chairpersons of the Councils of Ministers of the RECs to ensure that 
Secretariats participate in, coordinate, and harmonise positions on the Economic Partnership 
Agreement negotiations with the European Union, the World Trade Organization, Doha 
Development Round, and other multilateral negotiations. There was no movement at the Summit 
and Councils of Ministers levels, but only at the member state level. Member states are 
negotiating on their own terms, as seen in South Africa’s negotiations within SACU, and the 
EPA Mozambique concluded with Brussels that will be finalised in October 2016.
600
    
 
While maintaining their own regional protocols, mandates, and time frames for free trade areas 
and customs unions, COMESA, the EAC, and SADC in October 2008 signed an important 
memorandum of understanding on inter-regional cooperation and integration to accelerate their 
efforts as underpinned by a legal and institutional framework for this Tripartite body.
601
 
However, national interests of member states override regional interest. Power and resources, 
have determined economic policy of member states, and such economic policies are historically 
linked to African states associated with sovereignty.
602
 South Africa refused to sign the free trade 
agreement for the Tripartite bloc and felt that it was not ready to commit to such an agreement of 
zero tariff settings.
603
  
 
At the February 2015 TTCM meeting, an analysis of rules of origin was tabled that demonstrated 
that Tripartite imports in 2012 were worth $323 billion, of which $42 billion were intra-Tripartite 
imports and $280 billion extra-Tripartite imports. After revising the agreed chapters to 18 and 
headings to 39, the total Tripartite imports for the 18 chapters in 2012 were $27.52 billion, 
accounting for eight percent of Tripartite imports. The intra-Tripartite imports were $4.04 billion 
and accounted for nine percent of the total intra-Tripartite trade, while the extra-Tripartite 
imports were $23.5 billion, accounting for eight percent. Furthermore, the 39 headings for total 
Tripartite imports were $6.5 billion, accounting for two percent of the total Tripartite imports. 
The intra-Tripartite imports were $1.7 billion, which accounted for four percent of the total intra-
Tripartite imports, and the extra-Tripartite imports were $4.7 billion, accounting for two percent 
of the total extra-Tripartite imports. This analysis showed that the intra-Tripartite trade for the 
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agreed chapters were still low and accounts for nine percent and four percent respectively of the 
total intra-Tripartite imports.
604
  
 
Therefore, an interim arrangement was discussed at the TTCC February 2015 meeting to address 
rules of origin for the COMESA-EAC-SADC bloc and recommendations included: a) to use 
agreed common rules and the value addition rule of 35 percent ex-works cost as an interim 
measure to be launched at the Third Tripartite Summit in Egypt; and b) to use the agreed 
common rules for the launch of a partial Tripartite FTA, which was recommended for adoption at 
the Third Tripartite Summit in Egypt. The TTCC prepared their recommendations (which was 
tabled at the Third Tripartite Summit and Heads of States meeting), and it was envisaged that the 
Tripartite member states will sign the Tripartite FTA Agreement, adopt the Post-Signature TFTA 
Implementation Roadmap, and launch Phase 2 negotiations that concern, Trade in Services, 
Competition Policy, Intellectual Property Rights, and Cross-border Investment. The following 
recommendations were also prepared ahead of the Egypt Summit of the Third Tripartite and 
included: a) The Tripartite Free Trade Area to be launched in 2015 based on the principles of 
variable geometry; b) On rules of origin, a general value addition rule of 35 percent ex-works 
cost to be used when the Tripartite FTA is launched while the work on the Customs Union to be 
negotiated under the built in Agenda; c) On Part Five (Trade Remedies) of the Draft Tripartite 
FTA Agreement, the following approach would be endorsed by COMESA: i) Detailed 
procedures on Trade Remedies to be discussed as part of the Built in Agenda, that is Annexure 2; 
ii) Existing REC provisions to apply within RECs and World Trade Organisation provisions will 
apply across RECs in the interim; and iii) The feasibility of developing a preferential safeguard as 
part of the current negotiations will be considered. d) On dispute settlement that the Annexure 10 
be adopted as finalised by the fourth (4th) technical working group on Trade Remedies and 
Dispute settlement; e) that the Phase II negotiations (Built in Agenda) be launched by the end of 
2015, and the TTNF be allowed to begin preparatory processes and convene a meeting to launch 
the negotiations; f) that, the industrial pillar Work Programme and Roadmap, as well as the draft 
Modalities on Cooperation on Industrial Development be adopted by the senior Tripartite Organs; 
g) that the COMESA Member States that have made tariff offers under the Tripartite FTA are 
urged to do so; and, h) that the Secretariat organise a consultative meeting for Member States to 
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determine a common COMESA position prior to the First Extraordinary Meeting of the TTNF, 
on 21-24 February 2015 in Lilongwe, Malawi. 
605
 
 
The February TTCC further reaffirmed their commitment to launch the Tripartite FTA during the 
Third Tripartite Summit in Egypt in 2015 on the principle of variable geometry. The Ministers 
also agreed that Phase 1 issues that were not exhaustively negotiated over the last two years 
would be concluded after the launch of the Tripartite FTA Agreement. To this end the TTCM had 
prepared a provision that was included into the draft Tripartite FTA Agreement for continued 
negotiation. The TTCM also reaffirmed that because of Zimbabwe’s non-availability and the 
presiding Chair at the Third Tripartite Summit that was supposed to have been held in December 
2014, there was a need for further consultations with SADC before the rescheduled Third 
Tripartite Summit that took place in June 2015 (an expanded discussion on variable geometry is 
provided in more detail in chapter 5).  
 
4.6 Regional transport master plan 
 
This section discusses the progress that the Tripartite bloc had made in regional infrastructure 
projects besides the regional airspace market discussed above. The most important aim in 
building Africa’s regional infrastructure is to exploit regional growth for larger markets, 
particularly for Africa’s landlocked states, through better-managed water resources and electricity 
production, and by establishing linkages for goods to reach both markets and people.
606
 Such 
initiatives inevitably lead to job creation and poverty eradication; effective transport lowers 
transport costs; and effectively generated energy facilitates agricultural production, industry, 
mining, and communications, and is therefore conducive to intra-regional trade.
607
  
 
Specialisation and infrastructure linkages have been viewed as important factors in economic 
integration. COMESA and SADC, through their Tripartite agreement, and with the EAC, held a 
conference that addressed regional infrastructure for the Tripartite bloc, in Lusaka, Zambia, in 
April 2009, and focused on the North-South Corridor. A second conference on the topic of 
development corridors was held in Nairobi, Kenya, in October 2010. The Tripartite Summit of 
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Heads of State is to meet every two years. These governments, with their Secretariats, met again 
in Johannesburg, South Africa, on 12 June 2011 to assess achievements since the 2008 Tripartite 
Summit. Progress made with regard to the objectives has been very slow. Therefore, the 2011 
Tripartite Summit urged the donor community to support the Aid for Trade Programme that was 
developed for the major corridors in the region. This support was further promoted at the 
Tripartite’s infrastructural development programmes and has been implemented at the Nairobi, 
Kenya, Tripartite and IGAD Infrastructure Investment Conference on 29-30 September 2011.  
 
The African Regional Transport Infrastructure Network (ARTIN) is also addressing trade 
corridors to expand Africa’s overall trade from 13 percent of total trade in 2009 to 18 percent by 
2040.
608
 Africa’s transport costs are the highest globally. The African Union’s heads of state and 
government launched the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA) in 
Kampala in July 2010, followed by the NEPAD Priority Action Plan (PAP), adopted by Africa’s 
states in January 2012.
609
 PIDA is projected to cost $360 billion by 2040. PIDA projects would 
create 37,300 kilometres of modern highways; 30,200 kilometres of modern railways; 1.3 billion 
tons of added port capacity; 61,099 megawatts of hydroelectric production; 16,500 kilometres of 
interconnecting power lines; 21,101 cubic hectametres of new water storage capacity; and six 
terabits of broadband internet capacity.
610
 Short-term policy frameworks have also been 
implemented by NEPAD, largely to promote intra-African trade, reduce transaction costs, and 
improve regional competitiveness. NEPAD contributed $2.27 billion in 2007 to multi-national 
projects in Africa, $2.46 billion in 2006, and $2.78 billion in 2007.  
 
As of 2011, the World Bank ranked Southern Africa in 149th place out of 183 regions in terms of 
cross-border trade.
611
 On average, cargo takes 35 days to be exported from Southern Africa, and 
42 days to be imported. The estimated cost to import a 20-foot container of non-sensitive goods 
ranges from $1899 to $2410. On average, eight documents are required for export, and nine for 
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import. Therefore, AfDB had committed $52 billion to regional development in transport, energy, 
and information and communications technology.
612
  
 
Convergence in infrastructure is evident in the North-South Corridor, jointly owned by 
COMESA, the EAC, and SADC, which is also Africa’s busiest and most congested corridor for 
freight under a single umbrella, boosting and revamping reforms to customs, border management, 
infrastructure, and transport regulation. Eight countries are benefitting from this initiative: 
Tanzania, the DRC, Zambia, Malawi, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and South Africa.  
 
In August 2011 the SADC summit launched its Regional Infrastructure Master Plan in Luanda, 
Zambia. At the individual REC level, the EAC has prioritised plans to develop roads, ports, 
railways, transmission lines, and oil and gas infrastructure over the next decade in its 2015–2025 
strategy paper. The EAC is improving handling capacity and efficiency at the ports of Dar es 
Salaam and Mombasa. In SADC, the Regional Infrastructure Development Master Plan  is a 
major component of the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan.
613
 The master plan has 
synergies with PIDA and the Tripartite free trade area among the three RECs: COMESA, EAC, 
and SADC. This Plan was signed by member states at the SADC Summit in August 2012, and 
will be implemented over three five-year intervals: short-term (2012–2017), medium-term (2017–
2022), and long-term (2022–2027).  
 
Funding from external donors will greatly assist regional infrastructure and the Tripartite bloc is 
awaiting earmarked funds from Europe totalling 110 billion euros pledged for infrastructure 
development. While funding is a challenge, there are other creative ways in which to address 
infrastructure challenges. For example, the Deloitte and Touche auditing firm offers a creative 
project funding methodology, which can support governments in major infrastructure projects by 
including new pools of infrastructure investors and financiers to deliver the required 
infrastructure needs.
614
 SADC was looking at $100 billion to finance its projects by 2015. 
Investment in the energy sector will require $47 billion over a period of five years; road projects 
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up to $26 billion; ports and inland waterways $18 billion; and information and communications 
technology, postal systems, and meteorology and water projects $9 billion.
615
 South Africa 
contributed $6.2 billion in 2012 towards investment through the Industrial Development 
Corporation in 41 projects across 17 African countries in mining, industrial infrastructure, agro-
processing, and tourism.
616
  
 
The Maputo Corridor was further developed in 2014 by South Africa’s Transnet for port and rail 
operators in Swaziland and Mozambique. The aim of the Maputo Corridor Joint Operating Centre 
(JOC) is to increase the MDC rail freight capacity. The JOC is a major milestone among the three 
countries: Swaziland, Mozambique, and South Africa. The rail freight corridor runs from 
Mpumalanga in South Africa through Swaziland to the Port of Richards Bay (South Africa) and 
the Port of Maputo in Mozambique. In operation since 2013, turnaround time for trade was 
reduced from 118 hours on road to 62 hours with an average of 10 to 18 trains running per week 
on this corridor. As discussed earlier, the Maputo Corridor and Logistics Initiative required funds 
of R1.9 billion for upgrades and road freight has been costly - with on average rail is 75 percent 
cheaper than road transport.
617
 South Africa’s Transnet’s Market Demand Strategy (MDS), is 
moving cargo from road to rail and includes a R312 billion seven-year infrastructure investment 
programme since 2013.
618
    
 
Throughout Africa, exploitable energy resources like hydropower, coal, gas, oil, uranium - both 
new and renewable resources - are in abundance. While both northern and western Africa have an 
abundance of oil and gas reserves, Southern Africa has large coal deposits. The SAPP grid, and 
the East African Power Pool (EAPP) grid, as well as planned power interconnections for five 
corridors and planned power-generation projects in Ethiopia, Sudan, the DRC, Kenya, Uganda, 
and Tanzania, are positive developments. In Southern Africa, challenges for power generation in 
the 2012-2016 period include development of cleaner energy sources (such as solar, hydro, wind, 
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and nuclear) compared to fossil fuels such as coal, as identified in the Renewable Energy 
Strategy and Action Plan.
619
  
 
Hydropower potential is evident in the Nile, Congo, Niger, Senegal, Volta, Orange, and Zambezi 
river systems. Geothermal resources are found in the Red Sea Valley and Rift Valley, and solar 
energy enterprises can be harnessed in Southern Africa (such as through South Africa’s coastal 
wind farms). Public private partnerships have been one mechanism used to bridge the funding 
gap in infrastructure, as was discussed in the micro-regionalism section further above in the 
assessment of the MDC. South Africa had proposed a plan through Eskom to have independent 
power producers within 28 projects between 2012 and 2025 to secure procurements under the 
Renewable Energy Independent Power Producer Programme (REIPPP).
620
 The REIPPP project 
assumes the following: a baseload capacity of 2 500 megawatts of coal-fired generation by 2024; 
2 652 megawatts of gas power by 2025; 2 609 megawatts of hydroelectric power imports by 
2024; 9 200 megawatts of wind generation; 1 200 megawatts of concentrated solar power; 8 400 
megawatts of solar photovoltaic production; 9 600 megawatts of nuclear capacity; 4 930 
megawatts of open-cycle gas-turbine peaking plant capacity; 2 370 megawatts of combined-cycle 
gas-turbine capacity; 11 332 megawatts of pumped-storage scheme; 2 659 megawatts of imported 
hydropower; and 465 megawatts of renewable technology.  
 
South Africa’s Integrated Resource Plan (IRP) of 2010-2013 further confirms a rolling renewable 
and procurement programme with 3 200 megawatts added to projects for development by 2020; 
as well as 3 725 megawatts in renewable capacity projects, valued at R100 billion.
621
 Such 
agreements could bring about significant convergence among the Tripartite bloc member states. 
The integration partnership between COMESA, EAC, and SADC requires further development 
of the infrastructural policies and institutional capacities of both of these regional economic 
communities for viable economic growth.
622
  
 
 
                                                 
619
 AfDB, Southern Africa Regional Integration Strategy Paper, 2011–2015. 
620
 See, Deloitte and Touche, “Partnering for Future Prosperity Delivering Successful Globally Competitive South 
African Cities”, 2012, p. 8.  See also, Terence Creamer, “SA Moves to Procure 7761 MW of Baseload IPP Power by 
2025” (29 October 2012), < http://www.polity.org.za>. 
621
 Creamer, “SA Moves to Procure 7761 MW of Baseload IPP Power by 2025”, 2012. 
622
 See, TradeMark SA, <http://www.trademarsa.org/news/regional-perspective-sadcs-infrastructure>. 
189 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
 
The findings in this chapter examined the extent to which convergence had occurred in regional 
trade agreements in providing a detailed account of the progress of COMESA and SADC’s 
Tripartite Agreement in relation to its roadmap, by assessing their trade protocols and 
timeframes. This provides an adequate account of how much convergence had occurred within 
COMESA and SADC. These findings were presented and directly aligned with the theme: 
situating regional integration in the divergence and convergence debate. The findings on regional 
integration and convergence were particularly relevant to this chapter as they provided the 
contextual basis for understanding the major issues before and after the formation of the 2008 
Tripartite Agreement of COMESA and SADC, adequately assessed and discussed in this chapter. 
These major factors constituted the principal issue in the thesis, to connect regional integration 
with liberalisation of regional trade arrangements linked to economic growth. Findings on this 
theme also revealed that while COMESA and SADC were faced with open markets of trade, 
regional integration could be exploited positively through micro-regionalism able to support 
weaker economies, as in Mozambique. The importance of building infrastructure to conduct 
effective regional trade was discussed. The chapter also considered COMESA and SADC’s 
competitive advantage to support endogenous growth factors of inputs of semi-skilled and 
unskilled labour in energy production. SAPP is an example of how electricity in trade had 
assisted the Southern African region. Also discussed was how South Africa as a stronger 
economy and most advanced parastal, Eskom, was able to contribute to the region’s infrastructure 
development and electricity generation, while also creatively managing to address some of its 
own socio-economic domestic challenges. Competition and competitive trade in agriculture was 
expanded on in examining how convergence could be improved among the three RECs through 
agriculture. An example of a COMESA-EAC-SADC sugar protocol in agriculture was provided 
to address several challenges of trade competition, skills enhancement, and technology 
development. The findings were presented in narrative form, and in tables, and graphs, and 
supported by evidence that was at times based on interviews conducted in the region. In most 
instances relevant literature was used to support such evidence. 
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The chapter also fully assessed the major events that occurred during 10 years (1998-2008), and 
expanded on the main actors and factors that led to the 2008 Tripartite Agreement.
623
  The 
chapter outlined how it happened that these three RECs, COMESA, EAC, and SADC, met again 
and merged in 2008, since their last gathering in 1997, which had been directly linked to 
facilitating infrastructure to enhance trade through the Yamoussoukro Declaration for air travel. 
The chapter interrogated what COMESA and SADC have managed to achieve with regard to 
their agreements and protocols outlined in the 2008 Tripartite Agreement for the period 2008-
2015, as well as the actors and factors that retarded their progress. The chapter highlighted that in 
1998, the SADC region was not in a position to merge with COMESA or sign any trade 
agreements, owing to various reasons such as political and security developments.   
 
This chapter noted that open trade with the EU and US caused divergence for smaller economies 
and infant industries. It also noted that the hegemonic role of South Africa was important to the 
integration process of the Tripartite bloc, but, it was also viewed negatively by regional states for 
example in its investments in the region. This discussion was further supported by Soko’s 
regional analysis of South Africa’s role in the region. However, the thesis provides a flipside to 
the debate of divergence and convergence that is outlined in the neoclassical economics approach 
of open trade. This contrasting view is expanded in chapter 5 of the thesis, which defines 
convergence of economic growth, as outlined by Venables, who notes that North-South trade has 
a more positive outcome for growing economies with the presence of a stronger economy in a 
regional scheme. Venables’ theory is tested in chapter 5 to assess whether multiple memberships 
hinder or promote integration and how COMESA and SADC (as both institutions and member 
states) are managing multiple memberships. Therefore, the role of hegemony is taken into 
account, which assesses South Africa’s trade relations within the Southern African Customs 
Union.  
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Chapter 5 
 
Management of Multiple Memberships of COMESA and SADC 
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
The focus of this chapter is on the management of multiple memberships of COMESA and 
SADC member states, including the EAC member states, which belong to various regional 
economic communities.Two main questions are posed in this chapter: 1) How are COMESA, the 
EAC, and SADC (as both institution and member states) managing the issue of multiple 
memberships? 2) Do multiple memberships hinder or promote integration? 
 
Firstly, the discussions in this chapter will contribute to the core focus of the thesis, that is, the 
convergence of COMESA, and SADC, which evolved into a Tripartite Agreement in 2008, 
together with the East African Community. Further efforts were made to promote regional 
integration and a Tripartite FTA was formed in 2015 by just more than half of the members. This 
chapter will discuss the management of multiple memberships by both RECs and member states 
that have hindered convergence for the bloc and will expand the discussion on South Africa and 
SACU’s relations.  
 
As a starting point the chapter posits that the success of convergence of the Tripartite FTA is 
linked to the achievement of real economic gains and benefits for all member states and these 
benefits may not be equal. Moreover, convergence of the Tripartite bloc can only occur with a 
hegemonic presence - a strong member state/s with a strong economy/ies, and the hegemonic 
state must achieve real economic gains.  
 
In order to contextualise the discussion, on the management of multiple memberships, the chapter 
notes firstly that, the genesis of multiple memberships are linked to the rationalisation processes 
of COMESA and SADC of 1997. As was explained in Chapter 3 under the rationalisation process 
of the two blocs, COMESA and SADC agreed to divide the two regions into a Preferential Trade 
Area for the South that comprised all SADC member states. Preferential trade arrangements in 
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the Southern region were to be carried out under the auspices of SADC.
624
 The process of 
separating the two regions into North and South was to evolve over time, and the modalities 
regarding which area COMESA and SADC member states would want to belong to, had to be 
determined by individual member states as their sovereign right. Also agreed was that there 
should be a Preferential Trade Area for the North, which comprised non-SADC countries, and 
member states from both blocs could choose which REC they wished to join. 
 
Secondly, and as was indicated in Chapter 4, that the 2008 Tripartite Agreement allow member 
states to liberalise tariffs according to their individual preparedness, namely, the variable 
geometry approach that had been adopted by the Tripartite bloc. Furthermore, the variable 
geometry approach was also adopted by individual RECs of SADC, COMESA, and the EAC, 
where member states were given considerable flexibility in terms of timing and liberalisation of 
tariffs. The chapter notes that the dilemma for the Tripartite bloc is that its decision to implement 
a variable geometry approach – allowing for member states of a regional grouping to cooperate in 
separation from other members, as well as for flexible progression in cooperation in a variety of 
areas and at different speeds – was an attempt to help manage the multiple memberships of 
member states.
625
 But this approach has hampered regional integration.  
 
Thirdly, when the 2008 Tripartite Agreement was formed (see Chapter 4), member states were 
allowed to continue bilateral agreements, for example, with Europe and the US. The findings in 
this chapter will demonstrate that due to rules of origin specified in trade commodities in external 
trade agreements such as in AGOA agreements – that these arrangements have further 
complicated the management of multiple memberships for the Tripartite bloc. The chapter 
therefore shows that given the fact that the Tripartite bloc has not finalised its own policies 
concerning Rules of Origin, trade liberalisation that is reflective of open markets, is causing 
polarisation of smaller markets and industries.
626
  
 
The bilateral agreements of AGOA are examples of the polarisation nature of trade and the 
chapter shows the extent of trade between AGOA schemes and the Tripartite bloc member states 
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and the extent of trade divergence. Moreover, this chapter notes that globalisation dictates open 
markets and trade which creates a contradiction for the Tripartite Agreement’s regional 
integration approaches. These contradictions are not adequately supported within the neoclassical 
economic approach theory of open trade and regional integration divergence and convergence 
debates as was discussed in the literature reviewed in chapter 2.  
The thesis identifies this as a gap in relation to the theories discussed in chapter 2 and deploys a 
new theory in support of this discussion in this chapter, defined as: neoclassical economic 
regional integration which will help in supporting the findings provided here in Chapter 5.  
 
5.2 Management of multiple memberships 
 
This section of the chapter shows as indicated in Table 5.1 the multiple memberships held by 
members of the Tripartite bloc. This section of the chapter also expands on the economic and 
political effects on multiple memberships, and provides an understanding why some states join 
some blocs and not others.  The purpose of the discussion is to contribute to the core focus of the 
thesis: convergence and divergence of the Tripartite bloc. Fourteen of COMESA’s 19 member 
states participated in the FTA it established in 2000. The exceptions are Ethiopia, which has 
liberalised only 10 percent of its trade; the DRC, which has liberalised none of its trade and is 
still charging duty on all goods entering the country; Uganda, which has liberalised 80 percent of 
trade; and Eritrea, which has liberalised only 10 percent of trade. Swaziland, as a SACU member 
state, is under derogation and not liberalising tariffs.
627
 The EAC, besides being member states of 
COMESA and Tanzania in SADC, is creating its own zone of free trade and has achieved 100 
percent liberalisation of trade, as well as forming its own customs union.
628
 Under Article 31 of 
the SACU Agreement (revised in 1969 and 2002), “Swaziland as a COMESA member sought 
derogations from granting trade preferences to its COMESA trade partners due to its SACU 
membership.”629 South Africa, as the largest economy in the Tripartite bloc, belongs to one free 
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trade area (SADC’s) and one customs union (SACU’s). Of the AU’s 54 member states, 26 are 
members of two RECs and 20 are members of three RECs. The DRC belongs to four RECs. Of 
the 14 regional integration groupings in Africa, there are two or more groupings in other sub-
regions (for example, both in SADC and COMESA).
630
 
Table 5.1: Membership in RECs and FTAs in the Tripartite bloc 
 
 
Note: ECCAS is the Economic Community of Central African States; CEPGL is the Economic Community of the 
Great Lakes Countries; CEN-SAD is the Community of Sahel-Saharan States. 
Source: United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), Study On the Establishment of Inter-RECs’ Free Trade 
Areas in Africa Drawing on Lessons from the COMESA-SADC-EAC FTA Experience, 2 May 2011, 
<http://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/uploaded-documents/CTRCI-VII/Tripartite_comesa_eac_sadc_fta-study-final-
report.pdf>, pp. 14–20. 
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COMESA  EAC  SADC  COMESA 
FTA  
EAC 
FTA  
SADC FTA  States 
belonging 
to no FTA 
Membership 
in Other 
RECs 
Tripartite 
Grand FTA 
(10 June 
2015)631 
Burundi Djibouti Angola Burundi Djibouti Botswana Eritrea Angola 
(ECCAS) 
Angola 
Comoros Kenya Botswana Comoros Kenya Lesotho Ethiopia Burundi 
(CEPGL) 
Burundi 
Djibouti Rwanda DRC Djibouti Rwanda Madagascar  Djibouti 
(CEN-SAD) 
Comoros 
DRC Tanzania Lesotho Egypt Tanzania Malawi  DRC 
(CEPGL) 
the DRC 
Egypt Uganda Madagascar Kenya Uganda Mauritius Egypt 
(CEN-SAD 
Djibouti 
Eritrea Malawi Libya Mozambique Eritrea 
(CEN-SAD) 
Egypt 
Ethiopia Mauritius Mauritius Namibia Eritrea 
(CEN-SAD) 
Kenya 
Kenya Mozambiqu
e 
Rwanda Seychelles Libya (CEN-
SAD) 
Malawi 
Libya Namibia Seychelles South Africa Rwanda 
(CEPGL) 
Namibia 
Madagascar Seychelles Zambia Swaziland Somalia 
(CEN-SAD) 
Sudan 
(CEN-SAD) 
Rwanda 
Malawi South 
Africa 
Zimbabwe  Tanzania Seychelles 
Mauritius Swaziland  Zambia Sudan 
Rwanda Tanzania Zimbabwe Tanzania 
Seychelles Zambia Uganda 
Sudan Zimbabwe Swaziland 
Tanzania  Zimbabwe 
Uganda 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
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The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) has also exacerbated tensions with Ethiopia’s 
government remaining wary of Egypt’s moves.632 The Ethiopian government has had several 
disputes with Egypt, such as that over the Nile River dam (as discussed in Chapter 6). Egypt’s 
deployment of troops in South Sudan and its signing of a bilateral cooperation agreement with 
South Sudan have further estranged Ethiopia from South Sudan.
633
 Hence, when assessing Table 
5.1 above, it is clear that Ethiopia has neither reached a position of trust nor the ability to conduct 
and liberalise tariffs when security and political tensions have been looming large over the 
region.  
 
In SADC, 13 of 15 member states are in the SADC FTA, excluding Angola and the DRC. There 
are also tensions that relate to historical relations among the Tripartite bloc’s member states. The 
DRC conflict flared up again in 2011, with the Rwandan-backed March 23 rebel group 
movement occupying some of the territory in the DRC (discussed in detail in Chapter 6). Porous 
borders and poor governance have also contributed to the Tripartite’s bloc’s own set of 
challenges in obtaining regional convergence.
634
 As indicated in Table 5.1, there is extensive 
overlap, with most member states belonging to more than one REC. Political and economic 
tensions and examples of divergence are evident. Rwanda and Uganda’s conflicts in the DRC 
have kept the DRC from joining or sharing a zone of trade initially with these member states.  
Rebel groups supported by Rwandan and Uganda in the DRC
635
 have been the centre of an 
intermittent but long-standing conflict since 1998. However, while the conflict situation in the 
Great Lakes Region has caused regional divergence, since the move of South Africa, Malawi and 
Tanzania in coordinating military efforts, in assisting the Great Lakes Region militarily 
deploying a 3,000-strong Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) in eastern Congo, the regional 
dynamics changed.  
 
The tense political situation in the Great Lakes region did initially create divergence among the 
member states of the EAC, but as discussed above, have also caused the convergence of these 
members’ economic policies in trade due to the FIB and its success in combating the M23 rebel 
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movement. Evidently, on 10 June 2015, the DRC, Tanzania, Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi were 
all part of those who signed the Tripartite Grand Free Trade Agreement. This meeting took place 
in Egypt and only was signed by 16 member states, mainly of the COMESA bloc, based on 
variable geometry.
636
 The 16 member states and signatory to the Tripartite FTA included: 
Angola; Burundi (EAC); Comoros; the DRC; Djibouti; Egypt; Kenya (EAC); Malawi; Namibia; 
Rwanda (EAC); Seychelles; Sudan; Tanzania (EAC); Uganda (EAC); Swaziland; and 
Zimbabwe.
637
 Most of SADC’s member states (Botswana, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mauritius, 
Mozambique, South Africa and Zambia); and COMESA’s member states (Ethiopia, Eritrea, and 
Libya), did not sign the Tripartite FTA in June 2015. Though the SACU Secretariat pointed out 
that it had no intentions of joining the Tripartite FTA,
638
 however, two of its member states 
signed the Tripartite FTA: Namibia and Swaziland. Namibia was among the countries that 
complained bitterly about South Africa’s relationship with the European Union. There were 
major losses in agricultural produce due to quota-free market access for fish, beef, and grapes.
639
 
Namibia also complained that South Africa’s stringent rules of origin have been a further 
impediment to intra-regional trade for Southern Africa and that South Africa has prohibited the 
importation of live animals from Namibia; as a result, costs to the Windhoek government were 
estimated at R30 billion in establishing agro-processing schemes such as feed-loads and abattoirs 
to create an environment conducive to trade.
640
  Namibia, became signatory to the Tripartite FTA 
on 10 June 2015.
641
  On its part, Swaziland, is hoping to benefit from the AGOA trade within a 
larger Tripartite FTA and also signed the Tripartite FTA, since the US stopped its trade relations 
with Swaziland and is discussed later on in this chapter. Eritrea, and Ethiopia, have remained 
wary of joining the COMESA FTA and fear revenue losses, trade divergence on sensitive 
products, and loss of protection of their key industries. Ethiopia’s fears also concern mainly the 
country’s manufacturing sector and it envisages substantial job losses since it lacks competitive 
advantages.
642
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Cordial relations also started to exist among Sudan, Ethiopia,
643
 and Kenya in particular, with the 
4 March 2012 official opening of Lamu Port in Kenya by the former Kenyan President, Mwai 
Kibaki, and the successful completion of the Lamu Port for Southern Sudan–Ethiopia Transport 
(LAPSSET) corridor. In July 2013, at the 12th Annual Ethiopian–Djibouti Joint Commission 
Ministerial Meeting, agreements on trade investment and infrastructure, as well as security and 
other issues, were reached. These two countries were already executing joint mega-projects, 
including rail and road infrastructural development and new ports, power and water services. 
Ethiopia exports 65 megawatt electricity and clean water to Djibouti, in a multimillion-dollar new 
railway project between Addis Ababa and Djibouti.
644
 
 
In the case of SADC, trade liberalisation takes on an asymmetrical structure in SADC, which 
means that the 15 countries are classified into three groups: SACU; least developed countries 
(Angola, DRC, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe); and 
developed countries (Seychelles, and Mauritius). With the adoption of the SADC trade protocol 
and moving towards an FTA, SADC like COMESA also took on a variable geometry approach. 
SADC’s non-SACU members decided to frontload its tariffs within five years of adoption of the 
trade protocol and bring its tariffs to zero with the exception of a few sensitive products. The 
Developing Countries agreed to start their tariff reductions earlier than other non-SACU 
members, while LDCs were allowed to back-load their reduction commitments.
645
 
 
5.3 Variable Geometry and the Tripartite bloc 
 
This section provides a brief account of how COMESA, EAC and SADC (as both institutions and 
member states) manage multiple memberships. In the area of trade, customs and economic 
integration, the Tripartite Summit at Kampala, Uganda on 22 October 2008
646
 and the Tripartite 
MOU that came into force on 19 January 2011
647
 defined the free trade process and membership 
agreements (as was discussed in chapter 4). In Article 1 of the MOU, the 2008 Tripartite Summit 
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agreed that in establishing the FTA it would take into account the principle of variable geometry, 
and provide a legal and institutional framework to underpin the FTA. Since the signing of the 
June 2015 Tripartite FTA, these legal instruments are still being negotiated and are still to be 
concluded.
648
 
 
The Tripartite bloc’s decision to implement variable geometry, which is a principle that allows 
member states of a regional grouping to cooperate in separation from other members as well as 
flexibility for progression in cooperation in a variety of areas and at different speeds, was an 
attempt to help manage the overlapping REC memberships of member states.
649
 The Tripartite 
bloc has also adopted a trade liberalisation framework that is reflective of open markets.
650
 Trade 
liberalisation through bilateral trade agreements further hampers the principle of variable 
geometry, and appears to contrast with trade protection and incremental integration, since the 
pace of integration varies between these two approaches: trade liberalisation and variable 
geometry. 
 
As Gathii
651
 contends, variable geometry is a time-tabled approach committing member states to 
different speeds of economic ability to serve the interests of members belonging to a regional 
bloc, which provides them with the flexibility to trade. The Tripartite bloc is attempting to 
harmonise regional policies in trade undertaken for regional economic convergence. Krugman, 
and Martin
652
 note that regional economies dependent on export clusters held together by local 
Marshallian-type
653
 external economies, allow states to reap benefits from specialised labour of 
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technological spillover, which also lead to increasing economic returns that further benefit those 
member states within a regional grouping and place such states in a competitive advantage. States 
should therefore consider how to build on total factor productivity to boost jobs and skills.  
 
Furthermore, Krugman suggests that “regional trade can benefit in technology and skills transfer 
in those export clusters (poorer economies) that conduct trade with more advanced economies. 
Such benefits include a shift in the production of goods to countries which can produce them 
most competitively and efficiently; improvement in socio-economic welfare due to consumer 
surplus resulting from lower prices from competitively produced goods; an increase in 
employment and job creation; and more importantly, comparative advantages and being able to 
produce and manufacture goods that reflect these advantages, which in turn have the potential to 
create economies of scale.”654 What this means is that for the Tripartite bloc to become more 
technologically advanced and competitive, it should not only focus on internal inter-regional 
trade and value-added and industrialisation-driven policy, but also consider conducting trade 
outside of the bloc with external partners that benefit its own integration. Competing and 
becoming competitive have been lacking for the Tripartite bloc, which stifles economic growth 
with industries not advancing as outlined by both Krugman and Martin.
655
  
 
This chapter purports that the Tripartite member states are conducting trade with external partners 
like AGOA trade schemes that have challenged the rules of origin associated with similar trade as 
with the Tripartite bloc, hence the chapter provides a consideration based on the analysis. Gathii 
contents that trade liberalisation policies have complicated rules of origin that are attached to 
goods linked to external trade agreements and, conflict with internal settings of rules of origin.
656
 
Gathii notes: 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
homogeneous products, perfect knowledge and perfect factor mobility. The value of the economy is therefore 
measured by nominal and real values (the equilibrium values of real [real values are obtained by deflating nominal 
values by a price index] variables (employment, output) are determined in the labour and goods markets, whereas 
nominal [nominal values are e.g. wages, and output] variables (current prices) are determined in the money market). 
Given that real variables are not affected by changes in the money supply in such a model, money is then neutral. 
Hence this generates two parts of the theory: i) a theory of how equilibrium output and employment are determined, 
and, ii) a theory of how the aggregate price level is determined.”   
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“African RTAs [regional trade arrangements] are trade-plus regimes that reflect a broad 
set of goals and are not simply trade treaties. Seeing African RTAs as regimes adds to the 
argument that countries that are members of more than one RTA may well regard treaties 
establishing RTAs as providing a framework for cooperation, but not necessarily as 
treaties creating binding obligations.”657 
 
Africa’s states have the liberty to form multiple memberships, which states see as offering them 
the flexibility to retain their sovereignty and accrue benefits.
658
 COMESA and SADC’s economic 
integration practices allow further openness of their markets.
659
 Prior to the signing of the Grand 
FTA on 10 June 2015, in a January 2015 report by the COMESA Secretary-General, Sindiso 
Ngwenya, he provided a detailed account of the failed negotiations towards a free trade area 
(leading up to the FTA being concluded; and the legal binding treaties that have not been 
concluded as noted earlier above): 
 
“Some of the main challenges and pitfalls on the Tripartite FTA have been ambitious tariff 
liberalisation threshold. The 60 percent to 85 percent liberalisation threshold is less than trade 
liberalisation thresholds attained under the three REC FTAs, and the failure to respect the 
principle of acquis fully in this respect. The apparent contradiction between some principles, 
notably between variable geometry, which would allow countries that are ready to make progress 
while allowing slower countries to join later ... the principle of decision-making by consensus 
...resulted in slow progress as countries that were not ready could not allow others to proceed.”660 
 
According to Trade and legal expert, Gerhard Erasmus he highlighted that:  
 
“The signing of the FTA Agreement [10 June 2015] is indeed an important development... it will 
take time before this Agreement will enter into force. The remainder of the negotiations [also 
discussed in more detail in chapter 4] include Phase 1 (the built-in-agenda); Annex 1 – the 
Elimination of Customs Duties; Annex II on Trade Remedies and Annex IV on Rules of 
Origin.”661 
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Nyong’o662 posits that it would not be possible for COMESA and SADC FTAs to accommodate 
multiple memberships within a common external tariff and within a customs union. This is not a 
norm and would be in violation of the GATT article XXIV.
663
 All preferential agreements 
covering trade in services must also be reported under Article 5 of the WTO, regardless of 
membership. However, Article 5 is less relevant for Africa’s RECs, since their trading 
arrangements generally focus on trade in goods. Africa’s RECs experience great difficulty with 
the wide-open nature of the Enabling Clause. COMESA, for example, is considering reporting 
under Article 24 to protect itself from complaints concerning displacement of imports. Sri Lanka, 
for instance, has contended that its tea exports into Egypt have been displaced by Kenyan exports 
benefiting from COMESA preferences. Hence, under the enabling clause, Sri Lanka can claim 
that it is entitled to compensation since Egypt has a tariff agreement on tea that was undermined 
by the preferences.
664
  This means that African governments, through their RECs, have designed 
compensatory mechanisms to ensure losses that arise from liberalisation commitments are 
recovered and given to the disadvantaged parties. As Gatthi posits that “by foregrounding 
variable geometry and distributional equity concerns, African RTAs have correspondingly 
distanced themselves from non-discriminatory free trade”.665 As Panagariya notes, the 
complexity of regional integration is daunting even in the absence of trade barriers and 
“crisscrossing FTAs lead to a replacement of non-discriminatory MFN tariffs by a spaghetti bowl 
whereby tariffs vary according to ostensible origin of the product”.666 The increase in the number 
of bilateral and regional trade agreements, Bhagwati coined as the “spaghetti bowl”.667 Jenkins, 
Leape and Thomas define the generally poor regional frameworks that have been created as 
regional trade initiatives that have achieved very little. 
 
“… in spite of their political appeal ... [m]any schemes were designed without taking into account 
members’ divergent interests and the conflicting obligations stemming from overlapping 
[multiple] membership of different regional arrangements; without considering the feasibility of 
implementation for participating countries; and without assessing members’ incentives to comply 
and their scope for substituting non-tariff barriers for tariffs.”668 
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On the other hand, Europe is replacing its EU–SA TDCA 1999 agreement with South Africa and 
is negotiating under the SADC EPA with Southern African countries, in the main, Botswana, 
Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland, Mozambique, and South Africa. On 22 July 2014 the first round of 
negotiations with Europe addressed key trade areas, which had negatively impacted BLNS 
markets in the past during the 2000s. The renegotiated agreement was scheduled for conclusion 
by October 2016.
669
 The SADC EPA, as the EU’s largest trading partner, consists of 6 out of 15 
members of SADC (SACU plus 1 [Mozambique]). Europe’s exports have dwindled somewhat 
since South Africa joined BRICS. The 2013 EU exports to Southern Africa totalled 33 billion 
euros and Southern Africa’s main trade to the EU in 2013 totalled 31 billion euros and comprised 
chiefly: Botswana (diamonds); South Africa (diamonds; platinum; agri-food sector, including 
wine, sugar, citrus and other fruit; precious stones; metals, uranium, table grapes); Namibia 
(fish); Swaziland (sugar, fruit and nuts).  
 
The new SADC EPA agreement includes shielding sensitive sectors from European competitors 
in their domestic market. In the new negotiations, the EU had to make a commitment and refrain 
from subsidising its agricultural exports to the region. This the South African negotiators have 
enforced, or there will be no EPA agreement signed in 2016. A list of 251 EU geographical 
indications and 105 South Africa geographical indications has been agreed to.
670
 Trade can only 
be to the benefit of the Tripartite bloc economies when the lists of the SADC EPA, the trade lists 
of the AGOA scheme, and the trade list of the Tripartite FTA are taken into consideration jointly 
and carefully balanced so that the Tripartite FTA benefits the most. The Tripartite FTA must 
conclude its own rules of origin trade policy in order to derive maximum benefit. As outlined in 
chapter four of the thesis, a pilot study should be considered in trade that considers the 
comparative advantage of the Tripartite bloc in sugar, and leather; and steel.     
 
5.4 Rules of Origin and external trade agreements: AGOA and EPAs 
 
In building on the overall divergence and convergence debate of the thesis, this section of the 
chapter expands on how external bilateral agreements with the EU and the US, impact on 
multiple memberships of the Tripartite bloc member states. Trade with the EU’s EPAs and the 
                                                 
669
 European Union, Southern African region and the EU complete negotiations for an Economic Partnership 
Agreement, 22 July 2014, <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=940>. 
670
 European Union, Southern African region and the EU complete negotiations for an Economic Partnership 
Agreement, 2014. 
203 
 
United States’ AGOA liberalisation policies have complicated rules of origin attached to their 
goods.
671
  The goal of non-discriminatory trade under the GATT/WTO rules of origin, a ten-year 
assessment known as the Sutherland report is inconsistent with regards to rules of origin in 
multiple regional trade agreements, which hamper trade flows.
672
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Major partners of COMESA and South Africa with AGOA market in 2013  
Source: Adopted from <https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/africa/regional-economic-communities-rec/common-
market-eastern-and-Southern-africa-comesa> 
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In the case of COMESA–EAC–SADC, each REC, namely, COMESA’s FTA, EAC’s FTA, and 
SADC’s FTA, has its own rules of origin, which vary across products and transition phases; 
hence there are several different tariff rates complying with the tariff rates assigned to the 
products. The lists of sensitive products in SADC for example, came to the fore when South 
Africa signed the Trade Development and Corporation Agreement in 1999 with the European 
Union.
673
   
 
The requirements in SADC are for example, that garments must be produced from regionally 
produced textiles; fabric must be made from regionally produced yarn; yarn must be made from 
un-carded, uncombed fibre or from chemical products.
674
  Multiple memberships diminish trade 
capacity, since the Tripartite bloc has to conform to various ROOs under various regional 
economic communities’ requirements. Rules of origin are to protect trade and therefore restrict 
trade within a liberalised trade regime of the Tripartite bloc. These rules have become major 
obstacles to convergence and the COMESA–EAC–SADC bloc has not completed the negotiating 
process, which has been a continuous one since the Tripartite FTA was only signed by 16 
member states and Annex IV of the Tripartite FTA on Rules of Origin has not been finalised.
675
 
SADC’s own trade protocol objectives were particularly strained during the slow progress in 
ratifying the rules of origin for clothing, textiles and cane sugar. South Africa had excluded a list 
of sensitive products from duty-free entry into its market, including, dairy; wheat and wheat 
products; sugar and sugar confectionary; cotton, knitted or crocheted fabrics, and knitted or 
crocheted clothing; leather footwear; and motor vehicles. These were classified under Category C 
of sensitive products. Moreover, multilateral and international trade agreements offer the MFN 
tariff to only one trade partner, and to date such clauses have benefited European agreements in 
the main, leaving regional arrangements vulnerable.
676
 Brenton, Flanders, and Kalenga
677
 note: 
 
“Rather than facilitating development through trade, the Trade Protocol will replace transparent 
and declining tariff barriers in important sectors with complex and more restrictive input sourcing 
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requirements that will diminish trade, increase transactions costs, reduce flexibility of producers 
and make the region a less attractive place to invest. Restrictive rules of origin might be in the 
interests of particular producers that wish to avoid new competition in their domestic markets. By 
the same token, however, such rules will make it impossible for them to compete in other regional 
markets, make it difficult if not impossible to benefit from attractive sourcing opportunities in the 
region and elsewhere, and will deprive downstream users, both producers and final consumers of 
the benefits of preferential tariff reductions.”678 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Five top export commodities from AGOA to COMESA in 2013 
Source: Adopted from <https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/africa/regional-economic-communities-rec/common-
market-eastern-and-Southern-africa-comesa> 
 
To demonstrate the levels of trade with AGOA markets as an example of how trade with various 
rules of origin is causing difficulties in the management of multiple memberships for the 
Tripartite bloc, this is shown in Figure 5.1. COMESA and South Africa’s trade with AGOA in 
Figure 5.1, also outlines AGOA’s main export markets. The table also shows South Africa in the 
top category alongside those of Egypt and Libya. Top US export markets with COMESA 
member states and South Africa in 2013 were: Egypt – $5.2 billion; Libya – $812 million; 
Ethiopia – $678 million; Kenya – $651 million; and Djibouti – $170 million. South Africa was 
the United States’ 39th largest supplier of imported goods, with total imports from South Africa 
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at $8.5 billion in 2013, and AGOA’s exports to South Africa totalled $7.3 billion in 2013. The 
major economies like South Africa, Kenya, and Egypt have continued to conduct more trade with 
external partners like the US and the EU than with its regional partners, and external trade with 
external businesses and trading partners is progressively pursued as seen in the AGOA trade 
imports and exports.
679
 Flatters have also noted that trade agreements conducted outside of the 
blocs, as in the case of the Tripartite bloc, distort trade. Rules of origin specify when a product 
qualifies for duty-free movement within a regional trade agreement and the proportion of value to 
be added if it originates within the trade bloc, or whether it is required that a product undergo a 
substantial amount of transformation to allow it as a product for trade as per the stipulated 
requirements.
680
 
 
Figure 5.2 shows the top export commodities from AGOA markets to COMESA: machinery 
($1.2 billion), aircraft ($1.1 billion),wheat($714 million), vehicles ($551 million), and oil ($549 
million).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3: Major export goods in 2013 from COMESA to AGOA 
Source: Adopted from <https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/africa/regional-economic-communities-rec/common-
market-eastern-and-Southern-africa-comesa> 
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Figure 5.3 shows the major export goods in 2013 from COMESA to AGOA: mineral fuel and 
crude oil ($2.7 billion), woven apparel ($829 million), knitted apparel ($564 million), spices, tea 
and coffee ($253 million), and fertilizers ($172 million).
681
 
 
The primary products exported through the AGOA agreement, besides the extensive list of 316 
tariff lines, are also based on the primary products of COMESA–EAC–SADC Tripartite 
members’ trade with the US, and directly impact on the fabric origin rule for apparel. The third 
country fabric provision had changed, with textiles in Lesotho decreasing from 21 percent in 
2006 to 12 percent of total textile trade with AGOA.
682
 The AGOA Committee on Ways and 
Means and trade committees focus largely on US preference programmes. US imports of private 
commercial services (excluding military and government) were $1.9 billion in 2012 for travel, 
while the other private services (business, professional, and technical) accounted for most of US 
services imports from South Africa.
683
 US President, Barrack Obama, had extended his private 
sector budget proposal and AGOA trade fund for another 15 years from September 2015 to 
September 2030. The extended AGOA agreement, according to Lande, President of  Manchester 
Trade, and commonly known as the “father of the Generalized System of Preferences of 
GATT”,684 indicates that although AGOA provides duty-free access for 97.5 percent of all tariff 
lines, there are still 316 tariff lines, mostly in agriculture, that are not currently included under the 
second AGOA.  
 
With the EAC, the United States had $1.8 billion in total goods during 2013. Exports totalled 
$1.2 billion and imports totalled $597 million. US trade exports to the EAC in 2013 were $1.2 
billion, with Kenya ($651 million); Tanzania ($420 million); Uganda ($125 million); Rwanda 
($25 million); and Burundi ($17 million). US exports of agricultural goods to EAC countries 
totalled $127 million in 2013. These included: pulses ($23 million) and coarse grains ($22 
million).  
 
                                                 
681
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US goods imported from the EAC countries totalled $597 million in 2013 with partners Kenya 
who is also a major trading partner of the US as noted earlier in figure 5.1 ($451 million); 
Tanzania ($70 million); Uganda ($47 million); Rwanda ($24 million); and Burundi ($4 million). 
Goods exported from EAC to US were knitted apparel ($171 million); woven apparel ($148 
million); spices, coffee, and tea ($119 million); edible fruit and nuts ($31 million); and precious 
stones ($22 million). EAC agricultural exports to US markets in 2013 comprised unroasted coffee 
($111 million) and tree nuts ($31 million).
685
 
 
Panagariya provides an illustration of the spaghetti-bowl concept in FTAs as opposed to customs 
unions: 
“Member countries fear that imports from outside countries destined to a high-tariff member may 
enter through a low-tariff member … or entrepreneurs in the low-tariff country may import a 
product in almost finished form, add a small value to it and export it to the high tariff country free 
of duty.”686 
 
Therefore to avoid trade diversion, FTA agreements need to take into account the rules of origin 
and specify such rules “according to which products receive the duty-free status and only if a pre-
specified proportion of value added in the product originates within the union.”687  
 
5.5 Regional arrangements in multiple memberships: Hindrance or promotion? 
 
The first purpose of the discussion in this section will show that multiple memberships are linked 
to real economic gains for all parties irrespective of economic strength. If there are real economic 
benefits derived in another regional trade agreement/scheme there will be divergence in the 
Tripartite FTA. The second purpose of this section is to demonstrate economic benefits derived 
over a long-run convergence period in a regional trade agreement, and states can come on par 
with the stronger economy. In this instance SACU is expanded on. These findings further show 
that if real economic growth is derived in a regional scheme, relations among member states will 
be strengthened in such a scheme. SACU member states will therefore be at liberty to choose 
which regional scheme they wish to join based on real economic growth. Hence, greater 
economic benefits experienced in one scheme, will diverge integration in another – and in this 
                                                 
685
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instance divergence will be seen in the Tripartite FTA. The section also shows that greater 
economic benefits in a regional scheme can only be achieved with the presence of a strong 
partner or hegemonic state in a regional scheme and the willingness for the hegemon to be a 
“paymaster”. The discussion further outlines that in order for the integration process to work the 
hegemonic state, which is incentivising the regional group, must therefore too experience real 
economic gains and derive real economic benefits. This section will also provide effective ways 
and means of how the Tripartite bloc could better manage multiple memberships and guard over 
the member states as South Africa has been doing in SACU.  
 
Multiple memberships have been compounded at the individual REC levels of COMESA, EAC, 
and SADC. Member states are still faced with the difficulties of negotiating with stronger 
member states like South Africa. According to Vickers, former official in the Policy Research 
Unit at the South African Department of Trade and Industry, that South Africa is enlarging its 
market to place it in a position to deal effectively with domestic challenges, which is a key 
objective of its regional developmental approach.
688
 However, South Africa also protects its 
markets and productive firms through implementing high domestic entry barriers in the various 
sectors and protecting imports, which preserves market shares of less productive and less 
innovative firms in some sectors, this is believed to place regional firms at risk.
689
 These policies 
are also viewed negatively by regional partners and seen as impacting on trade that is becoming a 
challenge and hurdle to trade competition policies as well as a high regional trade barrier. For 
example, at the 34th SADC Heads of State and Government Summit in August 2014, 
Zimbabwe’s President Robert Mugabe noted: 
 
“... we appeal to South Africa, which is highly industrialised, to lead us in this [industrialisation] 
and work with us, and cooperate with us and not just regard the whole continent as an open 
market for products from South Africa. We want a reciprocal relationship where we sell to each 
other [and] not just receiving products from one source.”690 
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At the same SADC August 2014 Summit, South Africa was not in a position to sign the SADC 
Trade Protocol Services Agreement, and Namibia similarly refused. At the SADC level, Robert 
Mugabe, presiding in the Chair, expressed his disappointment at South Africa’s one-sided trade 
practices at the SADC summit at Victoria Falls in August 2014.
691
 Zimbabwe went on to sign a 
$533 million power project with China and a further $3 billion deal with Russia to jointly mine 
platinum in Zimbabwe, with Moscow providing the investment funds. This move was a counter-
move by Mugabe, based on South Africa’s one-sided deals in excluding Zimbabwe from the 
platinum deal.
692
 Hence, from the Tripartite bloc perspective, SACU/South Africa have been 
changing the negotiating mood in the Tripartite bloc. As the SACU Secretariat officials have 
pointed out,
693
 they are looking at how to attract “swing countries”694 in widening their 
negotiation reach for strategic reasons such as population size, which provides a larger market, 
GDP, and natural resources.  
 
In considering economic growth linked to benefits of regional schemes, this section focuses on 
the theory of Venables that suggests that trade liberalisation with external partners in north–south 
regional trade agreements can bring about economic development and growth in per capita gross 
national income for poorer economies in a regional trade agreement. Venables observes that in an 
FTA that has a member with a high income relative to that of the rest of the world, the lower-
income members are likely to converge with the high-income partner and benefit from the FTA. 
Venables therefore suggests that developing countries are likely to be better served by north–
south than by south–south FTAs. This discussion takes into account economic convergence over 
a long run of nine years (2005–2013).695 A neo-classical economic approach should predict that 
open trade will produce convergence. 
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Barro and Sala-i-Martin provide a further understanding of economic growth convergence as a 
result of trade liberalisation by describing two levels of convergence in their model: beta-
convergence, or absolute convergence (also called the “catch-up” process), and sigma-
convergence, when the dispersion among a group of countries decreases over time.
696
 
  
States’ preservation of their membership in SACU, while also being member states of the 
Tripartite bloc, exacerbates the problem of managing multiple memberships.
697
 The SACU 
Secretariat has already stated that the region has no intention of joining a COMESA–EAC–
SADC FTA, because of the extensive tariff adjustments required.
698
 But as we can see that 
Swaziland and Namibia both signed the Tripartite FTA on 10 June 2015. 
  
South Africa was also trading more with BRICS and slowly reducing trade with Europe because 
of the severity of the trade agricultural subsidies of Europe’s farmers on the Southern African 
market as was discussed. Though Europe’s trade with South Africa is still more than China’s it is 
declining. Hence, from 2000 to 2012, South Africa’s exports to other BRIC members (Brazil, 
Russia, India, China) rose from 5 to 19 percent of its total exports. Over the same period, the 
EU’s share of South African exports declined from 60 percent to 21 percent. South Africa’s 
exports to East Asia were R10.96 billion and total imports were R12.16 billion.
699
 During the 
financial crises of 2009 and 2010, South Africa formalised its relationship with China, mainly 
through BRIC.
700
 South Africa attempted to take advantage of the industrialised markets; its 
exports exploded and did exceedingly well, as was noted by the World Bank in their economic 
update report on South Africa.
701
 The report noted that South Africa should adopt an inward-
looking trade strategy. Its finding was that the lower competitiveness in Africa’s markets and 
regional export markets was ineffective and could not compete against an outside market. South 
African firms stood a better chance in the region, since African markets are less likely to demand 
high standards and superior quality of exports from South African firms than European markets 
would demand.
702
 South Africa, is also determined to remain attached to SACU because of the 
awkward position it was put in when listed as a “developed” country during the Uruguay Round 
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of WTO negotiations (1986–1994).703 Since then, South Africa has been negotiating at the WTO 
to be recognised as a special case requiring additional flexibility related to its membership of 
SACU.
704
 
 
Venables addresses income convergence in trade liberalisation in free trade agreements with a 
high-income member.
705
 This chapter is concerned with trade growth, which will have spillover 
effects and benefits for smaller economies and poorer countries over the long-run. If countries 
discern benefits over time, they will remain in a regional grouping and thus economic 
convergence in the grouping will occur, as it did in the case of SACU. 
 
 
Figure 5.4. SACU trade as a percentage of GDP, 2005–2013 
Source: World Bank, “Trade (% of GDP)”, <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS> 
 
Two variables are therefore relevant here: total trade as a percentage of GDP, and growth of total 
trade over a long-run period of nine years. Growth in trade in the BLNS countries is of critical 
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importance and will lead to overall GDP growth. The economic gap between these countries and 
those with stronger economies is so great that attainment of economic parity is highly unlikely; 
for instance, in 2013, South Africa had a GDP of $366 billion compared with Lesotho’s $2.3 
billion.
706
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.5: Total trade of SACU member states, 2005–2013 
Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) statistics database, 
http://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx?sCS_referer=&sCS_ChosenLang=en 
 
 
Figure 5.4 shows that growth in trade as a percentage of total trade of poorer countries has 
improved relative to growth in trade as a percentage of total trade of South Africa, particularly for 
Lesotho and Swaziland. The convergence between Lesotho, Swaziland, and South Africa in total 
trade as a percentage of GDP provides evidence for beta-convergence over the long-run period of 
2005–2013. Whereas Botswana and Namibia have experienced growth in trade, this does not 
indicate divergence, but instead demonstrates that these two countries have grown more as 
smaller economies belonging to an FTA with a strong partner (namely South Africa). Figure 5.4 
also shows that South Africa’s trade growth as a share of GDP is smaller than trade growth for 
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some countries in the BLNS group during this period. Botswana in particular experienced 12 
percent growth for the period 2012–2013, while South Africa had three percent. Swaziland’s 
growth increased by two percent for the same period; Lesotho had no growth, because of political 
violence during this period, particularly in 2013.
707
 
 
As Venables’ theory postulates, conducting trade with a stronger economic partner that trades 
more with stronger external economies can benefit smaller economies within a regional grouping. 
To demonstrate the total trade growth of individual SACU members and whether there are 
benefits for poorer countries belonging to an FTA with a wealthy partner, Figure 5.5 analyses 
total trade over the same nine-year period, 2005–2013. Figure 5.6 shows convergence in trade 
growth. 
 
 
Figure 5.6. Trade growth of SACU member states, 2005–2012 
Source: UNCTAD statistics database, 
<http://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx?sCS_referer=&sCS_Chosen
Lang=en> 
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Figure 5.7. Trade growth convergence of Botswana and South Africa, 2005–2012.  
Source: UNCTAD statistics database,< 
http://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx?sCS_referer=&sCS_ChosenLang=en> 
 
Figure 5.7 shows the trade growth of Botswana and South Africa, and the trade growth 
convergence point for these two countries, for the period 2005–2012.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.8 Trade growth convergence of Lesotho and South Africa, 2005–2012 
Source:UNCTAD statistics database, 
<http://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx?sCS_referer=&sCS_ChosenLang=en> 
 
Figures 5.8 to 5.10 show the convergence points, respectively, for Lesotho (2008–2009), 
Namibia (2006 and 2008–2009), and Swaziland (2006, 2008, and 2010) with South Africa.  
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Figure 5.9. Trade growth convergence of Namibia and South Africa, 2005–12.  
Source: UNCTAD statistics 
database,<http://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx?sCS_referer=&sCS_ChosenLang=en> 
 
 
Figure 5.10.Trade growth convergence of Swaziland and South Africa, 2005–2012 
Source: UNCTAD statistics database, 
<http://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx?sCS_referer=&sCS_ChosenLang=en> 
 
These convergence points illustrate when the smaller economy’s trade begins to achieve parity 
with that of the rich partner in a regional trade grouping, and shows that over a long-run period, 
poorer countries’ trade growth increases. It also shows that poorer partners are growing faster 
than South Africa. Various external factors explain why trade growth in the SACU bloc differs 
among its members. Consider South Africa and Swaziland. For South Africa, between 2009 and 
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2011, both the global economic recession and the strikes at South Africa’s platinum mines 
severely damaged the country’s trade. The violence and strikes, commencing in 2011 at South 
Africa’s Marikana mine, and which continued into 2014 at the Impala, Amplats, and Lonmin 
mines, resulted in losses of 24.1 billion rand in revenue, 440 000 ounces of platinum, and 20 000 
jobs.
708
 South Africa’s shortages seen in its electricity supply severely hampered its economic 
progress (which is also further discussed in chapter 6 of the thesis in providing the linkages of 
economic and security complexities), with South Africa losing R400 billion to its economy 
between the period 2008 to 2015.
709
 
 
Swaziland on the other hand experienced reduced trade after the US ejected it from the AGOA 
regime in January 2015. US Trade Representative, Michael Froman, explained: “[O]ur concerns 
[are] clear to Swaziland ... and we engaged extensively on concrete steps that Swaziland could 
take to address the concerns. ... [W]e hope to continue our engagement with the Government of 
the Kingdom of Swaziland on steps it can take so that worker and civil society groups can freely 
associate and assemble and AGOA eligibility can be restored.”710 Swaziland was the 173rd-
largest goods trading partner with the US in 2013, with $82 million in total trade ($23 million in 
US exports to Swaziland and $59 million in imports, with a US trade deficit of $36 million).
711
 
 
5.5.1 Management of multiple memberships by member states: The Case of South Africa in 
SACU 
 
This section discusses the main findings of this chapter which are clear: As long as SACU 
experiences growth (as was demonstrated) with a stronger member it will hinder convergence of 
the Tripartite FTA and complicate the management of multiple memberships. The findings show 
that South Africa has carefully managed the relations in SACU to promote economic integration 
for member states in a regional scheme and considered was a four-pronged approach. The first 
element of the approach is to factor in a “paymaster”. South Africa, as a hegemonic state, 
manages the multiple memberships of the SACU bloc by incentivising poorer economies through 
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the trade revenue generated in the bloc. This has benefitted the smaller BLNS economies in 
SACU. Walter Mattli notes that a “paymaster” can provide benefits that promote economic 
convergence in a regional grouping.
712
 South Africa is guarding its BLNS trading partners 
because their markets matter. According to a 2013 International Monetary Fund report on SACU-
generated revenue as a percentage of GDP, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland are 
accruing enormous incomes from the customs union.  
 
 
Figure 5.11: Total GDP of BLNS member states, 2005–2013 
Source: UNCTAD statistics database, 
<http://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx?sCS_referer=&sCS_ChosenLang=en> 
 
In 2013, current account receipts constituted only 28 percent of GDP for South Africa, compared 
with over 37 percent in Botswana, more than 55 percent in Namibia, and over 100 per cent in 
Lesotho.
713
 James Gathii
714
 and Arvind Panagariya
715
 argue that the pace of regional integration 
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is defined by and linked to the benefits of regional integration, and this explains why African 
countries join different regional schemes. According to the SACU agreement, SACU’s present 
revenue-sharing formula requires that South Africa contribute 98 percent of generated revenue to 
the revenue pool, which is shared according to intra-SACU trade or imports. South Africa has 
agreed to this formula because it dominates intra-SACU trade, accounting for over 75 percent of 
Botswana and Namibia’s total trade, and over 90 percent of Swaziland and Lesotho’s trade.716 To 
balance its domination in trade, South Africa’s approach includes a second element. 
 
The second element of the approach is a market-led approach in recognising the importance of 
increasing intra-regional trade while balancing external trade. The region is important to South 
Africa, which this chapter outlines as crucial in the convergence debate as was indicated in the 
conceptual framework in chapter 2 in discussing Putnam’s two-level game theory.  
 
Putnam argued that at the national level, “domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the 
government to adopt favourable policies, and politicians seek power by constructing coalitions 
among these groups.”717 “At the international level, national governments seek to maximise their 
own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimising the adverse consequences of foreign 
developments.”718 South Africa was facing pressure with low unemployment and poor 
manufacturing (as was shown in chapter 3, figure 3.2). According to the World Bank 2014 report, 
and in assessing the iron and steel value chain, South Africa’s exports seem to have been moving 
in the opposite direction – towards basic production and lower quality.  Similarly, UNECA had 
also observed that the quality of South Africa’s manufactured products was inferior to that of its 
neighbouring states. In order for South Africa’s participating in higher value-added segments 
would require: “investment in research and skills, access to raw materials, reliable and cost-
effective electricity, access to imported technologies, and effective transport flexible enough to 
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reach global export markets. However, amid high transport costs for non-commodities, rising 
cost and declining reliability of electricity, and import parity pricing on key inputs, the economics 
of adding value would not add up for South Africa.”719  
 
Hence, South Africa changed its approach in manufacturing and moved towards the region by 
conducting more trade, and in-so-doing addressed its semi-skilled labour; as well as flooding the 
region with iron ore of a lower-value segment. Evidently, in 2000, level-1 products (iron ore and 
concentrates) accounted for just 18 percent of exports (by value), but by 2012: their share had 
more than tripled to 57 percent. By contrast, the share of level-2 products (ferro-alloys) and level-
3 products (semi-finished/finished steel) in exports declined dramatically, with level-3 products 
falling from a 44 percent share to just 13 percent.
720
 On the other hand, these manufacturing 
levels could also be positive for regional growth in considering Dowrick and Duc-Tho Nguyen’s 
TFP as a catch up variable for downstream industries whereby smaller industries have an 
opportunity to input into the value chain. Therefore the Tripartite bloc should consider trade 
agreements that take into account endogenous factors of growth, such as technology, research, 
and inputs into trade that links rules of origin, to spur real growth. Such initiatives can also 
expand on endogenous growth factors in industrialisation and value addition of inter-regional 
trade.
721
    
 
External trade has led to a larger revenue pool generated from total trade, which benefits the 
BLNS countries, as shown in Figure 5.11 for the period 2005–2013. South Africa conducted 
trade with Europe long before this period; in 1999 for example, South Africa and the European 
Union signed a trade development agreement as already noted previously.  
 
Furthermore, South Africa has conducted trade not only with the BRIC bloc since 2010, but with 
Asian and Chinese markets long before the 2005–2013 period. As Carolyn Jenkins and Lynne 
Thomas argue, South Africa must look beyond the region to enhance economic growth for poorer 
economies.
722
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Figure 5.12. South Africa’s total trade with BRICS states, 2010–2014  
Source: Trade database of the South African Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), 
<http://tradestats.thedti.gov.za/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx?sCS_referer=&sCS_ChosenLang=en> 
 
Greater trade and enlarged markets have increased the SACU revenue pool and strengthened the 
SACU region; for example, South Africa’s 2011 merger with the BRIC states – a grouping of the 
world’s fastest-growing economies – was potentially positive for Southern Africa as a whole, by 
providing greater trade prospects (for the period under review).  
 
South Africa has been reaping the benefits of intra-SACU trade ever since the 1910 SACU trade 
agreement (revised in 1969 and again in 2002). Even though South Africa has conducted trade 
with Chinese and Asian markets prior to the merger, the BRICS agreement has provided a more 
formalised relationship for its trade with African markets, resulting in increased trade among the 
BRICS bloc between 2010 and 2014, with 2013 showing the greatest trade, as seen in Figure 
5.12. 
 
The third element of the approach is developmental-led regional integration. South Africa, has 
taken the lead in infrastructure development. South Africa has approached infrastructure 
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development through SADC’s spatial development initiatives and through the Southern African 
Development Bank (as was discussed in chapter 4). The neo-classical growth model also stresses 
the importance of governments’ focus on physical investment to expand national outputs. 
Investment in equipment is just as important as investment in transport infrastructure, since 
equipment is critical for technological advancement.
723
  
 
Kenya’s rapid growth, for example, is linked to its growth in banking and telecommunications 
services (which have expanded to the middle class), urbanisation, and investment in 
infrastructure and railways. Uganda’s growth is supported by increased activity in the 
construction, financial services, transport, and telecommunications sectors.
724
  
  
The fourth element of the approach is to strengthen regional institutions. SACU is not recognised 
as a regional economic community by the Abuja Treaty of 1991, nor by the AU; rather, it is one 
of the regional mechanisms promoting convergence on the continent because of its negotiation 
skills; its access to BRICS, the EU, and the US; and its strong security mechanism, which is well 
endowed through South Africa’s support. Currently SACU is in negotiations with all the larger 
markets with which SACU does not share an FTA. Notably, these include Egypt in COMESA 
and Kenya in the EAC. 
 
The findings of this chapter for the period under research (2005-2014) and in relation to South 
Africa’s relations with the BRIC countries also considers and take into account the recent events 
that evolved in September 2015 in relation to China’s economic slowdown, where leading 
economists like, Jason Muscat, and Mthuli Ncube, outline China’s recent economic downturn as 
worrisome for Africa. During the period August and September 2015, economists were alarmed 
when China’s Shanghai Composite index, a proxy for the Chinese equity market fell by 30 
percent after a 150 percent increase over the previous year (2014). According to Goldman Sachs, 
“$225 billion of capital flowed out of China between April and June 2015”.725  Various articles in 
Finweek, noted that what this means for South Africa as a major trading partner to China, is that 
the decades–long commodity super cycle is effectively over. With that comes slower economic 
growth, or worse – outright recession. For the rest of the world, slower Chinese growth translates 
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into weaker demand for commodities: Brent crude oil was down by half to $54 a barrel since 
2012, while tin, copper and iron ore dropped 40 to 60 percent. Countries that are rich in 
commodity resources will also be heading into a recession and these are: Canada, Australia, 
Brazil, Venezuela, Peru, Russia, Nigeria, Angola, Chile and Indonesia. According to Muscat, 
senior industry analyst at First National Bank, South Africa, two sectors of the South African 
economy that will be worst affected by China’s slow growth are: mining and manufacturing. 
Muscat notes,    
 
“This is obviously very bad news for South Africa as it means a material decrease in export 
revenue and prevents a faster narrowing of the current account deficit. Fortunately for our 
economy, the lower oil price is rescuing the import bill and offsetting what would otherwise have 
been a far worse deterioration in terms of trade. Even so, our expectations are for the current 
account deficit to narrow very slowly, which should keep the rand under pressure, raising inflation 
and interest rate concerns.”726 
 
To mitigate the negative downturn, Ncube suggests that African governments will also need to 
focus more on implementing “cross-border infrastructure programmes and raising intra-regional 
trade to mitigate the effects [with China’s] of the slowdown”.727 Economists also indicated that 
Africa will have to increase intra-regional trade and strengthen its economic policies.  
 
While, South Africa was an important actor leading up to the convergence of COMESA and 
SADC in 2008 in signing the Tripartite agreement, South Africa will need to conduct more intra-
regional trade and will need to consider increasing its infrastructure project development 
contributions for spearheading regional trade, as was outlined and discussed in this chapter.
728
 
  
The growth convergence of BLNS members in the SACU bloc could also be accelerated by 
mineral-rich countries, which are expected to build on their momentum and accelerate from an 
average of 3.4 percent GDP growth in 2014 to 4.1 percent in 2015. These include countries in the 
Southern African region, such as Angola (coal), Botswana (coal, copper, and diamonds), Namibia 
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(diamonds and uranium), and Zambia (copper). Southern Africa’s GDP growth is expected to 
accelerate from 2.9 percent in 2014 to 3.6 percent in 2015, with Angola, Mozambique, and 
Zambia expected to be the fastest-growing economies in 2015.
729
 These growth poles are “mainly 
driven by an increased investment in the non-diamond sector in Botswana, private consumption 
recovery in South Africa, and an increase in mining and natural gas investment and exploration in 
Mozambique”.730 In the EAC, GDP growth is expected to continue to increase from 6.5 percent 
in 2014 to 6.8 percent in 2015, which will make East Africa the fastest-growing African sub-
region. Kenya and Uganda have been the key drivers in 2014 and 2015, as indicated by the UN’s 
2015 economic outlook report.
731
 SACU is hoping that Angola will join the 2016 Southern 
African EPA agreement, and that the DRC will join the SADC free trade area in order to enlarge 
the SACU trade market.
732
 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
 
In concluding this chapter, the findings claims that multiple memberships have not been 
adequately managed by the Tripartite bloc. Multiple memberships however, did benefit the 
political and economic circumstances of some member states as pointed out in Table 5.1 in 
infrastructure projects. In examining regional trade agreements in Africa, the neo-classical 
economic approach is relevant to understanding regional integration, divergence, and 
convergence, and provides a context for understanding the issues after the 2008 Tripartite 
Agreement among COMESA, the EAC, and SADC, and the benefits of multiple memberships for 
poorer economies in a regional integration process. However, this chapter highlighted that the 
pace of globalisation dictates one of open markets and trade which creates a contradiction for the 
Tripartite Agreement’s regional integration approaches of variable geometry and liberal tariff 
settings. These contradictions were not adequately supported within the neoclassical economic 
approach theory of open trade and regional integration divergence and convergence debates as 
was discussed in the literature reviewed in chapter 2. The chapter deployed a new theory in 
support of this discussion, defined as: neoclassical economic regional integration which 
supported the findings provided in this chapter.  In this regard, the chapter also discussed the 
dilemma for the Tripartite bloc in its decision to implement a variable geometry approach – 
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allowing for member states of a regional grouping to cooperate in separation from other 
members, as well as for flexible progression in cooperation in a variety of areas and at different 
speeds – was an attempt to help manage the multiple memberships of member states.733 But this 
approach has hampered regional integration. The Tripartite bloc has also adopted a trade 
liberalisation framework that is reflective of open markets and is causing polarisation of smaller 
markets and industries.
734
  
 
The Tripartite bloc has also allowed its member states to conduct external trade, notably with 
AGOA and the EU. While such agreements are important for generating wealth, they must be 
negotiated at the Tripartite level to ensure that rules of origin do not hamper regional trade. The 
findings in this chapter claim that rules of origin specified in trade commodities in external trade 
have caused divergence for regional trade and further hampers the spillover effects for 
endogenous factors of growth that concerns technology, research, and skills. The findings 
identify this as a gap in the theory of Krugman’s accounting index, which does not take into 
account the impact of rules of origin in his discussion that concerns inputs of production. As 
Krugman suggests, growth accounting needs to calculate explicit measures of both “increases in 
the output per unit of input …. Increases in knowledge can be positive for growth convergence. 
However, growth measurements must be considered in the process of economic growth. The 
view is that per capita income can only occur if there is a rise in output “per unit of input”.735 
Restrictive rules of origin might also be in the interests of particular producers that wish to avoid 
new competition in their domestic markets. These rules will then make it impossible for smaller 
industries to compete in other regional markets, and deprive downstream users to input into 
products to benefit value addition industrialisation.
736
 
 
This chapter notes that trade agreements must take into account endogenous factors of growth, 
such as technology, research, and inputs into trade that links rules of origin, to spur real growth. 
The chapter also expanded on endogenous growth factors in industrialisation and value addition 
of inter-regional trade, as defined by Dowrick and Duc-Tho Nguyen’s TFP as a catch up variable 
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for downstream industries.
737
 Therefore, in looking ahead, as the COMESA-EAC-SADC 
Tripartite FTA negotiates its rules of origin (Annexure 4), synchronisation of trade agreements of 
member states’ national policies is of vital importance and must be carefully aligned with that of 
the COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite FTA as well as at individual REC levels. Bhagwati.
738
 and 
Gathii
739
 have noted that African regional trade agreements provide a framework for cooperation, 
but because of the non-existence of legal binding agreements, Africa’s states have the liberty to 
form multiple memberships, which states see as offering them the flexibility to retain their 
sovereignty and also accrue benefits.
740
 Multiple memberships have hindered progress in the 
Tripartite FTA with only 16 members that have signed out of 26 members as already noted. Since 
SACU members are deriving benefits from the SACU configuration, it has not signed the 
Tripartite FTA and have hindered progress in this regard. Therefore Core trade must be 
conducted intra-continentally and carefully balanced against external trade.  
 
Gathii contends that instead of using intra-regional trade to expand trade in the region and as a 
framework for growth, it should be swung around and the framework of industrial growth should 
inform intra-regional trade and market diversification.
741
 Trade with competitive advantage 
should be built in the Tripartite bloc and potential for value-add possibilities to build Africa’s 
industrialisation should be actively pursued. While economic integration has been central to the 
Tripartite bloc to improve economic growth, the management of multiple memberships is critical 
for convergence. Moreover, the thesis is of the view that without regional security economic 
prospects will too remain bleak. These issues are next discussed in the proceeding chapter 6 that 
deals with COMESA and SADC’s management of regional security.  
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Chapter 6 
Security Cooperation 
 
 “War has increasingly become the continuation of economics by other means”,742   
Carl von Clausewitz. 
 
6.1 Introduction  
 
Previous chapters of this thesis concentrated on the divergence and convergence debates that 
focused on economic integration of COMESA and SADC. This chapter expands on the 
convergence of COMESA and SADC and discusses the political economy of regional security 
within these two regions: COMESA and SADC, and assesses how these two RECs have 
managed regional peace and security since 2008 when the Tripartite Agreement was formed 
between COMESA, EAC, and SADC. The EAC is also included in this discussion. A regional 
security complex framework theory assists in providing a detailed analysis regarding security 
issues, and also helps understanding security complexities. Buzan and Wæver’s743 writing on 
regional security (as was discussed in the conceptual framework in chapter 2) outlines “the 
possibility of systematically linking the study of internal conditions, relations among units in the 
region, relations between regions, and the interplay of regional dynamics with global acting 
powers”.744 However, security dynamics at the inter-regional level can override the regional 
dynamic through support gained from a single great power, which in turn can create more 
complexity such as super-complexes (with one or more great power at their core), and further 
redefine and re-shape the inter-regional level into a super- region.
745
 In support of Buzan and 
Wæver’s746 RSC theory, this chapter also deploys a new theory: neorealist security convergence 
which will help explain the convergence of COMESA and SADC in managing regional security. 
The neorealist security convergence theory will also help in assessing the role of South Africa in 
the regional security nexus. While South Africa has provided military support as is discussed in 
this chapter, it has also acted as a malign hegemon that has as its principal gain self-interest; 
hence realists’ analyses of self-interest are associated with dominance and mercantilist strategy 
and is able to support the analysis provided in this chapter. 
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Regional security is complex and has various dimensions not solely defined as “military and 
security dimensions,” but involving economic, military, political, social and international 
dimensions. Eastern and Southern African states in their drive for power, within a regional 
security complex framework, appear to have played one region off against another, and one state 
against another, and these practices have filtered into the security of the region.
747
 
 
Buzan and Wæver also suggest that where there are instances in which great powers can override 
the regional imperative, there will also be small powers present in such a security dynamic that 
tend to reinforce it. Thus penetration into regions occurs when external actors intervene in 
conflict and establish security mechanisms with states. In building on Buzan and Wæver’s 
regional security complex theory, the chapter assesses the main conflict drivers and the conflict-
prone and problem countries in the two RECs, within the convergence years of COMESA and 
SADC since 2008. The chapter further expands the discussion on how COMESA and SADC 
manage security in their respective regions by providing specific case studies confined to the 
period 2008–2015. Since, overall the thesis aims to assess the growing convergence between 
COMESA and SADC in the economic arena (discussed in previous chapters of the thesis), the 
discussion on security is important to assess the growing convergence between COMESA and 
SADC in their security roles, which is supported by the theory identified as a gap on neorealist 
security convergence. This complements the discussions in previous chapters of the Tripartite 
bloc’s economic role. 
 
6.2 Regional Security Complex Framework: Evolving domestic actors and factors  
 
This section builds on the discussion (in Chapter 3) which highlights that even though violent 
conflict and the wars of the apartheid regime ended in 1994, COMESA and SADC regional blocs 
have become a regional community with complex security issues that have forced these two 
RECs to work together with the EAC. This section also expands on the complexity of regional 
security which also concerns economic reasons and the further difficulty that COMESA and 
SADC were confronted with, in its attempts of managing complex regional security scenarios.  
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Buzan and Wæver note that 
 
“a regional security complex [RSC] cannot be applied to any group of countries ... [but] in 
order to qualify as a RSC, a group of states or other entities must possess a degree of 
security interdependence sufficient both to establish them as a linked set and to 
differentiate them from surrounding security regions.”748  
 
What distinguish states within a RSC framework, is their security interconnectedness, and their 
indifference. These factors are also distinguished from global powers that produce a set of 
complications, anomalies, and difficulties that have elements of both external involvement and 
border concerns between regions.  
 
Many states with legitimate regimes have also faced territorial insecurity within the first few 
decades of independence such as border conflicts. These are evident in the cases of Burundi, 
Uganda, Rwanda and the DRC. The liberal view of the state leans more on individual 
responsibility and on the freedom of state political and economic structures.
749
 Illiberal regimes 
feature at times as established democratic states but, in essence, are autocratic regimes that are 
partially free and straddle between democracy and authoritarianism (also defined as quasi-
democratic, semi-authoritarian, or hybrid regimes), where democratic rights are either not upheld, 
or not institutionalised.
750
 Such regimes see regional organisations as a mechanism to serve their 
own self-interests, because of historical and past legacies. Regional security has become a 
polarised system between the international and regional levels.  
 
Furthermore, within a regional security complex is a clear security complex framework found in 
an alliance formed at the subregional level. Pertinent examples are the roles of South Africa in 
SADC, and Malawi and Tanzania in COMESA and SADC, in forming a security complex of 
peacekeeping troops and trying to remedy the conflict in the DRC and the Great Lakes region.
751
 
COMESA was not designed as a security organisation and do not have a brigade as SADC does. 
Member states with strong military presence assisted in managing the regional conflicts. 
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Resource-based conflicts have many dimensions and actors. Actors could include national 
armies, rebels, insurgents, private militias, warlords, mercenaries, private security companies, and 
multinational corporations. These actors often accumulate wealth by gaining direct and indirect 
access to resource-rich areas such as the DRC’s diamonds, cobalt, oil, zinc, copper, and gold; and 
South Sudan’s oil. 
 
Out of desperation in April 2013, the African Union set up an African Capacity for Immediate 
Response to Crises (ACIRC).
752
 This brand-new military intervention tool sought to create a 
Rapid Deployment Capability. Though seen as a temporary measure, the robust military force 
would have integrated combat units of 1500 troops with many specialist capabilities. The main 
idea behind ACIRC was to prevent atrocities and war crimes by armed rebel forces, crimes 
against humanity, and genocide, with the main imperatives to save lives, protect democratic 
governance, and establish and maintain the rule of law. The delay in operationalising a 
continental brigade had resulted in African states improvising interventions. 
 
The major issue of non-support for the AU by the UN has also been argued by former Kenyan 
foreign minister, Moses Wetangula: 
 
The practice in the past two years seems to indicate an undesirable trend that appears to be 
selective on the part of the Security Council and that seems to disregard full consideration of the 
position and/or recommendations of the AU or its organs.
753
  
 
Buzan and Wæver also suggest that violent conflict explains the complex nature of intervention 
that requires a multidimensional approach of governmental, intergovernmental and development 
agencies, alongside non-governmental organisations, and state and non-state agencies, which are 
both internally and externally connected. In assessing regional security, various dimensions need 
to be considered. These include the poverty dilemma (the deprivation of basic needs), and the 
mismanagement of resources that spill over into various levels of society and cause violent 
conflict.  Protests by DRC civilians have persisted since conflict erupted in the Congo in 2011. 
The parties to the conflict have been the Allied Democratic Forces, the Armed Forces of the 
DRC; the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (Forces démocratiques de libération 
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du Rwanda) (FDLR), and the DRC government. In February 2013, 11 African states signed a 
peace, security and cooperation framework agreement for the DRC, to restore peace in the 
Eastern Congo. 
  
South Africa, Tanzania, and Malawi, as well as the AU, scrambled together resources in support 
of the DRC. Their initiative spurred the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) 
into action. Only later did the UN Security Council authorise its first ever offensive UN force in 
April 2013 with the key responsibility of neutralising armed groups, namely, the Force 
Intervention Brigade, which was created when UN Resolution 2098 was passed. It provided an 
intervention brigade of 19,815-strong.  
“Resolution 2098 condemned M23, the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, the 
Lord’s Resistance Army, and all other armed groups for their continued acts of violence and 
atrocities committed that impacted on the human rights of citizens. It tasked the new brigade with 
carrying out offensive operations, either unilaterally or jointly with the Congolese armed forces, in 
a robust, highly mobile and versatile manner to disrupt the activities of those groups.”754 
 
Conflicts involving armed militia groups use civilians as a tool of war and the most vulnerable 
groups of society are often targeted. Examples are the rape of women and recruitment of 
children
755
 as soldiers.
756
 COMESA, EAC, and SADC member states are mainly developing 
states, plagued by weak governance structures such as parliamentary and electoral systems; 
inadequate security and justice systems; public administrations that are either absent or 
dysfunctional; and debilitating poverty evident in post-election conflicts in countries such as 
Madagascar, Zimbabwe, and more recently, Burundi, and Lesotho. These are key ingredients that 
lead to conflicts that can spiral into violence that inevitably lead to lawlessness and the collapse 
of states. Africa overall is still confronted with corrupt governments inadequately delivering (and 
sometimes failing to deliver) the most basic social services for their citizens.  
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COMESA, EAC, and SADC member states - Burundi, the DRC, Rwanda, and Uganda - have 
also been equally involved in a complex security web. Regional disputes have been largely driven 
by mutual threats to security and domestic politics. Since 1997, the conflict in the DRC has 
largely been linked to diamond and cobalt plundering and 18 years later in 2015, the DRC is still 
trying to address the same issue with Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda. The conflict style of most 
African leaders, when resources and state apparatus are threatened, is to use force through 
military action, and by fuelling rebel groups and inciting violence.  
 
In the case of Uganda, the Uganda’s Allied Democratic Forces – National Army for the 
Liberation of Uganda (ADF-NALU) have had a continued presence in the DRC, dating back to 
the 1980s. Sudan’s refugees were hosted in Uganda and formed the Sudan People’s Liberation 
Army (SPLA) and fought the Khartoum government from Uganda’s soil. Uganda also assisted 
Rwanda, with many refugees harboured there since the early 1960s. In 1982, when Rwandans 
were expelled from Zaire, close to 3000 Rwandese joined Museveni’s bush war.757 By 1986, the 
number of Rwandans in the National Resistance Army (NRA) had increased to about 8000 
troops. Moreover, from 1998 to 2003, Uganda became involved in the violent conflict in the 
DRC and backed militia groups in Kisangani in the Eastern DRC.
758
 The UN accused Ugandan 
commanders of unlawfully extracting the DRC’s mineral resources, and in 2005 the International 
Court of Justice ordered Uganda to pay reparations.
759
 In the north-east of the DRC, Uganda has 
also played a dual role of both “arsonist and fireman with disastrous consequences for the local 
population”.760 Uganda’s continued political feuds among Congolese party leaders sparked 
violence among the local ethnic groups, and these heightened their plundering of resources and 
furthering their own interests at the expense of the DRC government while occupying its 
territory. In December 2009, the Lord’s Resistance Army/Movement (LRA) rebels killed over 
300 people and abducted 250 more over four days in Makombo, in the north-east of the DRC. 
Several reports have blamed Uganda’s presence in the DRC and linked it to the plundering of the 
Congo’s resources. Museveni’s own domestic track record has also been viewed as poor. 
Domestic politics in Uganda have become commercialised with the president carrying bags of 
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money and distributing money to Ugandan citizens in an attempt to gain favour.
761
 The political 
instability and with the upcoming elections, led to 144,000 refugees that had fled Burundi to 
Tanzania, Rwanda, the DRC, Uganda and Zambia by June 2015.
762
 
 
Burundi has a GDP of $3.037 billion and a population of 9.201 million people as of 2014. The 
country is chiefly dependent on agriculture and grows coffee and tea. Coffee plantations employ 
90 percent of the population, with 800,000 farmers dependent on employment in this sector, 
directly followed by tea production. In the mining sector it has the world’s second largest coltan 
reserves (coltan is a dull metallic ore, used extensively in almost all cell phones, laptops, pagers 
and many other electronic devices) and six percent of the world’s nickel reserves.763 But, Burundi 
is one of the poorest countries in Africa. In April 2015, Burundi faced a constitutional crisis that 
centred on the question of Burundian President, Pierre Nkurunziza’s bid for a third term. 
Regardless of its constitutional laws, Nkurunziza was controversially re-elected as president on 
20 August 2015.
764
  
 
With regard to Rwanda, since its genocide in 1994 that killed 800,000 people, the country has 
seen real improvements in economic growth. In 2014, Rwanda’s total GDP was $7, 521, 261 
790.6 versus a total GDP of $753, 636, 370.6 in 1994. Rwanda boasted one of the high economic 
growth on the continent in 2014, at 7.5 percent,
765
 which was one of the highest, and has 
developed its military capacity largely due to the donor support that it received – totalling $4.2 
billion – between 2005 and 2012.766 Although Rwanda had troops in the DRC until 2002, 
Rwanda’s FDLR rebel group is stationed in the east Kivus region of the DRC and has invaded 
the DRC four times.  
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Figure 6.1: Smuggling by transnational organised crime syndicates from Eastern DRC to 
criminal groups, companies or individuals in Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi  
767
 
 
The tide started turning against Kagame in 2012, when evidence emerged that Rwanda was 
supporting the March 23 (M23) rebel group movement. After this revelation, several donors 
suspended aid to Rwanda, and Kigali started becoming more circumspect in its actions.
768
 In 
2017, Rwanda will be preparing for its presidential elections.  
 
Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda have been embroiled in regional conflict, given the resources in 
the DRC that have much greater importance, as shown in Figure 6.1. A 2012 UN report made 
allegations against Uganda for deploying 600 troops to help rebels prepare offensives against the 
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DRC government. Uganda has vehemently denied the accusations, and portrayed its role as a 
regional mediator that was attempting to facilitate dialogue between Kinshasa and the rebels. In 
its attempts to portray the UN reports as inaccurate, during this time, Uganda became actively 
involved in supporting the DRC in disarming the M23 rebel group alongside South Africa and 
Malawi. President Museveni chaired the ICGLR from December 2011 to December 2013. 
However, three tonnes of minerals mined in the DRC have been smuggled across borders to 
Burundi (and Rwanda and Uganda), including gold, diamonds, cobalt and copper. Other 
smuggled resources include fish, ivory, timber and charcoal.
769
 Uganda exported seven tonnes (7 
000 kg) of gold in 2006, which was 318 times the official production figure of only 22 kg that 
year. During this same period Uganda also assisted in deploying its military troops to assist the 
South Sudanese president, Salva Kiir Mayardit, against the opposition leader, Riek Machar, a 
rebel leader of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement In Opposition (SPLM-IO), and a former 
vice-president that was sacked by President Kiir.
770
  
 
According to the April 2015 United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) report,
771
 
transnational organised crime syndicates have benefited greatly from the conflicts in the Great 
Lakes region, and in the DRC in particular. The 2015 report noted that  
 
“illicit natural resource exploitation in Eastern DRC amounted to between $722 to $862  million 
per annum, and these amounts excluded illicit diamond exploitation. Of this amount, 10 to 30 
percent (approximately $72 million to $426 million per annum) goes to organised transnational 
criminal groups.”772  
 
The report further reveals that  
 
“illicit resources were derived from deals in gold ($40 million to $120 million); timber  
($16million to $48 million); charcoal ($12 million to $35 million); 3T minerals (cassiterite  [tin], 
wolframite [tungsten], coltan [tantalum]), cobalt, and copper ($7.5 million to $22.6 million); 
diamonds sourced mainly from outside of the DRC ($16 million to $48 million); and wildlife, 
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including ivory and fisheries; local taxation schemes; cannabis; and other resources ($14.3 million 
to $28 million).”773  
 
“Ninety-eight percent of the net profits were from illegal natural resource exploitation, 
particularly of gold, charcoal, and timber, which went to transnational organised criminal 
networks operating in and outside of the DRC. Armed groups retained around two percent 
(approximately $13.2 million per year) of the net profits from illegal smuggling, which also 
represents the basic subsistence cost for at least 8 000 armed rebel fighters per year.”774  
 
Furthermore, the revenue generated from illegal natural resource exploitation finances about 25 
armed groups that continue to destabilise the Eastern DRC. Minerals are carried across borders to 
Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi and other parts of the DRC. Tantalum is largely produced and sold 
in north Katanga, Rubaya in the Masisi territory of north Kivus, and Shabunda in south Kivus. 
Tantalum smuggling occurs from Rubaya via Goma into Rwanda. Militia in Shabunda control the 
mining and distribution of cassiterite. Official estimates of DRC’s gold produced and traded were 
150.58 kg in 2014, and 180.76 kg in 2013, which is less than two percent of the total gold 
produced. The remainder of the gold is smuggled and was estimated at ten tonnes (10 000 kg) in 
2013 at a value of about $391 million to $418 million. In 2014, the DRC produced up to 40 
tonnes (40 000 kg) of gold for the year and illicit gold exports were estimated between $118 
million and over $1.8 billion. Burundi officially exported two tonnes of gold in 2008, of which 
one ton originated in the DRC, and Rwanda exported nearly twice its production, although only 
38 kg was mined in 2008.
775
  
 
The DRC government condemned Rwanda and viewed it as using the FDLR component as a 
pretext to destabilise the DRC.
776
 With regard to regional security in the DRC, the Allied 
Democratic Forces, had continued to operate in the area of Beni, North Kivu, and 17 people were 
reportedly hacked to death with machetes on 4 February 2015.
777
  On 12 December 2013, the 
M23 rebels surrendered and signed a declaration in Namibia with talks orchestrated by the 
Ugandan government and as president of the ICGLR was also the facilitator in these talks. 
                                                 
773
  UNEP and MONSUCO, 2015. 
774
  UNEP and MONSUCO, 2015.  
775
  UNEP and MONSUCO, 2015. 
776
 See UN document, < http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11268.doc.htm> 
777
 Security Council Report, “Democratic Republic of the Congo”, 
<http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11268.doc.htm>. 
237 
 
However, the fighting in the DRC has continued. The United Nations Organisation Stabilisation 
Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies 
pour la Stabilisation en République Démocratique du Congo) (MONUSCO) report in 2015, by 
the Envoy to the Great Lakes Region, Said Djinnit, outlines the conclusion of the mandate of 
MONUSCO, which also includes MONUSCO’s intervention brigade that expired on 31 March 
2015.
778
 The continued violence in the DRC was mainly caused by the proposed government 
census, which some Congolese saw as a ploy for granting an extended term of office for 
President Joseph Kabila in the presidential elections scheduled for 27 November 2016.
779
   
 
6.3. Neorealist security convergence 
 
Convergence of COMESA and SADC in managing regional security has been possible with the 
presence of a hegemonic power like South Africa. As neorealist security convergence theory will 
show in this section that convergence of regional security occur with a strong hegemonic power 
due to state self-interest on the part of the hegemon. In discussing the complex security scenarios 
the section also provides examples of security convergence between the two blocs, and includes 
member states of the EAC. South Africa as a regional hegemonic power has been an important 
player in the convergence of security due to its own self-interests as discussed below. This 
section shows the growing regional security convergence between COMESA and SADC, as it 
should be elucidated why these two regional bodies are involved in regional peacekeeping while 
there is an international body, the United Nations. On the other hand there is an absence of a 
continental body to oversee peacekeeping, the ASF of the AU has not been created.
780
  Although 
the idea of a regional peacekeeping force was already born during the 1990s, to create an African 
Crisis Response Force (ACRF) with about 5000 African troops, this was reformulated into an 
idea for an African Crisis Response Initiative, which the UN did not sanction.
781
 A major 
challenge for regional brigades is to address the peacekeeping gap of the UN launching 
interventions timeously in Africa’s conflicts.  
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In further guarding over national interests South Africa’s Zuma administration is also investing 
hugely in regional peacekeeping operations and has been assisting the countries in recent 
conflicts in the Great Lakes region. As discussed in the conceptual framework in chapter 2 that 
RSC theory does not explain the convergence of COMESA and SADC in managing regional 
security, which neorealist security convergence theory identified as a gap and is expanded on in 
this section in support of the RSC theory. Neorealists define the hegemonic state as a powerful, 
strong economy that sets the rules of the game and has a greater advantage over its partner states 
and exert power.
782
 South Africa has taken on a leading role in security issues in the COMESA 
and SADC blocs. From 2008 to 2010, South Africa with the strongest economy and military 
component assisted with funding of military equipment, and troops were provided. Its African 
Renaissance and International Cooperation Fund (ARF) of 2001,
783
 prescribes in its legislature 
that its mandate is to, “identify and fund projects and programmes aimed at the promotion of 
democracy, conflict prevention and resolution, socio-economic development, humanitarian 
assistance and human resource development in Africa”. These moves are outlined in its 2014 
Defence Review policy that shows R44 billion, equivalent to 1.6 percent of South Africa’s 2015 
GDP made available for military deployment.
784
 The South African government has over the past 
decade and a half (2000-2015), deployed its National Defence Force (SANDF) of about 5000 
personnel to UN-led regional peacekeeping missions. With South Africa remaining constrained 
by its domestic challenges such as accessing reliable electricity, which affects its economic 
growth and has various other spin-offs such as job losses, it has increasingly turned towards the 
region. The South African government lost billions of dollars due to electricity shortfalls which 
drained its economy. According to the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),  
 
“South Africa’s “economic growth has decelerated in recent years, slowing to just 1.5 
percent in 2014. ....The roling black outs were the worst the country faced since 2008 …. 
Economists judge that growth cannot exceed 3 % until electrical supply problems are 
resolved.”785  
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Tshwane’s electricity is generated by its parastatal, Eskom and operates coal plants. Hydro-
electricity will be a key alternative source in assisting Tshwane’s strained parastatal. In assisting 
the government in its dilemma, South Africa begun securing regional investments in Lesotho and 
in the DRC, both militarily and economically. In Lesotho, South Africa invested R11.2 billion to 
build a hydro-power electricity generated plant. In the DRC, Tshwane had tried since 2010 to 
secure links with the DRC government in trying to gain access to its water resources in the Grand 
Inga dam.
786
 South Africa adopted a more firm approach towards the DRC government, having 
invested hugely militarily and had more clout in doing so. In mid-2015 South Africa secured a 
2,500 Mega Watt hydro-electricity contract with the DRC government for electricity generation 
from the Grand Inga three project in the DRC.
787
  
 
While South Africa had been providing regional security it had also been expanding its arms 
exports. For example, South Africa’s arms exports totalled R2.98 billion in exports in 2014, R3.2 
billion in 2013, and R10.6 billion in 2012 as outlined in the South African National Conventional 
Arms Control Committee (NCACC) report.
788
 From 2008–2015, South Africa assisted the DRC 
in its perennial conflicts.
789
 As shown in Table 6.1, South Africa assisted Comoros in 2008 with 
elections and also deployed 800 forces to restore the rule of law there. In Rwanda, South Africa 
assisted the Rwandan government with setting up a security sector reform programme. South 
Africa was involved in Madagascar between 2009 and 2013, and South African president, Jacob 
Zuma tried to mediate but failed.  
 
South Africa’s outward-looking regional strategy is an approach that has been adopted to address 
inward-looking problems. South Africa intervened militarily in Lesotho in 1998, as an important 
reservoir of water to South Africa’s Gauteng province with a population of 13 million people. 
While Lesotho was experiencing political conflict in 2015, following post-election disputes, 
South Africa agreed to mediate there. This request emanated from the 3 July 2015, SADC 
Double Troika Extraordinary Summit that met in Tshwane, and included presidents from: 
Zimbabwe (SADC Chair), Botswana (incoming chair), Malawi (outgoing chair), South Africa 
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(current OPDSC Chair), Lesotho (incoming OPDSC chair) and Namibia (outgoing OPDSC 
chair). 
 
Table 6.1: State interventions in conflict areas from 2008–2013 790 
Conflict States Date of 
Intervention/ 
deployment 
State Intervention 
Burundi 2009 
2010 
2013 
Mozambican and South African troops deployed alongside AU and later UN 
hybrid missions.  
Sudan 2008–2010 
2010 
South Africa assisted Sudan in a hybrid multinational mission (AU/UN), and 
also provided a component of security sector reform in Sudan with assistance 
from Sweden. 
Peace-support operations and military deployment. 
DRC  
And the Great Lakes 
Region 
 
2008–2010 
2010–2015 
(present) 
MONUC (involvement of South Africa’s troops).   
FARDC SSR (involvement of South Africa and requested by the AU’s Post- 
Conflict Reconstruction and Development Programme (PCRD)
791
. South 
Africa’s ARF provided financial assistance of R101 million.   
*SSR – South Africa’s involvement with Sweden. 
*Peace support operations and military deployment. 
Zimbabwe 2008–2009 
2010–2013 
South Africa’s ARF project provided financial assistance of R613 million for 
PCRD projects in Zimbabwe.
792
    
Comoros (Grande 
Comore and Moheli 
Islands)  
Anjouan Island 
2008 Elections – involvement of South Africa.   
Comorian and AU forces (800) deployed to restore constitutional rule on  
Ajoujan.
793
 
Rwanda 2008–2010 SSR – South Africa’s involvement with Sweden. 
Uganda 2010 Peace support operations – military deployment.  
Madagascar 2009–2013 Track Two Diplomacy – mediation. 
Libya 2011 Peace Diplomacy – South Africa’s support of the United Nations (UN) 
Resolution 1973 (calling for a no-fly zone, an arms embargo and an asset 
freeze of Gaddafi regime).    
 
The meeting focused on how to remedy the ongoing violence in Lesotho. The main cause of the 
violence was linked to Lesotho’s elections and also to the brutal killing of Brigadier 
Maaparankoe Mahao, on 25 June 2015 – a key political figure and a former Lesotho Defence 
Force Commander. The South African deputy president, Cyril Ramaphosa was asked by its 
government to be the SADC facilitator and to mediate between the various political stakeholders 
in Lesotho.
794
 South Africa also assisted Sudan’s government and the SPLM in forming its 
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Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) of 2005, aimed at crafting a government for South Sudan as 
well as a central government for Khartoum.
795
  
 
COMESA’s focus is mainly trade related as noted in previous chapters of the thesis. COMESA 
had tried adopting an approach of inclusivity by involving all of its member states in its security 
framework, and through partially managing converging national policies to align with its regional 
peace and security frameworks. However, conflicts persisted within its region and were difficult 
to resolve (also as discussed below in the case of Zimbabwe).  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2 COMESA profile  
Source: http://biblioteca.clacso.edu.ar/ar/libros/iss/pdfs/comesa/1COMESAProfile.pdf 
 
Unlike other sub-regional organisations (see Figure 6.2 outlining COMESA’s profile), COMESA 
was intended to be a purely trade and investment oriented organisation. However, a Committee 
on Peace and Security has been formed that meets once a year. Article 3 of COMESA’s Treaty is 
aligned with the Abuja 1991 Declaration of Political Principles. COMESA had tried adopting an 
approach of inclusivity by involving all of its member states in its security framework, and 
through partially managing converging national policies to align with its regional peace and 
security frameworks. However, conflicts have persisted within the region and have been difficult 
to resolve (also as discussed below in the case of Zimbabwe).  
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COMESA member states are committed to a number of principles and among them are the 
recognition of human and peoples’ rights in accordance with the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights which was established in 1987 also known as the Banjul Charter and adopted in 
1988 (came into force on 25 January 2005);
796
 the maintenance of regional peace and stability; 
and peaceful settlement of disputes. In September 1998, COMESA signed two agreements with 
USAID and received $6 million towards democracy/conflict management and regional economic 
integration for the benefit of its member states.
797
   
 
COMESA established good relations with IGAD, the Indian Ocean Commission, and the EAC. It 
had signed a cooperation agreement with IGAD and ECOWAS. In November 1999, COMESA’s 
Intergovernmental Committee addressed member states to explore efforts for a security 
framework specifically for post-conflict reconstruction. One year later, in March 2000 at a 
meeting of member states, the COMESA bloc made the decision to put together a legal 
framework on peace and security, based on the widespread violence and conflicts experienced 
among its member states, DRC, Rwanda, Uganda, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Sudan.   
 
COMESA, and SADC are trying to create greater cohesion among member states. Just prior to 
the 2008 Zimbabwe elections, president Robert Mugabe’s government was awaiting a shipment 
of arms from the Chinese vessel, An Yue Jiang. The ship was turned away from South Africa and 
was not able to dock.
798
 Likewise Angola, Mozambique and Namibia refused the vessel entry to 
their ports. Zambia’s President, Levy Mwanawasa, urged nations in the region to bar the Chinese 
ship carrying arms destined for Zimbabwe from entering their waters and noted that this shipment 
would aggravate the conflict and violence in Zimbabwe.
799
 Nevertheless, three million rounds of 
assault rifle ammunition, 3000 mortar rounds and 1500 rocket-propelled grenades were offloaded 
in the Congolese port of Ponta Negra, and airlifted by freight charter to Zimbabwe.
800
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Member states have also used the regional economic community to their advantage. For example, 
on 31 July 2013, COMESA was asked to intervene in Zimbabwe’s election at the request of 
Zimbabwe to monitor the country’s elections. As Zimbabwe is both a COMESA and SADC 
member state, it expressed its dissatisfaction with South Africa’s approach under SADC. 
COMESA sent an election monitoring team to Zimbabwe comprising Ambassador Bethuel 
Kiplagat and 27 observers drawn from COMESA member states (Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, 
Mauritius, Seychelles, Uganda, and Zambia) including civil society organisations accredited to 
COMESA.
801
 However, COMESA could also be seen as side-stepping SADC and giving into 
Zimbabwe’s overtures. In 2014, COMESA’s electoral monitoring regional team led successful 
observer electoral missions, among others, to Malawi in May 2014. The legal framework in 
Malawi was based on COMESA’s international, continental and regional standards, governing 
the conduct of democratic elections. COMESA has been working closely with the AU’s 2002 
Principles of Governing Democratic Elections, the African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and 
Governance, as well as adopting SADC’s Principles and Guidelines in Governing Democratic 
Elections.
802
    
 
COMESA worked extensively with the Intergovernmental Authority on Development by drawing 
support from IGAD to resolve conflicts in South Sudan, Egypt, and Ethiopia, while COMESA 
was adopting its own conflict early warning system. These systems are still a work in progress. 
The conflict styles adopted by most African leaders, when resources and state apparatus are 
threatened, are through using force through military actions, fuelling rebel groups and inciting 
violence.
803
 For example, in 2013, former Egyptian president, Mohamed Morsi, invited state 
leaders from Ethiopia and Sudan to discuss a tripartite Egypt–Ethiopia–Sudan commission in 
Ethiopia’s efforts to build a hydropower dam of $4.2 billion to produce electricity. The source of 
the water was from the Blue Nile River, which both Sudan and Egypt depend on for water.
804
 The 
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completion of the hydro dam construction would make Ethiopia Africa’s biggest producer of 
electricity when completed in 2017.
805
 Egypt had plans of sabotaging the hydro dam in Ethiopia 
by aiding rebels inside Ethiopia.
806
 But since the dam constituted no serious threat to the flow of 
water reaching Egypt and Sudan, leaders could resolve their water conflict amicably.                
 
In February 2014 a COMESA meeting of the Council of Ministers,
807
 commended the DRC for 
its efforts to restore peace and security in the Eastern DRC and the victory of the Forces armées 
de la République démocratique du Congo/Armed Forces of the DRC (FARDC) - greatly assisted 
by South Africa, Tanzania and Malawi - over M23 rebel factions. COMESA urged Kinshasa to 
expedite the regional peace, security and cooperation framework commitments of disarmament, 
demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants. At the same Summit meeting, COMESA 
commended Burundi for its efforts to resolve its land disputes and encouraged the Burundian 
government to create a space for political actors from exile to participate in formal national 
politics. But these countries are experiencing continuous corruption in their countries with 
exploitation of resources and undermining of their respective constitutions as was discussed 
above.
808
 These gestures by COMESA, shows that regional communities have turned a blind eye 
to bad governance of member states as well as non-adherence to government constitutions.  
SADC on the other hand was set up from the start of its creation as a security mechanism as was 
discussed in chapter 3 and is at a more advance stage in terms of its regional security mechanism 
than COMESA. The SADC Summit launched the SADC Brigade in Lusaka, Zambia in August 
2007, as a regional and multidimensional peace support operation.  
 
COMESA had been battling to attract funding for its governance programme and therefore could 
not continue the work in this area.
809
 COMESA’s secretariat, like SADC’s secretariat, is largely 
dependent on donor funding and is only able to implement programmes that attract funding. 
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Funding assistance for the COMESA–EAC–SADC bloc to be effective in its continued efforts to 
fight piracy on the shores of especially Kenya, Seychelles, Madagascar, and Mauritius.
810
 
COMESA believes that maritime security can significantly benefit integration for the entire 
region.
811
 COMESA and SADC’s member states’ maritime security framework was provided 
with the assistance of donor funds from the EU, in March 2013.
812
 The International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) reported 237 attacks on ships in 2011; 75 attacks on ships in 2012; and 13 
incidences of piracy for the first three quarters of 2014.  
 
The decrease in incidences and attacks on Africa’s shores are believed to be due to the 
implementation of “Best Management Practices for Protection against Somalia-Based Piracy”.813 
Maritime security is important for both the US and the EU. For example, the United States have 
up to 90 percent of regional trade volumes transmitted by maritime transport and that is linked to 
its AGOA trade relations with COMESA and SADC. The United Nations spends $139 million to 
counter each attack on sea and the estimates from 2011 to 2014 were $3.2 billion.
814
 Security was 
also imperative to secure Europe’s trade in goods by sea. COMESA was able to launch a 
programme to fight piracy with EU pledged funds, of 37.5 million euros to implement a 
comprehensive programme to fight piracy in the Indian Ocean.
815
  
 
6.4 Conclusion 
 
The chapter expanded on the regional security complex framework theory, which provided a 
detailed analysis regarding the security issues, and also provided assistance in understanding 
security complexities. The chapter expanded on the main conflict drivers in the two regions over 
recent years (2008–2015), the convergence years of COMESA and SADC. The chapter further 
expanded on the conflict problem countries which were confined to three RECs: COMESA, EAC 
and SADC. Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, and the DRC are member states of COMESA and of the 
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EAC, and the DRC is a member state of SADC. These three regions, including member states of 
the EAC, were able to galvanise efforts and form a peacekeeping initiative against the violence in 
their regions. The main conflict parties are also member states of the ICGLR. The chapter further 
discussed how COMESA and SADC managed security issues in their regions and provided 
specific case studies confined to the recent regional conflicts. The regional security complexes of 
the Eastern and Southern African regions discussed above is explained by Buzan and Wæver’s 
regional security complex theory, which defines “a group of states whose primary security 
concerns are sufficiently closely linked so that their national security cannot realistically be 
considered apart from one another”816 – but kept together either by the negative or positive 
security links among such states. As was discussed in this section, some of these actors take on 
more than one role or possibly interchangeable roles to serve their self-interest. Hence, the 
chapter identified the RSC theory as a gap in explaining the convergence of COMESA and 
SADC in managing regional security, which the neorealist security convergence theory deployed 
helped to explain. As was noted that neorealists defines the hegemonic state as a powerful, strong 
economy that sets the rules of the game and has a greater advantage over its partner states and 
exerts considerable power.
817
 The chapter outlined the importance of the hegemonic state in 
security convergence and South Africa’s role, even though at times its regional support was due 
to state self-interests.     
 
The chapter recognised that multiple memberships of member states have assisted COMESA and 
SADC in their growing regional security convergence resulted in the establishment of the Force 
Intervention Brigade in 2013. The chapter recognises that a more equitable division of labour is 
needed between COMESA and SADC with regard to security. Both COMESA and SADC deal 
with security challenges of member states that concern both blocs. There is no proper 
coordination of division of labour and member states can choose which organisation to approach 
that best suits their political interests. Like COMESA, SADC reports on the DRC; M23 rebels; 
and the Egypt/Sudan/Ethiopia water conflict. For example, at a 13th COMESA Committee 
meeting on Peace and Security held in Lusaka from 6–7 November 2013, COMESA reported on 
the M23 rebel situation in the DRC (also a SADC  member) – a peacekeeping initiative 
undertaken by SADC – as well as on the collaborative, coordinated and sustained efforts in the 
Great Lakes Region. The COMESA bloc managed the 2013 elections of its members: Kenya, 
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Madagascar, Swaziland, and Rwanda. COMESA’s Committee of Elders had been engaging the 
AU’s High-Level Panel in implementing a roadmap and new constitution for Egypt’s 
government. The COMESA, EAC and Indian Ocean region bloc have been more severely 
affected by piracy due to proximity with Somalia and the huge piracy problems on the shores of 
Somalia as discussed above. SADC had been affected to a lesser degree and has focused more on 
resolving the conflict in the DRC and working closely with the ICGLR.  
 
There have been instances where countries relapse into war and conflict such as in Burundi and 
the DRC. Besides peacekeeping initiatives, COMESA and SADC should find effective strategies 
of involving the UN in effective post-conflict reconstruction efforts and peace-building 
interventions that address the root causes of conflicts and that deal with such triggers effectively, 
such as setting up good governance and institutional structures. Acharya’s observations is of 
relevance to this chapter (as was indicated in the conceptual framework) of regional security 
which define security complexes as a national threat, which is a very strong indicator of the 
important determinants of security interdependence.
818
 Acharya makes an important distinction 
between regional security complexes, and notes that external powers are perceived differently 
within the region, and could fall between the categories of guarantor, while others can be seen as 
adversarial. Therefore, in designing a regional policy, what ought to be considered is reworking 
the relations and understandings of different outside powers. Such considerations should 
incorporate creating a “common non-intervention regime” applicable to all outside powers, which 
may be persuaded to sign agreements in declaring a region a zone of peace, and also commit 
themselves to non-interference.
819
 The next chapter focuses on providing an overview and 
analysis, as well as recommendations in concluding the thesis.   
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Chapter 7 
 
Conclusion 
 
7.1 Overview of thesis  
 
This thesis addressed the convergence of two regional economic organisations: the Common 
Market for Eastern and Southern African States and the Southern African Development 
Community. It gave a retrospective view to help understand why the 2008 Tripartite Agreement 
with the East African Community, namely the COMESA–EAC–SADC 2008 Tripartite 
Agreement was reached, and what relations have evolved since then. It also expanded on the 
impact that SACU has had on the Tripartite Agreement. Throughout the thesis discussions, it 
recognised the role that hegemony had played in COMESA and SADC’s rationalisation period of 
1980-1997; during its convergence period of 1998-2008 and leading up to the Tripartite 2008 
Agreement; as well as during the period 2008-2015 leading up to the Tripartite Grand FTA.  
 
The main discussions posed in the thesis addressed: Why did the two organisations come into 
existence? How similar and different were they? What were the relations between them before 
their contemplating convergence? What led to the convergence process? How far has that process 
progressed to date and why has more not been achieved? This background information to the 
thesis was introduced in chapter 1.  
 
The thesis primarily used the neoclassical economic approach in its discussion on the divergence 
and convergence debates, and the neorealist approach in its discussions on regional integration, 
multiple memberships, and security. While, the neoclassical economic approach defines how 
open markets function within these two blocs and the polarisation of infant industries, the thesis 
underscores that the neoclassical economic approach cannot be wished away, since it is part of 
the reality of the real world – that of open trade and markets. Furthermore, the neoclassical 
economic approach is viewed by Africa’s governments as a good approach for developing 
countries, as this is what globalisation dictates – open markets and open trade through the WTO 
and former GATT frameworks. However, this approach also dictates that price distortions in 
trade and tariff adjustments and settings be removed among member states in a regional group, as 
well as trade policies be harmonised, COMESA and SADC member states have been challenged 
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with market and price distortions amidst infant industries and poorer economies. The assumption 
within these two blocs were that mobility of trade, labour, and capital could strengthen poor 
economies. However, the thesis noted that with trade liberalisation and open markets, unequal 
growth has been a consequence.  
 
Hence, while neoclassical economics has a primary focus of growing poorer economies through 
open markets, there may also be unequal growth that occurs during such a process and the reverse 
will occur - poverty not growth. The thesis also noted that this theory does not adequately take 
into account the effects of the principles of trade that are linked to international policy and 
whether in liberalised trade circumstances divergence or convergence between North–South 
liberal trade arrangements and South–South trade relations will occur. The thesis notes that the 
Tripartite bloc should therefore consider finalising its Trade In Services Agreement with the 
World Trade Organization under the general agreement on tariffs and trade, Article V, as also 
discussed in the thesis, so that RECS are able to benefit from external linkages. Currently, SACU 
and SADC are signed up under GATT (now WTO) Article XXIV, and COMESA and EAC under 
the Enabling Clause to the Committees on Regional Trade Agreements and Trade and 
Development.
820
 External trade is important – but the negotiation strategy must focus on putting 
the Tripartite bloc’s needs up front to benefit its member states.   
 
Based on the discussion which outlined the roles, objectives and major regional roles of 
COMESA and SADC, this thesis posits that a grand FTA for the Tripartite bloc would benefit 
regional trade in terms of building industries and a solid regional manufacturing base. 
Manufacturing and industrialisation partnerships could further foster endogenous growth factors 
like technology transfer, skills development, research, and education. 
  
African countries invariably gained independence with economies that spent a large part of their 
resources on the production of export commodities. Hence, the thesis further argued that the 
reality is that the region builders (government leaders) have not sufficiently merged policies of 
trade and policies of migration (labour). The thesis highlighted that instead, Africa’s regional 
                                                 
820
 Trade Law Centre for Southern Africa (Tralac), From Cape To Cairo: Making the Tripartite Free Trade Area 
Work (Stellenbosch, South Africa: Tralac, 2011), pp. 14-155. See also, Osabuohien Evans and Efobi Uchenna, 
“Trade Outcomes in Africa’s Regional Economic Communities and Institutional Quality: Some Policy 
Prescriptions”, Petroleum – Gas University of Ploiesti Bulletin, Technical Serie, vol. 64, issue 4 (October 2012), 
<http://connection.ebscohost.com/c/articles/90515682/trade-outcomes-africas-regional-economic-communities-
institutional-quality-some-policy-prescriptions>. 
250 
 
integration processes have adopted a market-led strategy of free trade – a neoclassical economic 
approach of open markets that worked against the principles of variable geometry, which the 
COMESA–EAC–SADC have adopted as a mechanism and framework designed to protect 
smaller economies and infant industries. These policies are also still being negotiated.  
 
The convergence debates outlined that economic growth models can favour free trade, as was 
demonstrated in chapter 5 in regional groups. Countries in SACU were able to achieve economic 
growth through more external trade that favoured eliminating discriminatory policies. 
Endogenous growth factors of industrialisation, technology and knowledge-driven production 
could be enhanced. In considering these growth models, the thesis found that convergence could 
be achieved, and in time poorer countries benefited from more advanced trade with the presence 
of a regional hegemon or a stronger state in a regional scheme, like SACU.
821
 However, while 
these factors have promoted growth for SACU’s weaker economies, it has caused divergence for 
the Tripartite FTA as was substantiated in chapter 5.    
 
The thesis also underscored that multiple memberships have brought regions closer, as was 
identified in the security composition of SADC, COMESA, and the EAC in terms of the Great 
Lakes Region. Mechanisms for strengthening the linkage between national, regional and 
continental efforts in conflict prevention and mediation should be considered at the AU and 
RECs levels. The thesis thus recommended that a regional structural conflict prevention 
framework could enhance regional and continental leadership for the maintenance of peace and 
security. This initiative would be a key opportunity to harmonise regional experiences and 
complementary action by national governments and construct consensus-building processes.
822
  
In the discussion on security, the thesis noted that there have been instances where countries 
relapse into war and conflict such as in Burundi and the DRC. Hence, besides peacekeeping 
initiatives, COMESA and SADC should find effective strategies of involving the UN in effective 
post-conflict reconstruction efforts and peace-building interventions that address the root causes 
of conflicts and that deal with such triggers effectively, such as setting up good governance and 
institutional structures. Similarly, assisting building infrastructure such as roads, railways, 
schools, hospitals, and sanitation (running water) should be improved, with a greater focus on 
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building socio-economic conditions that could benefit the country’s economic growth. RECs 
should also call on external donors and the international community to assist in post-conflict 
reconstruction. This could address humanitarian assistance; refugees; repatriation; political, 
economic and social structures; and most importantly, disarmament, demobilisation, 
disintegration, and reintegration of ex-combatants and militia groups into their communities. 
 
7.2 Conceptualisation of chapters and findings 
 
Chapter 2:  
 
In chapter 2, the thesis provided the historical dimensions of regional integration in Africa, which 
centred on the EU’s success at economic integration. Soon after independence, Africa believed 
that it could adopt a similar regional integration model to assist its weak economies that was 
plagued by post-colonialism and aspired to achieving regional integration by strengthening 
Africa’s cooperation between economies. Region builders in Africa further evolved from the 
OAU that defined regional integration as a vehicle for states to build regional institutions. 
UNECA was seen as the master builder and another catalyst to Africa’s integration, but it was a 
paper plan and concept that has not fully succeeded amidst the reality of Africa’s own political 
economy of sovereign states holding onto power. The PTA which later became COMESA, was 
advanced by UNECA to promote trade liberalisation and state cooperation in specialised 
development industries. Concepts of “old” and “new” regionalism were provided by various 
scholars like Asante, Akokpari, and others such as Warleigh Lack that explained the new and old 
regional processes. These views articulated regionalism seen as processes that have evolved from 
being state led, to constituting important dimensions of global restructuring processes. Therefore, 
new regionalism was viewed to have evolved from the continuous transformation processes of 
the global political economy that developed within regions and included state actors and non-
state actors such as MNCs and TNCs. Such entities forged new alliances alongside national, 
regional, and international institutions and governments.  
 
Chapter 2 further defined the regionalisation processes and highlighted the evolving regional role 
caused by the difficulties experienced in the regions. Earlier studies between 1980 and 1990 
conducted on economic growth contributed to the divergence and convergence debate. These 
studies suggested a more neo-liberal approach of outward-looking market processes that would 
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lead to convergence of regional per capita incomes over the long run. For Africa, neoclassical 
economics was believed to be the safeguard mechanism against policy-induced distortions and 
non-market failures of the Structural Adjustment Programme policies implemented in African 
economies during the 1980s and 1990s. Hence the neoclassical economic approach was viewed 
by Africa’s governments as a good approach for developing countries. The approach indicated 
that price distortions in trade should be removed among member states in a regional group and 
trade policies harmonised. But as Phillip Nying’uro argued, global trends in the political and 
economic global order had been mainly associated with free-market driven liberalisation 
processes. Nying’uro holds the view that the capitalist global order has been more diverging than 
converging.
823
 Hettne’s view of new regionalism captured both globalisation and regionalisation, 
which he noted to be part of a larger process of structural changes that included economic, 
political, social, and cultural aspects. Whereas the old regionalism was a more top-down 
approach, the new wave of regionalism involved more diverse actors, which was more of a 
spontaneous process within each region.  
 
Chapter 3:  
 
In Chapter 3 the thesis highlighted that the PTA’s “functional” regionalism focused on economic 
integration, while SADCC’s regional cooperation was important to address the legacy of South 
Africa’s regional destabilisation policies. COMESA and SADC’s rationalisation processes 
further underscored the major competition for donor resources and foreign direct investments, 
with each region competing for institutional and political relevance. Regional institutions were to 
serve as vehicles that could strengthen the state; simultaneously, sovereign capacity was viewed 
as an important factor in regional integration and economic cooperation.  
 
Chapter 3 expanded on the historical perspective on the formation of these two RECs: COMESA 
and SADC as well as their evolving relations and reasons for remaining separate institutions from 
the 1970s until 2008. Both RECs received little support from the OAU, which had one of its key 
principles “non-interference in the internal affairs of its member states”, which meant sovereignty 
trumped security, politics and economics.
824
 Both COMESA and SADC have had devastating 
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histories of wars and endemic poverty. Though both were afflicted by various regional intra- and 
inter-state conflicts, the two RECs begun their existence from very different bases. SADC was 
formed to fight for the liberation of the region and against apartheid. COMESA was created out 
of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa and for economic and trade reasons and 
to liberalise trade. COMESA sought to create a zone of free trade and largely focused on issues 
related to socio-economic aspects of its member states and had a weak security mechanism. 
SADC focused on security and state survival. During the rationalisation period, in 1997, member 
states were given a choice to join either organisation as their sovereign right.
825
 In 1998, the 
SADC region was neither in a position to merge with COMESA, nor sign any trade agreements, 
owing to internal factors such as restructuring of the organisation and external factors concerning 
intra-state conflicts, for example in the DRC. The thesis also argued that like COMESA, SADC 
too made regional integration membership easy for its member states, in allowing those member 
states with bilateral and multilateral trade agreements to continue with the trade agreements they 
were linked to.
826
 South Africa joined SADC in 1994 and viewed by the region as a strong state 
to assist in increasing regional trade, building SADC’s SDIs and increasing regional investments. 
The rationalisation process also considered the Tripartite Common Monetary Area (between 
South Africa, Lesotho, Swaziland, and Namibia) and was seen as a means that could inform 
implementation of a unified exchange rate structure for SADC in the future. The CMA was 
viewed as a possible vehicle to facilitate financial integration for SADC member states and 
alleviate the debt burden and fiscal deficits. But, as Maria Ramos, (former CEO of the Reserve 
Bank of South Africa) had explained at the Brussels regional integration meeting in 1995,827 (as 
was discussed in chapter 3) that SADC was not in a position to implement macroeconomic 
convergence policies due to the fragile nature of its economies.  
 
Chapter 4 
 
In chapter four, the thesis expanded on the important actors and factors that led to the Tripartite 
Agreement being formed and the convergence era of 1998-2008; and 2009-2015.  South Africa 
was identified as one of the important actors that championed the convergence of COMESA and 
SADC in 2008 and the signing of the Tripartite Agreement. The thesis discussed the importance 
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of hegemony in regional integration and expanded on South Africa’s hegemonic role that had 
taken on multiple roles to tackle its own socio-economic inequalities in its domestic situation. 
South Africa adopted a market-driven integration approach through SADC as a vehicle,
828
 and 
secondly a micro-regional development-led integration in using two of SADC’s four Spatial 
Development Initiatives. These two approaches entailed enhancing transport projects in a micro-
region with Mozambique through the formation of the Maputo Development Corridor, and 
electrical power generation through the creation of the Southern African Power Pool. Chapter 
four outlined the strength of South Africa’s economy. The country had the largest economy 
regionally in terms of total GDP of $128 billion in 2000 and by 2010 a total GDP of $228 
billion;
829
 South Africa’s post-apartheid government post 1994 had major set-backs in dealing 
with its socio-economic disparities.
830
 The thesis further expanded on the neo-realist approach in 
discussing a hegemonic state in a regional bloc and the effects that such role had on regional 
convergence.  While South Africa had invested regionally, its MNCs were seen as exploiting the 
region. The region had not established effective measures such as regional policies that could 
guard over infant industries and that could address oligopolistic behaviour of exploitative 
industries.  
 
Chapter 4 also discussed the various attempts made by COMESA and SADC to converge 
regional trade policies. These attempts were driven by the continental body defining the Abuja 
Treaty in 1991. Due to the infrastructural regional gap, COMESA and SADC agreed in 1994 to 
participate in establishing an African Economic Community by 2028. Similarly, the 
Yamoussoukro Decision of 1999 for a liberalised airspace for these two regions, which received 
funding and captured the attention of the East African Community in 2005, brought COMESA 
and SADC together. This paved the way for the creation of the Tripartite Task Force in 2006, 
which attempted to harmonise policies in trade and infrastructure. The US’s support for a 
liberalised airspace through the OAU and later the AU continued, and was an opportunity for 
Africa’s states to have a viable infrastructure mechanism that could solve the major non-tariff 
barrier of poor infrastructure and issues that concerned roads, ports, and railways, which severely 
hampered inter-regional trade. The thesis explained that various agreements must still be 
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negotiated in terms of   harmonising of policy instruments and trade policies, processes and 
procedures, internal and external tariffs, rules of origin and customs documents for exporters and 
importers; consideration of phytosanitary health measures and safety; and elimination of tariff 
barriers. Since the signing of the Tripartite FTA with only half of its members, the Tripartite bloc 
is not at the stage of negotiations to consider macroeconomic convergence. 
 
The linkages of micro-regions were further developed in 2013 by South Africa’s Transnet 
company. This development included port and rail operators in Swaziland and Mozambique in 
order to increase rail freight capacity. These countries developed the MDC Joint Operating 
Centre. The MDC JOC was a major milestone for these three countries: Swaziland, Mozambique, 
and South Africa. Through micro-regions, more trade and movement of traders were enhanced, 
and functional spillovers in transport were gained. Thesis explained that rail transport had been 
more reliable than road transport in the region, owing to vehicle accidents with poorly serviced 
roads with 30 percent of roads paved on the entire continent. Problematic border controls have 
delayed trade, and the thesis argues that the Tripartite bloc should focus more on rail and less on 
road transport. For example, the South African-based Shoprite franchise reported in 2010 that for 
each day that one of its trucks was delayed at a border, it cost the company $500.
831
   
 
While workable infrastructure is critical in pursuing region-building and regional integration for 
the Tripartite bloc, equally important is the concentration of the transport infrastructure monopoly 
holders, where South Africa plays a key role in its Transnet (freight railway carrier) structure. 
The country has several areas of monopoly over regional transport areas. For example, the South 
African government’s tariff pricing for freight is still reflective of support for import substitution 
and cross-price subsidisation. Freight prices are similarly seen to be placing smaller labour-
intensive industries at a disadvantage. According to the World Bank’s 2014 report: “Port tariffs 
on containers were 360 percent of the global average in 2012, while on bulk commodities they 
were 19–43 percent below the global average. [However], [r]ail freight tariffs on iron ore were 
below US prices while those on general freight businesses are 4–7 times higher.”832 Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin also suggest governments should place more emphasis on institutions to achieve 
economic growth. Sovereign states have also become important in formulating rules for 
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economic activity, as “referees” that ensure compliance with the rules of the market, and as 
“provider[s] of infrastructure”.833 
 
Chapter 4 also discussed how the Tripartite bloc could converge its policies in enhancing its 
comparative advantage.  The chapter noted that the EU”s common agricultural policy, was a step 
ahead and disadvantaged the COMESA and SADC agricultural market. The thesis outlined two 
examples that the COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite bloc could possibly consider when 
addressing how to improve its own agricultural market. Sugar production was used as one 
example.  
 
Chapter 5 
 
Chapter 5 discussed multiple memberships of member states and was explained in Table 5.1 of 
the chapter. Multiple regional commitments ensued among COMESA and SADC member states 
belonging to other regional economic communities for both political and economic reasons. 
Moreover, the thesis noted that these two blocs are yet to finalise their own policies on rules of 
origin. The thesis therefore notes that the negative effects of trade have further entrenched 
multiple memberships, since states are more focused on guarding their weaker industries.  The 
thesis discussed the conflicting responses to regional trade accompanying the reality of 
globalisation and domestic market factors, which fragmented and distorted regional trade 
agreements. The chapter outlined that initially regional integration efforts of the three RECs – 
COMESA, EAC, and SADC – have been largely driven by the diplomatic efforts of their 
Secretariats. The success of these diplomatic efforts bore fruit with the first Tripartite Summit 
that took place in Uganda on 20 October 2008. Even though the EAC joined the Tripartite 2008 
Agreement, the EAC nevertheless established its own regional trade mechanism among its 
member states, and still sets its own tariffs. The thesis noted that RECs at the sub-regional level 
have also undertaken a linear approach of economic integration that comprise suppressing some 
form of discrimination through removal of trade barriers. As Lamy,
834
 suggested (as was outlined 
in chapter 2), that there is a tendency among academics to apply analytical frameworks and linear 
models that are 50 years out of date. Such models prove that regional integration processes begin 
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with a FTA and proceed to a customs union, a common market, and a monetary union, which 
lead to a political union. The linear models do not correspond to today’s world, hence there are 
various processes and degrees of integration globally. The thesis recognised that “doubling up” of 
efforts compound regional integration efforts for the Tripartite bloc. The same processes are 
repeated at the regional level. The thesis recognised that while it is important having regional 
integration policies that are aligned at the national, sub-regional and the Tripartite levels, the 
implementation of a FTA at individual REC level is duplicating efforts and distracting from the 
Tripartite FTA.
835
        
 
 In explaining the multiple roles of a hegemonic state, the thesis expanded on Robert Putnam’s 
“two-level game” model (as was outlined in chapter 2’s conceptual framework). This model 
helped explained how state capital of hegemonic states influenced the pace of economic and 
regional growth. This model was able to assist the discussion expand on the inward-looking and 
regionally-focused policies of South Africa. Similarly, Friedmann’s theory in the conceptual 
framework outlined in chapter 2, helped the thesis to conceptualise the debate on the unequal 
nature of growth defined in his world systems theory. This theory highlighted the fact that the 
core could be seen to be dependent on the periphery through market exploitation, creating a 
“periphery of the periphery” (with poor, vulnerable and resource-depleted economies). 
 
The thesis noted that a hegemonic state must be able to derive benefits from integration so that it 
is able to continue supporting the integration process. As was discussed in the thesis that at the 
beginning of 2000, an estimated 60 percent of South Africa’s total exports went to the OECD 
markets and constituted mainly trade with Europe. But in the next decade, from 2000 to 2010, 
South Africa’s exports to the EU and to OECD slowly started stagnating and exports from the 
South African market went to Africa’s markets. South Africa’s inward-oriented approach and the 
shift to concentrate more on Africa’s market was outlined by the findings of the World Bank in 
1988 concerning the quality in its manufacturing (as was shown in figure 3.2 in chapter 3). The 
thesis built on this discussion and the assessment made 16 years later in the World Bank’s 2014 
report (discussed in chapter 4). The 2014 report suggested that since South Africa is a major 
minerals producer and exporter of metal-based manufactured goods, it has opportunities for 
export expansion and for offering scope to countries in moving to higher quality (and thus higher 
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value) and greater variety, both across and within stages of production which could build 
industries across the region.  
With regional economies not performing well as was discussed in chapter 5, several smaller 
economies have become dependent on other forms and ways of economic growth to protect their 
infant industries, which have further entrenched the notion of multiple memberships with 
member states trying to protect their economies and infant industries. These distortions in trade 
were adequately explained by Gatthi, Panagariya, and Bhagwati.
836
 Distorting mechanisms 
included: signing external trade agreements with the US (AGOA trade agreements); and EU 
(EPAs). Similarly, the thesis established that these external trade agreements have also proven to 
challenge economic growth. According to Panagariya, states are also simultaneously trying to 
circumvent or replace the non-discriminatory MFN tariff associated with the WTO regulations.
837
 
External trade agreements have their own rules of origin that exploited COMESA and SADC’s 
markets and affected trade negatively within the COMESA and SADC blocs. As was pointed out 
in chapter 5 that price distortions and market inflations hinder competitiveness of downstream 
industries in value adding into products and for companies dependent on inputting into larger 
firms’ outputs.838 Moreover, trade policies that reduce the profitability of exporting and that 
favour established industries and firms, raises the costs of inputs for downstream sectors. 
 
In discussing how multiple memberships are managed by the Tripartite bloc and their member 
states, the thesis recognises SACU as diverging integration for the Tripartite bloc. The thesis also 
noted that poorer economies are finding means and ways of protecting their industries like the 
ones in SACU. Therefore, only two of its member states signed the Tripartite Free Trade Area on 
10 June 2015, namely: Namibia and Swaziland. Moreover all SACU member states are 
negotiating a new SADC EPA with the EU in 2016. The thesis assessed SACU’s trade relations 
and provided findings that show how the market economy of the core can grow to create a larger 
periphery or a semi-periphery and hence deriving benefits from the SACU Agreement.  
 
The key theory used was that of beta-convergence of Barro and Sala-i-Martin in terms of north–
south trade that takes into account South Africa (as a high-income partner relative to the world) 
and smaller economies within the SACU bloc (as low-income countries forming an FTA with a 
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high-income partner). Barro and Sala-i-Martin provided a further understanding of economic 
growth convergence as a result of trade liberalisation by describing two levels of convergence in 
their model: beta-convergence, or absolute convergence (also called the “catch-up” process), and 
sigma-convergence, when the dispersion among a group of countries decreases over time.
839
 
South Africa, in total trade as a percentage of GDP, provided evidence for beta-convergence over 
the long-run period of 2005–2013. Chapter 5 specified that while Botswana and Namibia have 
experienced growth in trade; this does not indicate divergence, but instead demonstrates that 
these two countries have grown more as smaller economies belonging to an FTA with a strong 
partner (namely South Africa). Venables’ theory of south–south and north–south trade predicated 
that conducting trade with a stronger economic partner that trades more with stronger external 
economies, could benefit the smaller economies within a regional grouping. Also identified in the 
discussion and findings was that while SACU is not a regional economic community recognised 
by the Abuja Treaty of 1991 and the AU, it is a new regional mechanism that could converge the 
regions through its negotiation skills, its access to BRICS, the EU, and US, and its strong security 
mechanisms endowed through South Africa. Currently negotiations include all the larger markets 
with which SACU does not share an FTA, notably the EAC, in particular Kenya, and also Egypt.    
 
The thesis also highlighted that the pace and intentions of regional integration of the Tripartite 
bloc – COMESA–EAC–SADC – provide an indication of how regional integration will fare. 
Moreover, such factors include skills and education; labour migration; infrastructure such as 
transport and communications; and trade and finance, among others. Therefore Panagariya 
outlined that the complexity of regional integration is daunting even in the absence of trade 
barriers and “crisscrossing FTAs lead to a replacement of non-discriminatory MFN tariffs by a 
spaghetti bowl whereby tariffs vary according to ostensible origin of the product”.840   
 
With ten landlocked member states within the Tripartite bloc, infrastructure gaps have remained a 
challenge for the bloc. Most of the economies of the 26 members remain small.
841
  The thesis 
concurred that trade is not the only means of binding states to agreements since without workable 
infrastructure for landlocked countries particularly, it is equally impossible to achieve economic 
growth if there were no viable means of transport to conduct trade. Transportation costs for trade 
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facilitation are also expensive for the member states of the COMESA–EAC–SADC Tripartite 
bloc. States may see benefits in having more than one trade agreement. Gathii indicated the 
importance of accessing commodities through waterway transportation, as the largest river basins 
globally are found in Africa. Multiple memberships therefore provide alternative access to 
landlocked countries. Regional trade agreements shift to where the benefits are. Gathii has noted, 
“African RTAs also serve as institutions of basin management demonstrating the entwined 
relationships among trade, environment, and security aspects of international river basins.”842  
Therefore, numerous trade agreements are related to the limited access of trade routes for 
landlocked countries and the competition in relation to transport costs in regional trade in Africa. 
Similarly, as had been claimed by Kalenga,
843
 that trade barriers in the COMESA–EAC–SADC 
Tripartite bloc have also contributed to the lack of effective trade. These trade barriers included 
451 different TBs reported in April 2013, such as, lengthy and costly customs procedures –issues 
related to rules of origin; costly road user charges; and issues related to phytosanitary issues.  
 
Therefore, the importance of infrastructure development for regional integration was viewed as 
critical to the thesis discussion, since currently more trade is being conducted externally due to 
the absence of reliable infrastructure. The neo-classical model purporting that trade liberalisation 
in regional blocs with a hegemonic partner, such as in the SACU configuration, can spur 
economic growth and result in the members of such a grouping converging over the long run, is 
based on such an approach.  
 
Finally, in chapter five the thesis highlighted that main impediments for convergence is the fact 
that the Tripartite bloc has also adopted a market-led strategy of free trade – a neoclassical 
economic approach of open markets, and relaxed tariffs, amidst multilateral international 
agreements that is in contrast to the principles of variable geometry of protecting member states 
against discriminatory free trade. Hence, the forces of globalisation of open markets and trade 
create a contradiction for the Tripartite Agreement’s regional integration approaches.  
 
The thesis noted that these contradictions are not adequately supported within the neoclassical 
economic approach theory of open trade and regional integration divergence and convergence 
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debates discussed in the theory and conceptual literature reviewed. The thesis identified this as a 
gap in relation to the theories and deployed a new theory in support of the literature reviewed in 
this chapter, defined as: neoclassical economic regional integration in supporting the findings that 
were provided in chapter 5.  
 
Chapter 6 
 
In building on the discussion of the violent conflict and the wars of the apartheid regime that 
ended in 1994, the thesis also addressed the complex nature of regional security. Expanded on 
was Buzan and Wæver’s844 writing on regional security that outline “the possibility of 
systematically linking the study of internal conditions, relations among units in the region, 
relations between regions, and the interplay of regional dynamics with globally acting 
powers”.845 The thesis demonstrates convergence of regional security between these blocs which 
include COMESA, EAC, and SADC. In discussing the complex security scenarios of their 
member states, the chapter also provides examples of security convergence between the two 
blocs, and includes the member states of the EAC. 
 
The neoclassical realism approach was an appropriate theory to use in the thesis in helping to 
understand and examine the interactions of powerful member states, since the neoclassical 
realism approach incorporates both domestic and systemic factors and explains how COMESA 
and SADC manage regional security. Buzan and Wæver’s theory assisted this discussion 
considerably in providing a framework of how to deal with security through COMESA and 
SADC’s peace and security mechanisms.  
 
As Buzan and Wæver’s theory also suggested, socio-economic, political and security factors 
internally and extra-regionally cannot be ignored. The chapter outlined the difficult period for the 
regional groups immediately after the Rwandan genocide that killed 800 000 people in 1994. The 
Rwandan rebels then fuelled conflict in the DRC with Uganda and Rwanda also supporting rebels 
in the DRC. This was discussed in terms of the recent 2013–2015 Great Lakes region’s intra- and 
inter-state conflicts. Current wars have centred on the exploitation of minerals such as diamonds 
and cobalt, among others.  
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The thesis posits that security remains a challenge for both COMESA and SADC. The new wave 
of regional integration has become complex, with various dynamics of state and border conflicts, 
involving intra- and inter-state conflicts, piracy in East Africa, and the emergence of rebel 
groups. There has been a resurgence of violence and abuse against women and children, as well 
as an influx of child soldiers in Eastern and Southern Africa. These violent conflicts have 
precipitated changes to the traditional methods of peacekeeping and having regional economic 
communities fending for themselves in the light of an absent continental African Standby Force. 
While South Africa had taken the lead in implementing sub-regional peace and security, its 
former mediation strategy in the 1990s did not always bear fruit. Middle powers like Zimbabwe, 
Namibia, and Angola bypassed South Africa in 1998 and militarily intervened in the DRC 
conflict.  
 
What has been foregrounded is that within the individual regional economic communities, 
regional political dynamics and fragmentation among member states are prevalent. These 
divergences have effected a convergence within the Tripartite bloc, which has been evident in the 
2013–2015 violent conflict in the Great Lakes Region. While Buzan and Wæver’s theory assisted 
the thesis, based on the conceptual literature reviewed in chapter 2, the theory on RSC was not 
able to adequately explain the convergence of COMESA and SADC in managing regional 
security which the literature review identified as a gap. Hence, in support of the literature review 
and to help the thesis’ analysis, the thesis deployed a new theory defined as: neorealist security 
convergence. This theory of neorealist security convergence deployed was able to expand on 
Buzan and Wæver’s regional security complex theory to better understand the complexity of 
regional security. Hence, the analysis in the thesis was able to adequately discuss the security 
convergence among the Tripartite bloc, and a convergence of a security nexus among its member 
states and SADC (Malawi, South Africa, and Tanzania) in establishing an immediate response 
mechanism to help intervene in the DRC conflict and in the Great Lakes Region.   
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7.3 Key policy recommendations 
 
The thesis proposed the following recommendations: 
 
7.3.1 Rules of origin (ROO) 
 
This thesis identified the gaps in the rules of origin of the Tripartite bloc in light of its 14 articles 
that are being negotiated under its roadmap and is outstanding since the signing of the 2008 
Tripartite Agreement.
846
 International relations students and scholars could possibly interrogate 
how ROOs could work for the Tripartite bloc’s future trade negotiations once these agreements 
are signed. The recently negotiated EPA configurations and agreements awaiting finalisation are 
pertinent to the continued success of the Tripartite bloc. The discussion on ROOs was important, 
since at the beginning of the thesis it is claimed that Krugman did not take into consideration 
inputs of production in his accounting index, which the literature review identified as a gap. 
Manufacturing that fosters endogenous growth factors like technology transfer, skills 
development, research, and education is important to enhance trade, since African countries 
invariably gained independence with economies that spent a large part of their resources on the 
production of export commodities. Lesotho, for example, has only been exporting clothing to the 
US under the aegis of AGOA, with no other diversification of goods.  
 
7.3.2 Total Factor Productivity (TFP)    
 
The view from some leading economists is that per capita income can only occur if there is a rise 
in output “per unit of input”, a point which Krugman makes.847 Krugman’s expansion on total 
factor productivity similarly outlines that because capitalist growth is based on growth in both 
inputs and efficiency, efficiency is therefore the median to raise per capita income, and therefore 
it is per capita income that will show an increase through output per unit of input. In expanding 
on endogenous growth factors in industrialisation and value addition of inter-regional trade, the 
thesis employed Dowrick and Duc-Tho Nguyen’s TFP as a catch up variable for downstream 
industries. Hence, aligning such processes will lead to technological advances and total factor 
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productivity. Evidently, and as was discussed in chapter 5, the World Bank’s 2014 report 
outlined South Africa has increased its trade in iron and steel – with a share of level-2 products - 
from 18 percent in 2000 to 57 percent in 2012, all traded to Africa’s markets with the largest 
share of iron ores (ferro alloys) to SACU markets.
848
 To enhance regional value addition 
industrialisation, the thesis notes that this is a good opportunity for the Tripartite bloc to consider 
at policy level how smaller industries could input into South Africa’s semi-manufactured level-2 
products in the region and benefit from total factor productivity. Hence, the Tripartite bloc could 
then consider how “downstream industries can add value into iron and steel products and input 
into larger firms’ outputs”.849   
 
7.3.3 Protecting Tripartite member states’ industries is much more than just variable 
geometry, free trade, and the principle of acquis  
 
A grand continental FTA and customs union have further positive spinoffs, which an enlarged 
market could bring about, such as increased economies of scale, as well as greater political and 
negotiating leverage at international forums. However, benefits for smaller economies will only 
occur on the basis that more trade is conducted and regional hegemons like Kenya and South 
Africa accept more exports from smaller economies into their markets that also support smaller 
industries. The approach of variable geometry implemented by the Tripartite bloc to provide a 
mechanism for smaller vulnerable member states to come on board at a slower pace than other 
members, and trade liberalisation to enhance and conduct more inter-regional trade and 
expanding trade, cannot be implemented without a third approach of a thoroughly negotiated 
agreement with EU’s economic partnership agreements and the African Growth and Opportunity 
Act’s agreement with the US. The thesis identified that variable geometry and trade tariff 
liberalisation are two approaches that are not conducive to convergence of the Tripartite bloc in 
trade.  The variable geometry approach has not sufficiently helped the Tripartite bloc in assisting 
poorer economies to converge to tariff adjustments. The openness of trade liberalisation allows 
international trade to flood the markets of the Tripartite bloc, with no coping mechanism for 
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small, vulnerable industries to withstand the economic shocks associated with loss of industry. 
The SADC EPA is a key example of such an approach, which the thesis recommends.  
 
For example, South Africa refuses to sign the new SADC EPA that will come into effect in 2016 
with Europe, should Brussels not forgo its agricultural subsidies and those on goods that it will 
trade within the new SADC EPA. The EU has now agreed to this. South Africa has been very 
firm in negotiations with the EU because of negative experiences where BLNS was negatively 
affected by the SA–EU Trade Development and Corporation 1999 Agreement and affected the 
South African industries as was discussed in chapter 4. South Africa is adamant not to repeat the 
past. The Tripartite bloc should learn from this negotiation experience and deploy similar 
strategies when negotiating trade agreements with AGOA, in particular in finalising the new 
regional EPAs. The thesis proposes a key recommendation here, that COMESA, the EAC and 
SADC should revisit their trade protocols and agreements and put in place a legal framework that 
fines member states belonging to the blocs that violate the current trade preferences of the 
Tripartite bloc.  Member states that jeopardise the trade liberalisation of agreed goods should also 
be sanctioned.  
 
Liberalising trade agreements with external partners like the US and Europe is important for a 
number of reasons, chiefly in advancing technology and levels of skills. However, trade 
agreements that favour and protect regional trade in both goods and services must be negotiated, 
as the EU has done by protecting its own industries through agricultural subsidies since the 
1950s. As discussed in the thesis, a total of 251 EU geographical indications and 105 South 
African geographical indications have been negotiated.
850
 While external trade is important to 
grow smaller economies in a regional scheme (as was discussed in SACU), but requires a well 
conceived and articulated negotiated agreement. Chapter 5, provided key recommendations on 
how COMESA and SADC (as both institutions and member states) could promote regional 
integration with multiple memberships.  
 
To promote regional integration with multiple memberships, this conclusion proposes the 
consideration of a four-pronged approach for the COMESA–EAC–SADC Tripartite member 
states’ governments: a) The first element of the approach is to factor in a “paymaster”. As South 
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Africa, as a hegemonic state, manages its multiple memberships of the SACU bloc (as shown in 
chapter 5) by incentivising poorer economies through the trade revenue generated in the bloc. 
This has benefited the smaller BLNS economies in SACU. This approach was suggested by 
Walter Mattli - he suggests that a “paymaster” can provide benefits that promote economic 
convergence in a regional grouping.
851
 The findings were: firstly, the hegemonic state in a 
regional grouping must conduct trade with global partners but these relations must be carefully 
balanced.  Secondly, there must be a compensating trade mechanism, such as SACU’s trade 
revenue disbursement mechanism, in compensating smaller economies in the Tripartite bloc so 
that there is a benefit for smaller economies to belong to a trade scheme. Such benefits could also 
consider (as was also discussed in chapter 3) the implementation of a payment mechanism to 
assist member states in facilitating trade such as  COMESA’s Regional Payment and Settlement 
System created to make trade conducive for its member states. REPSS links member states’ 
national payment systems to regional central banks to effect payment and settlement of trade, and 
includes banks in Asia and Europe as well as Africa and viewed as an innovative online system 
with standards based on those of the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial 
Telecommunication. The COMESA clearinghouse serves as the agent of the central banks in 
formulating bilateral agreements that could assist inter-regional trade among the member states.     
 
b) The second element of the approach is recognising the importance of increasing intra-regional 
trade while balancing external trade. Trade must expand across the continent and not for the sake 
of integrating regions. If more amicable relations with more intra-regional trade are to occur, then 
larger economies like South Africa for example, must relax its stringent domestic industrial 
policies, and trade protectionism – for example, its 60 billion rand in yearly subsidies to its motor 
industry – can hamper regional efforts and reinforce multiple memberships.852 For instance, 
Botswana’s hide and leather market is of great value to South Africa’s motor industry for the 
manufacture of car seats and South Africa should continue to guard over this relationship. 
 
c) The third element of the approach is developmental-led regional integration and must be a dual 
benefit for both the hegemonic state and the region. In this instance, the hegemonic state was not 
able to trade manufacturing products (as noted in chapter 3 see figure 3.2) that was not conducive 
for the global market and therefore conducted more trade in the region. Moreover, South Africa, 
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was able to use semi-skilled labour which it has an abundance of for its regional trade, for 
example iron and steel. In-so-doing, South Africa was able to boost jobs. With regards to the 
region, smaller industries can input into South Africa’s level 2 products. However, the Tripartite 
bloc, must carefully formulate policies concerning rules of origin to make such value added trade 
possible for its member states.  The neo-classical growth model also stresses the importance of 
governments’ focus on physical investment in order to expand national outputs. Investment in 
equipment is just as important as investment in transport infrastructure, since equipment is 
critical for technological advancement. Finally, Barro and Sala-i-Martin outline the linkages 
between convergence and the increased economic integration that follows from trade 
liberalisation; educed transport and transaction costs lead to greater “spatial agglomeration” as 
well as specialisation.
853
  South Africa, has done in the MDC – since poor infrastructure capacity 
inevitably affects trade.
854
 Therefore the fourth element of the approach is to strengthen regional 
institutions. SACU is not recognised as a regional economic community by the Abuja Treaty of 
1991, nor by the AU; rather, itis one of the regional mechanisms promoting convergence on the 
continent owing to its negotiation skills; its access to the BRICS, the EU, and the US; and its 
strong security mechanism, which is well endowed through South Africa’s support. Currently, 
SACU is in negotiations with all the larger markets with which SACU does not share an FTA. 
Notably, these include Egypt and Kenya in the EAC. The thesis recognises SACU as becoming 
the new regional integration frontier for Africa.   
 
7.4 Final word 
 
This thesis has addressed key issues that will help shape the future of regional integration in 
Africa. It is hoped that the thesis will strengthen future studies in this area on topics pertinent to 
Africa’s development, and towards sustained and solid economic growth. Although this is the 
first full research study on this topic I am aware of, it is recognised that this thesis has not 
covered every topic of this broad area. More work needs to be done on the process of 
convergence and divergence, and this will become possible when new sources of evidence 
become available. Future academics and students in Africa’s think tanks and universities should 
assess, address and/or expand on the lacunae in this thesis. The conclusions of this study are 
relevant for academic community, policymakers within COMESA, EAC, SADC, and SACU 
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Secretariats and their governments. Other beneficiaries are IGAD, ICGLR, ECCAS, the South 
African government; Africa’s continental bodies, like the AU; important African bodies like 
NEDPAD, the African Development Bank, the Development Bank of Southern Africa, and 
UNECA; the European Union; the United States; and donor communities and civil society actors.   
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